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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD 
June 15, 1970 
The Honorable Thomas 0. Paine 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 20546 
Dear Dr. Paine: 
Pursuant to your directives of April 17 and April 21, 1970, I am 
transmitting the final Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Concurrent with this transmittal, I have recessed the Board, subject 
to call. 
We plan to reconvene later this year when most of the remaining 
special tests have been completed, in order to review the results 
of these tests to determine whether any modifications to our 
findings, determinations, or recommendations are necessary. In 
addition, we will stand ready to reconvene at your request. 
Sincerely yours, 
Edgar M. Cortright 
Chairman 
PREFACE 
The Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's third mission to explore 
the surface of the Moon, is a harsh reminder of the immense difficulty 
of this undertaking. 
The total Apollo system of ground complexes, launch vehicle, and 
spacecraft constitutes the most ambitious and demanding engineering 
development ever undertaken by man. For these missions to succeed, both 
men and equipment must perform to near perfection. That this system has 
already resulted in two successful lunar surface explorations is a tribute 
to those men and women who conceived, designed, built, and flew it. 
Perfection is not only difficult to achieve, but difficult to main- 
tain. The imperfection in Apollo 13 constituted a near disaster, averted 
only by outstanding performance on the part of the crew and the ground 
control team which supported them. 
The Apollo 13 Review Board was charged with the responsibilities 
of reviewing the circumstances surrounding the accident, of establishing 
the probable causes of the accident, of assessing the effectiveness of 
flight recovery actions, of reporting these findings, and of developing 
recommendations for corrective or other actions. The Board has made 
every effort to carry out its assignment in a thorough, objective, and 
impartial manner. In doing so, the Board made effective use of the 
failure analyses and corrective action studies carried out by the Manned 
Spacecraft Center and was very impressed with the dedication and objec- 
tivity of this effort. 
The Board feels that the nature of the Apollo 13 equipment failure 
holds important lessons which, when applied to future missions, will 
contribute to the safety and effectiveness of manned space flight. 
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Inflight photograph of service module showing damage to bay 4. 
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AUTHORITIES 

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546 
Anril 17, 1970 
TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright 
SUBJECT : Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board 
REFERENCES: (a) NM1 8621.1 - Mission Failure Investigation Policy 
and Procedures 
(b) NM1 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
1. It is NASA policy as stated in Reference (a) "to investigate and 
document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the 
conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take appropriate 
corrective actions as a result of the findings and recommendations." 
2. Because of the serious nature of the accident of the Apollo 13 space- 
craft which jeopardized human life and caused failure of the Apollo 13 
lunar mission, we hereby establish the Apollo 13 Review Board (hereinafter 
referred to as the Board) and appoint you Chairman. The members of the 
Board will be qualified senior individuals from NASA and other Govem- 
ment agencies. After consultation with you, we will: 
(a) Appoint the members of the Board and make any subsequent changes 
necessary for the effective operation of the Board; and 
(b) Arrange for timely release of information on the operations, 
findings, and recommendations of the Board to the Congress, and, through 
the NASA Office of Public Affairs, to the public. The Board will report 
its findings and recommendations directly to us. 
3. The Board will: 
(a) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to the space- 
craft which occurred during the flight of Apollo 13 and the subsequent 
flight and ground actions taken to recover, in order to establish the 
probable cause or causes of the accident and assess the effectiveness 
of the recovery actions. 
(b) Review all factors relating to the accident and recovery actions 
the Board determines to be significant and relevant, including studies, 
findings, recommendations, and other actions that have been or may be 
undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and contractors 
involved. 
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(c) Direct such further specific investigations as may be necessary. 
(d) Report as soon as possible its findings relating to the cause or 
causes of the accident and the effectiveness of the flight and ground 
recovery actions. 
(e) Develop recommendations for corrective or other actions, based 
upon its findings and determinations or conclusions derived therefrom. 
(f) Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations and 
submit a final report. 
4. As Chairman of the Board you are delegated the following powers: 
(a) To establish such procedures for the organization and operation 
of the Board as you find most effective; such procedures shall be part 
of the Board's records. The procedures shall be furnished the Aerospace 
Safety Advisory Panel for its review and comment. 
(b) To establish procedures to assure the execution of your 
responsibilities in your absence. 
(c) To designate such representatives, consultants, experts, liaison 
officers, observers, or other individuals as required to support the 
activities of the Board. You shall define their duties and responsi- 
bilities as part of the Board's records. 
(d) To keep us advised periodically concerning the organization, 
procedures, operations of the Board and its associated activities. 
5. By separate action we are requesting the Aerospace Safety Advisory 
Panel established by Reference (b) to review both the procedures and 
findings of the Board and submit its independent report to us. 
6. By separate action we are directing the Associate Administrator for 
Manned Space Flight to: 
(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space Flight 
cooperate fully with the Board and provide records, data, and technical 
support as requested. 
(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews, 
studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop recommenda- 
tions to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14 
mission with respect to hardware, operational procedures, and other 
aspects of the Apollo program. 
1-2 
All elements of NASA will cooperate with the Board and provide full 
support within their areas of responsibility. 
George M. Low 
Deputy Administrator T. 0. Paine 
Administrator 
_- 
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OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546 
April 21, 1970 
TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright 
SUBJECT : Membership of Apollo 13 Review Board 
Reference: Memorandum to you of April 17, subject: Establishment of 
Apollo 13 Review Board 
In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Reference (a), the membership of 
the Apollo 13 Review Board is established as follows: 
Members: 
Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman (Director, Langley Research Center) 
Mr. Robert F. Allnutt (Assistant to the Administrator, NASA Hqs.) 
Mr. Neil Armstrong (Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center) 
Dr. John F. Clark (Director, Goddard Space Flight Center) 
Brig. General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (Director of Space, DCS/R&D, 
Hqs., USAF) 
Mr. Vincent L. Johnson (Deputy Associate Administrator-Engineering, 
Office of Space Science and Applications) 
Mr. Milton Klein (Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office) 
Dr. Hans M. Mark (Director, Ames Research Center) 
Counsel: 
Mr. George Malley (Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center) 
OMSF Technical Support: 
Mr. Charles W. Mathews (Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of 
Manned Space Flight) 
Observers: 
Mr. William A. Anders (Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics 
and Space Council) 
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Dr. Charles D. Harrington (Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety 
Advisory Panel) 
Mr. I. I. Pinkel (Director, Aerospace Safety Research and 
Data Institute, Lewis Research Center) 
Congressional Liaison: 
Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoff (Office of Legislative Affairs, NASA Hqs.) 
Public Affairs Liaison: 
Mr. Brian Duff (Public Affairs Officer, Manned Spacecraft Center) 
In accordance with applicable NASA instruction, you are authorized to 
appoint such experts and additional consultants as are required for 
the effective operations of the Board. 
George M. Low T. 0. Paine 
Deputy Administrator Administrator 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546 
OFFICC OF THE ADMINISTRATOR 
April 20, 1970 
TO : Dr. Charles D. Harrington 
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
SUBJECT : Review of Procedures and Findings of Apollo 13 Review Board 
Attachment: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M. 
Cortright, subject: Establishment of Apollo 13 
Review Board 
References: (a) Section 6, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Authorization Act, 1968 
(b) NM1 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
1. In accordance with References (a) and (b), the Aerospace Safety 
Advisory Panel (hereafter referred to as the Panel) is requested to 
review the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13 Review Board (here- 
after referred to as the Board) established by Attachment (a). 
2. The procedures established by the Board will be made available to the 
Panel for review and comment as provided in paragraph 4(a) of Attachment (a). 
3. As Chairman of the Panel, you are designated an Observer on the Board. 
In this capacity, you, or another member of the Panel designated by you, 
are authorized to be present at those regular meetings of the Board you 
desire to attend. You are also authorized to receive oral progress re- 
ports from the Chairman of the Board or his designee from time to time to 
enable you to keep the Panel fully informed on the work of the Board. 
4. The final report and any interim reports of the Board will be made 
available promptly to the Panel for its review. 
5. The Panel is requested to report to us on the procedures and findings 
of the Board at such times and in such form as you consider appropriate, 
but no later than 10 days after the submission to us of the final report 
of the Board. 
George M. Low 
Deputy Administrator 
Enclosure 
T. 0. Paine 
Administrator 
cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board 
MjMr. Dale Myers 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20546 
April 20, 1970 
TO : Mr. Dale D. Myers 
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight 
SUBJECT : Apollo 13 Review 
References: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M. 
Cortright, subject: Establishment of Apollo 13 
Review Board 
(b) Memorandum dated April 20, 1970, to Dr. Charles 
D. Harrington, subject: Review of Procedures 
and Findings of Apollo 13 Review Board 
1. As indicated in paragraph 6 of Reference (a), you are directed to: 
(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space 
Flight cooperate fully with the Board in providing records, 
data, and technical support as requested. 
(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews, 
studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop 
timely recommendations to us on corrective measures to be 
taken prior to the Apollo 14 mission with respect to hard- 
ware, operational procedures, flight crews, and other aspects 
of the Apollo program. 
2. The recommendations referred to in paragraph l(b) above should be 
submitted to us in such form and at such time as you deem appropriate, 
but a report should be submitted no later than ten days after the 
Apollo 13 Review Board submits its final report. 
3. The assignments to the Apollo 13 Review Board and to the Aero- 
space Safety Advisory Panel by References (a) and (b), respectively, 
in no way relieve you of your continuing full responsibility for the 
conduct of the Apollo and other OMSF programs. 
Deputy Administrator Administrator 
CC: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board 
Mr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
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NMI 8621.1 
April 14, 1966 
Medive r/ate 
Management Instruction 
SUBJECT: MISSION FAILURE INVESTIGATION POLICY AND PRGCEDURES 
1. PURPOSE 
This Instruction establishes the policy and procedures for investigating 
and documenting the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the 
conduct of NASA space and aeronautical activities. 
2. APPLICABILITY 
This Instruction is applicable to NASA Headquarters and field installations. 
3. DEFINITION 
For the purpose of ';I-,is Instruction, the following term shall appiy: 
In general, a failure is defined as not achieving a major mission 
objective. 
4. POLICY 
a, It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major 
mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and aeronau- 
tical activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a 
result of the findings and recommendations. 
b. The Deputy Administrator may conduct independent investigations 
of major failures in addition to those investigaticns required of 
the Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices as set 
forth in paragraph 5a. 
5. PROCEDURES -- 
a. Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices are responsible, 
within their assigned areas, for: 
(1) Informing promptly the Deputy Administrator of each major 
failure and apprising him of the nature of the failure, status 
of investigations, and corrective or other actions which are 
or will be taken. 
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(2) Determining the causes or probable causes of all failures, 
taking corrective or other actions, and submitting written 
reports of such determinations and actions to the Deputy 
Administrator. 
b. When the Deputy Administrator decides to conduct an independent 
investigation, he will: 
(1) Establish a (name of project) Review Board, comprised of appro- 
priate NASA officials; 
(2) Define the specific responsibilities of each Board, encompassing 
such tasks as: 
(a) Reviewing the findings, determinations and corrective or 
other actions which have been developed by contractors, 
field installations and the Official-in-Charge of cognizant 
Headquarters Program Office and presenting the Board's 
conclusions as to their adequacy to the Deputy Administrator. 
(b) Reviewing the findings during the course of investigations 
with cognizant field installation and Headquarters officials. 
(c) Recommending such additional steps (for example additional 
tests) as are considered desirable, to determine the techni- 
cal and operational causes or probable causes of failure, 
and to obtain evidence of nontechnical contributing factors. 
(d) Developing recommendations for corrective and other actions, 
based on all informaiion available to the Board. 
(e) Documenting findings, determinations and recommendations 
for corrective or other actions and submitting such documen- 
tation to the Deputy Administrator. 
c. Procedures for implementing the Board's recommendations shall be 
determined by the Deputy Administrator. 
6. CANCELLATION 
NASA Management Manual Instruction 4-l-7 (T.S. 760), March 24; 1964. 
Deputy Administrator 
DISTRIBUTION: 
SDL 1 
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NM1 1156.14 
December 7, 1967 
Medive date 
Management Instruction 
SUBJECT: AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL 
1. PURPOSE 
This Instruction sets forth the authority for, and the 
duties, procedures, organization, ani support of the 
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. 
2. AUTHORITY 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (hereafter calied the 
"Panel") was established under Section 6 of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 
1968 (PL 90-67, 90th Congress, 81 Stat. 168, 170). Since 
the Panel was established by statute, its formation 2nd 
use are not subject to the provisions of Executive Ortier 
11007 or of NM1 1150.2, except to tile extent that such 
provisions are made applicable to the Panel under this 
Instruction. 
3. DUTIES 
a. The duties of the Panel are set forth in Section 6 
of the I":ational Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Authorization Act, 1968, as follows: 
"The Panel shall review safety studies and 
operations plans referred to it and shall 
make reports thereon, shall advise the 
Administrator with respect to the hazards 
of proposed or existing facilities and pro- 
posed operations and with respect to the 
adequacy of proposed or existing safety 
standards, and shall perform such other 
duties as the Administrator may request." 
b. Pursuant to carrying out its statutory duties, the 
Panel will review, evaluate, and advise on all 
elements of NASA's safety system, including 
especially the industrial safety, systems safety, 
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and public safety activities, and the management of 
these activities. These key elements of NASA's 
safety system are identified and delineated as folloVJs: 
(1) Industrial Safety. This element includes those 
activities which, on a continuing basis, provide 
protection for the well being of-personnel and 
prevention of damage to property involved in IIASA's 
business 2nd exposed to potential hazards 
associated with carrying out this business. 
Industrial safety relates especially to the 
operation of facilities in the many programs of 
research, development, manufacture, test, opera- 
tion, and maintenance. Industrial safety 
activities include, but are not limited to, such 
functions as: 
(a) Determination of industrial safety criteria. 
(b) Establishment and implementation of safety 
standards and procedures for operation and 
maintenance of facilities, especially test 
and !lazardous environment facilities. 
(2) 
(c) Development of safety requirements for the 
design of new facilities. 
(d) Establishment and implementation of safety 
stantiards and procedures for operation of 
pro;;ram support and administrative aircraft. 
Systems Safety. This element includes those 
activities specifically organized to deal with the 
potential hazards of complex P&D systems that 
involve many hii;hly specialized areas of tech- 
nology. It places particular emphasis on 
achieving safe operation of these systems over 
their life cycles, and it covers major systems 
for aeronautical and space fl@,ht activities, 
manned or unmanned, including associated ground- 
based research, development, manufacturing, and 
test activities. Systems safety activities 
include, but are not limited to, such functions 
2s: 
(a) Determination of systems safety criteria, 
including criteria for crew safety. 
(b) Determination of safety data requirements. 
(c) Performance of systems safety analyses. 
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(d) Establishment and implementation of systems 
safety plans. 
(3) Public Safety. This element includes those 
activities which, on a continuing basis, provide 
protection for the well being of people and 
prevention of damage to property not involved in 
KASA's business, but which may nevertheless be 
exposed to potential hazards associated with carry- 
in::: out this business. Public safety activities 
include, but are not limited to, such functions as: 
(a) Determination of public safety criteria. 
(b) Establishment and control of public safety 
hazards associated with facility and systems 
tests and operations. 
(cl Cstablishment and implementation, as required, 
of emergency or catastrophe control plans. 
(4) Safety Hana -ement This element includes both the 
oro,rram and functional or:<anizations of FASA and 
its-contractors involved in the identification of 
potential hazards and their elimination or control 
as set forth in the foregoing description of 
safety activities. It also includes the management 
systems for planning, implementing, coordinating, 
and controlling these activities. These management 
systems include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
(a) The authorities, responsibilities, and working 
relationships of the organizations involved 
in safety activities, and the assessment of 
their effectiveness. 
(b) The procedures for insuring the currency and 
continuity of safety activities, especially 
systems safety activities which may extend 
over long periods of time and where manage- 
ment responsibilities are transferred during 
the life cycles of the systems. 
Cc) The plans and procedures for accident/incident 
investigations, including those for the follow- 
up on corrective actions and the feedback of 
accident/incident information to other 
involved or interested organizations. 
(d) The analysis and dissemination of safety data. 
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4. PROCEDUWS 
a. The Panel will Iunction in an advisory capacity to the 
Administr&tor, and, through him, to those organizational 
elements responsible for mana;;ement of the EASA safety 
activities. 
b. 'i'he iianel will be provitied vrith all information required 
to aischari:e its acivisory responsibilities as they 
pertain to both Ili;SA and its contractors' safety 
activities. This information will be made a~vailable 
through the ciechanis;:; of appropriate reports, and by 
means of in situ revieyrs of safety activities at tile 
various ;~ASAanci contractor sites, a-s dee!iled necessary 
by the Panel anti arranc,ed through the Administrator. 
The ?anel v;ill thus be enabled to examine and evaluate 
not only the :;eneral status of the IIASA safety sj’stem, 
but also the key elements of the planned and on-goinir, 
activities in this system. 
5. ORGANIZATION 
a. IIembership 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The Panel b!ill consist or a maximum of nine members, 
b!ho will be appointed by the Ads:inistratcr. 
Appointlients will be for a term of six years, 
except that, in order to provide continuity of 
membership, one-third of the members appointed 
oriGinally to the Panel t:ill be appointed for a 
term of two years, one-third for a term of four 
years, and one-third for a term of six years. 
Not more than four members of the Tanel shall be 
employees of I"IASA, nor shall such i!ASA members 
constitute a majority of the composition of the 
Panel at any given time. 
Compensation and travel allowances for Panel 
members shall be as specified in Section 6 of the 
NASA Authorization Act, 1966. 
b. Officers 
(1) The Officers of the Panel shall be a Chairman and 
a Vice Chairman, who shall be selected by the Panel 
from their 1:lembership to serve for one-year terms. 
(2) The Chairman, or Vice Chairman in his absence, 
shall preside at all meetings of the Panel and shall 
have the usual powers of a presiding; officer. 
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c. Committees 
NMI 1156.14 
(1) The ?anel is authorized to establish special 
COnXilittees , as necessary and as al:~roveil by the 
Administratcr, to carry out specified tzsks within 
the scope of duties ci' the Panel, 
(2) All such cs.:,lnittee activities Twill be considered 
an inseparable extension of Panel activities, and 
will be in accordance with all applicable rll'o- 
cedures and regulations set forth in this 
Instruction. 
(3) The Chairman of each special com:nittee shall be a 
member of the Aerospace Safety Adviscry Panel. The 
other committee members may or may not be members 
of the Panel, as recommended by the Panel and 
approved by the Administrator. 
(4) Appointment of Panel members to committees as 
officers or members will be either for one year, 
for the duration of their term as Panel members, or 
for the lifetime of the committee, whichever is the 
shortest. Appointments of non-Panel members to 
committees will be for a period of one year or for 
the lifetime of the committee, whichever is shorter. 
(5) Compensation and travel allowances for committee 
members who are not members of the Panel'shall be 
the same as for members of the Panel itself, except 
that compensation for such committee meslbers 
appointed from outside the Federal Government shall 
be at the rate prescribed by the Administrator for 
comparable services. 
d. Meetings 
(1) Regular meetings of the Panel will be held as often 
as necessary and at least twice ayear. One meeting 
each year shall be an Annual Meeting. Business 
conducted at this meeting will include selecting 
the Chairmanad the Bite Chairman of the Panel, 
recommending new committees and committee members 
as required or desired, approving the Panel's 
annual report to the Administrator, and such other 
business as may be required. 
(2) Special meetings of the Panel may be called by the 
Chairman, by notice served personally upon or by 
mail or telegraph to the usual address of each 
member at least five days prior to the meeting. 
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(3) Special meetings shall be called in the same 
manner by the Chairman, upon the written request 
of three members of the Panel. 
(4) If practicable, the object of a special meeting 
should be sent in writing to all members, 2nd if 
possible a special meeting should be avoided by 
obtaining the views of members by mail or otherl:lise, 
both on the question requiring the meeting anti on 
the question of calling a special meeting. 
(5) All meetings of special committees will be called 
by their respective chairmen pursuant to and in 
accordance with performing their specified tasks, 
(6) Pilinutes of all meetings of the Panel, and of s;:ecial 
committees established by the Panel, will be kept. 
Such minutes shall, at a minimum, contain a record 
of persons present, a description of matters dis- 
cussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all 
reports received, issued, or approved by the Panel 
or commlttee. The accuracy of all minutes will be 
certified to by the Chairman of the Panel (or by 
the Vice Chairman in his absence) or of the 
committee. 
e. Reports and Records 
(1) The Panel shall submit an annual report to the 
Administrator. 
(2) The Panel will submit to the Administrator reports 
on all safety reviews and evaluations with comments 
and recommendations as deemed appropriate by the 
Panel. 
(3) All records and files of the Panel, including 
agendas, minutes of Panel and committee meetings, 
studies, analyses, reports, or other data compila- 
tions or work papers, made available to or 
prepared by or for the Panel, will be retained by 
the Panel. 
f. Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest 
(1) Nongovernmental members of the Panel, and of 
special committees estnblisheu by the Panel, are 
"Special Government Emplojrees " 7Jithin the meaning 
of NHB 1900,2A, which sets forth guidance to 1jASA 
Special Government 3ployees regarding the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest and the 
observance of ethical standards of conduct. A 
December 7, 1967 Ina 1156.14 
6. 
copy of NHB 1900.2A and related ZASA instructions 
on conflicts of interest will be furnished to each 
Panel or committee member at the time of his 
appointment as a NASA consultant or expert, 
(2) Nongovernmental members of the Panel or a special 
committee will subnit a "NASA Soecial Government 
Employees Confidential Statement of Employment 
and Financial Interests" (NASA Form 1271) prior to 
participating in the activities of the Panel or a 
special committee. 
SUPPORT 
a. A staff, to be comprised of full-time NASA employees, 
shall be established to support the Panel. The members 
of this staff will be fully responsive to direction from 
the Chairman 01' the Panel. 
b. The director of this staff will serve as Executive 
Secretary to the ?anel. The Executive Secretary of the 
Panel, in accordance r!ith the specific instructions from 
the Chairman of the Panel, shall: 
(1) Adcinister the affairs of the Panel and have general 
supervision of a.11 arrangements for safety reviews 
and evaluations, and other matters undertaken by 
the Tanel. 
(2) Insure that a written record is kept of all 
transactions, and submit the same to the Panel for 
approval at each subsequent meeting. 
(3) Insure that the same service is provided for all 
special committees of the Panel. 
k 
f&L4 
dministrator 
CF'R Title 14, Chapter 5, Subpart 1209.5. 
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PART 1. SUMMARY OF BOARD HISTORY AND PROCEDURES 
The Apollo 13 Review Board was established on April 17, 1970, by 
the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator under the authority of 
NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966. In the letter 
establishing the Board, Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Director of Langley 
Research Center, was appointed as Chairman and the general responsibili- 
ties of the Board were set forth. The seven additional members of the 
Board were named in a letter from the Administrator and the Deputy 
Administrator to the Chairman, dated April 21, 1970. This letter also 
designated a Manned Space Flight Technical Support official, a Counsel 
to the Board, several other supporting officials, and several observers 
from various organizations. In addition, in a letter dated April 20, 
1970, to Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman of the NASA Aerospace 
Safety Advisory Panel, that Panel was requested to review the Board's 
procedures and findings. 
The Review Board convened at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, 
Texas, on Tuesday, April 21, 1970. Four Panels of the Board were formed, 
each under the overview of a member of the Board. Each of the Panels 
was chaired by a senior official experienced in the area of review 
assigned to the Panel. In addition, each Panel was manned by a number 
of specialists, thereb'y providing a nucleus of expertise for the review 
activity. During the period of the Board's review activities, the 
Chairmen of the four Panels were responsible for the conduct of evalua- 
tions, analyses, and other studies bearing on their Panel assignments, 
for preparing preliminary findings and recommmdations, and for developing 
other information for the Board's consideration. To overview these 
Panel efforts, each member of the Board assumed specific responsibilities 
related to the overall review. 
In addition to the direct participants in the Board activity, a 
number of observers and consultants also attended various meetings of 
the Board or its constituent Panels. These individuals assisted the 
Review Board participants with advice and counsel in their areas of 
expertise and responsibilities. 
While the Board's intensive review activities were underway, the 
Manned Spacecraft Center Apollo 13 Investigation Team, under James A. 
McDivitt, Colonel, USAF, was also conducting its own analysis of the 
accident on Apollo 13. Coordination between the Investigation Team 
work and the Apollo 13 Review Board activities was effected through the 
MSF Technical Support official and by maintaining a close and continu- 
ing working relationship between the Panel Chairmen and officials of 
the MSC Investigation Team. 
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The Board Chairman established a series of administrative procedures 
to guide the Board's activities. In addition, specific assignments of 
responsibility were made to all individuals involved in the Board's 
activities so as to insure an efficient review activity. Overall logis- 
tic and administrative support was provided by MSC. 
The Board conducted both Executive and General Sessions. During 
the Executive Sessions , plans were agreed upon for guiding the Board's 
activities and for establishing priorities for tests, analyses, studies, 
and other Board efforts. At the General Sessions, status of Panel 
activities was reviewed by the Board with a view towards coordination 
and integration of all review activities. In addition, Board members 
regularly attended daily status meetings of the Manned Spacecraft Center 
Investigation Team. 
In general, the Board relied on Manned Spacecraft Center postmission 
evaluation activities to provide the factual data upon which evaluation, 
assessment, and analysis efforts could be based. However, the Board, 
through a regular procedure, also levied specific data collection, re- 
duction, and analysis requirements on MSC. Test support for the Board 
was conducted primarily at MSC but also included tests run at other 
NASA Centers. Members of the Board and its Panels also visited a number 
of contractor facilities to review manufacturing, assembly, and test 
procedures applicable to the Apollo 13 mission. 
The Chairman of the Board provided the NASA Deputy Administrator 
with oral progress reports. These reports summarized the status of 
Review Board activities at the time and outlined the tasks still ahead. 
All material used in these interim briefings was incorporated into the 
Board's official files. 
As a means of formally transmitting its findings, determinations, 
and recommendations, the Board chose the format of this Final Report 
which includes both the Board's judgments as well as the reports of the 
individual Panels. 
A general file of all the data and information collected and examined 
by the Board has been established at the Langley Research Center, Hampton, 
Virginia. In addition, the MSC Investigation Team established a file of 
data at MSC. 
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PART 2. BIOGRAPHIES OF BOARD MEMBERS, OBSERVERS, AND PANEL CHAIRMEN 
CHAIRMAN OF THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD 
EDGAR M. CORTRIGHT 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Edgar M. Cortright, 46, D irector of the NASA Langley Research Center, 
Hampton, Virginia, is Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Mr. Cortright has been an aerospace scientist and administrator for 
22 years. He began his career at NASA's Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, 
Ohio, in 1948 and for the next 10 years specialized in research on high- 
speed aerodynamics there. 
In October 1958, Mr. Cortright was named Chief of Advanced Technology 
Programs at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., where he directed ini- 
tial formulation of NASA's Meteorological Satellite Program. In 1960, he 
became Assistant Director for Lunar and Planetary Programs and directed 
the planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner, Ranger, and 
Surveyor. 
Mr. Cortright became Deputy Director of the Office of Space Sciences 
in 1961, and Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and Appli- 
cations in 1963, in which capacities he served as General Manager of 
NASA's space flight program using automated spacecraft. He joined the 
Office of Manned Space Flight as Deputy Associate Administrator in 1967 
and served in a similar capacity until he was appointed Director of the 
Langley Research Center in 1968. 
He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro- 
nautics and of the American Astronautical Society. He has received the 
*Arthur S. Fleming Award, the NASA Medal for Outstanding Leadership, and 
the NASA Medal for Distinguished Service. 
Mr. Cortright is the author of numerous technical reports and 
articles, and compiled and edited the book, "Exploring Space With a 
Camera." 
He is a native of Hastings, Pennsylvania, and served as a U.S. Navy 
officer in World War II. He received Bachelor and Master of Science 
degrees in aeronautical engineering from the Rensselaer Polytechnic 
Institute. 
Mr. and Mrs. Cortright are the parents of two children. 
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MEMBERS OF THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD 
ROBERT F. ALLNUTT 
NASA Headquarters 
Robert F. Allnutt, 34, Assistant to the NASA Administrator, 
Washington, D. C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Mr. Allnutt was named to his present position this year. Prior to 
that, he had been Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs since 
1967. 
He joined NASA in 1960 as a patent attorney at the Langley Research 
Center, Hampton, Virginia. In 1961, he was transferred to NASA Head- 
quarters, Washington, D. C. 
Mr. Allnutt served as Patent Counsel for Communications Satellite 
Corporation from January to September 1965, when he returned to NASA 
Headquarters as Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters. 
He is admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia 
and the state of Virginia and is a member of the American Bar Association 
and the Federal Bar Association. 
Mr. Allnutt was graduated from Virginia Polytechnic Institute with 
a B.S. degree in industrial engineering. He received Juris Doctor and 
Master of Laws degrees from George Washington University Law School. 
Mr. and Mrs. Allnutt are the parents of two sons. The family lives 
in Washington, D. C. 
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG 
NASA Astronaut 
Neil A. Armstrong, 39, NASA astronaut, is a member of the Apollo 13 
Review Board. 
Commander of the Apollo 11 mission and the first man on the Moon, 
Mr. Armstrong has distinguished himself as an astronaut and as an 
engineering test pilot. 
Prior to joining the astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft Center, 
Houston, Texas, in 1962, Mr. Armstrong was an X-15 rocket aircraft 
project pilot at the NASA Flight Research Center, Edwards, California. 
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Mr. Armstrong joined NASA at the Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, 
Ohio, in 1955, and later transferred to the Flight Research Center as an 
aeronautical research pilot. 
His initial space flight was as command pilot of Gemini VIII, 
launched March 16, 1966. He performed the first successful docking of 
two vehicles in space. The flight was terminated early due to a mal- 
functioning thruster, and the crew was cited for exceptional piloting 
skill in overcoming the problem and accomplishing a safe landing. He 
has served on backup crews for both Gemini and Apollo. 
Mr. Armstrong is a Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test 
Pilots, Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, and member of the Soaring Society of America. He has re- 
ceived the Institute of Aerospace Sciences Octave Chanute Award, the 
AIAA Astronautics Award, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, the John F. 
Montgomery Award, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom. 
He is a native of Wapakoneta, Ohio, and received a B.S. degree in 
aeronautical engineering from Purdue University and a M.S. degree from 
the University of Southern California. He was a naval aviator from 
1949 to 1952 and flew 78 combat missions during the Korean action. 
Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong have two sons. 
JOHN F. CLARK 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
Dr. John F. Clark, 49, Director of the NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
He is an internationally known authority on atmospheric and space 
sciences, holds four patents in electronic circuits and systems, and has 
written many scientific papers on atmospheric physics, electronics, and 
mathematics. 
Dr. Clark joined NASA in 1958 and served in the Office of Space 
Flight Programs at NASA Headquarters until 1961 when he was named 
Director of Geophysics and Astronomy Programs, Office of Space Sciences. 
From 1962 until 1965, he was Director of Sciences and Chairman of the 
Space Science Steering Committee, Office of Space Science and Applica- 
tions. 
In 1965, Dr. Clark was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for 
Space Science and Applications (Sciences), and later that year, Acting 
Director of Goddard. He was named director of the center in 1966. 
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Dr. Clark began his career in 1942 as an electronics engineer at 
the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. From 1947 to 1948 he 
was Assistant Professor of Electronic Engineering at Lehigh University, 
Bethelem, Pennsylvania. He returned to NRL in 1948; and prior to join- 
ing NASA, served as head of the Atmospheric Electricity Branch there. 
He is a member of the American Association of Physics Teachers, 
American Geophysical Union, Scientific Research Society of America, 
Philosophical Society of Washington, the International Scientific Radio 
Union, and the Visiting Committee on Physics, Lehigh University. He 
received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Service, Outstanding Leadership, 
and Distinguished Service. 
Dr. Clark was born in Reading, Pennsylvania. He received a B.S. 
degree in electrical engineering from Lehigh University, M.S. degree in 
mathematics from George Washington University, and Ph. D. in physics 
from the University of Maryland. 
Dr. and Mrs. Clark have two children and live in Silver Springs, 
Maryland. 
WALTER R. HEDRICK, JR. 
Headquarters, USAF 
Brig. Gen. Walter R. Hedrick, Jr., 48, Director of Space, Office 
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, Headquarters, 
USAF, Washington, D.C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
He has participated in most of the Air Force's major nuclear test 
projects and has extensive experience as a technical project officer 
and administrator. 
General Hedrick joined the Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet in 
1941 and flew in combat with the 86th Fighter Bomber Group during 
World War II. After the War, he was assigned to the 19th Air Force, the 
14th Air Force, and as a project officer under Air Force Secretary 
Stuart Symington. From 1952 to 1955, he was assigned to the Air Force 
Office of Atomic Energy. 
In 1955, he was assigned to the Technical Operations Division, Air 
Force Special Weapons Command, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. In 
1957, he was named Commander of the 495lst Support Squadron, Eniwetok; 
and the following year, he was reassigned to Kirtland AFB as Assistant 
to the Group Commander and later as Air Commander of the 4925th Test Group. 
General Hedrick joined the Special Systems Office, Air Force 
Ballistics Division, Los Angeles, in 1960. He was named Commander of 
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the Satellite Control Facility in 1965, and in 1966, he was appointed 
Deputy Commander, Air Force Systems Command. He received his present 
assignment in 1967. 
General Hedrick is a Command Pilot and has received numerous Air 
Force awards. 
His home town is Fort Worth, Texas, and he attended Texas Techno- 
logical College, Lubbock, prior to joining the service. He received 
B.S. and M.S. degrees in physics from the University of Maryland. 
General and Mrs. Hedrick are the parents of two sons. 
VINCENT L. JOHNSON 
NASA Headquarters 
Vincent L Johnson, 51, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space 
Science and Applications (Engineering), NASA Headquarters, is a member 
of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Mr. Johnson was appointed to his present position in 1967. Prior 
to that time, he had been Director of the Launch Vehicle and Propulsion 
Programs Division, Office of Space Science and Applications, since 1964. 
He was responsible for the management and development of the light and 
medium launch vehicles used for NASA's unmanned earth orbital and deep 
space programs. His division also directed studies of future unmanned 
launch vehicle and propulsion system requirements. 
Mr. Johnson joined NASA in 1960, coming from the Navy Department 
where he had been an engineer with the Bureau of Weapons. His first 
assignments with NASA were as Program Manager for the Scout, Delta, and 
Centaur launch vehicles. 
He was a naval officer during World War II, serving with the Bureau 
of Ordnance. Prior to that, he was a physicist with the Naval Ordnance 
Laboratory. 
Mr. Johnson was born in Red Wing, Minnesota, and attended the 
University of Minnesota. 
He and Mrs. Johnson live in Bethesda, Maryland. They are the 
parents of two children. 
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MILTON KLEIN 
NASA Headquarters 
Milton Klein, 46, Manager, Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, NASA 
Headquarters, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Mr. Klein has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to 
that he had been Deputy Manager since 1960. The Space Nuclear Propulsion 
Office is a joint activity of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The office conducts the 
national nuclear rocket program. He is also Director of the Division of 
Space Nuclear Systems of the AEC, responsible for space nuclear electric 
power activities. 
Mr. Klein became associated with atomic energy work in 1946, when 
he was employed by the Argonne National Laboratory. In 1350, he joined 
the AEC's Chicago Operations Office as staff chemical engineer. Later, 
he was promoted to Assistant Manager for Technical Operations. Generally 
engaged in reactor development work for stationary power plants, he had 
a primary role in the power reactor demonstration program. 
Mr. Klein was born in St. Louis, Missouri. He served in the U.S. 
Navy during World War II. 
He has a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from Washington 
University and a Master of Business Administration degree from Harvard 
University. 
Mr. and Mrs. Klein and their three children live in Bethesda, 
Maryland. 
HANSM.MARK 
NASA Ames Research Center 
Dr. Hans M. Mark, 40, Director of the NASA Ames Research Center, 
Moffett Field, California, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Prior to being appointed Director of the Ames Research Center he 
was, from 1964 to 1969, Chairman of the Department of Nuclear Engineering 
at the University of California, Berkeley, California. 
An expert in nuclear and atomic physics, he served as Reactor 
Administrator of the University of California's Berkeley Research 
Reactor, professor of nuclear engineering and .a research physicist at 
the University's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California, 
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and consultant to the U.S. Army and the National Science Foundation. 
He has written many scientific papers. 
Except for 2 years as an Assistant Professor of Physics at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1958 to 1960, Dr. Mark's 
administrative, academic, and research career has been centered at the 
University of California (Berkeley). 
Dr. Mark received his A.B. degree in physics from the University 
of California, Berkeley, in 1951, and returned there as a research 
physicist in 1955, one year after receiving his Ph. D. in physics 
from M.I.T. 
He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and a member of the 
American Geophysical Union, the American Society for Engineering Educa- 
tion and the American Nuclear Society. 
Dr. Mark was born in Mannheim, Germany, and came to the United 
States when he was 11 years old. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen 
in 1945. 
Dr. and Mrs. Mark are the parents of two children. 
COUNSEL TO THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD 
GEORGE T. MALLEY 
NASA Langley Research Center 
George T. Malley, 57, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center, 
Hampton, Virginia, is the Legal Counsel to the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
He also served as Counsel to the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
Mr. Malley is the Senior Field Counsel of NASA and has been assigned 
to Langley since 1959. He was with the Office of the General Counsel, 
Department of the Navy, from 1950 to 1959, where he specialized in 
admiralty and international law. 
He is a retired Navy officer and served on active duty from 1939 to 
1946, mainly in the South Pacific. His last assignment was commanding 
officer of the U.S.S. Fentress. 
Mr. Malley has an A.B. degree from the University of Rochester and 
an LL.B. degree from Cornell University Law School. He is a native of 
Rochester, New York, and is a member of the New York Bar and the Federal 
Bar Association. 
Mr. and Mrs. Malley and their two children live in Newport News, 
Virginia. 
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MANNED SPACE FLIGHT TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
CHARLES W. MATHEWS 
NASA Headquarters 
Charles W. Mathews, 49, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned 
Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., directs the Office 
of Manned Space Flight technical support to the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Mr. Mathews has been a research engineer and project manager for 
NASA and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
(NACA), since 1943. In his present assignment, he serves as general 
manager of manned space flight. 
Prior to his appointment to this position in 1968, he had been 
Director, Apollo Applications Program, NASA Headquarters, since 
January 1967. 
Mr. Mathews was Gemini Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft 
Center, Houston, Texas, from 1963 until 1967. Prior to that time, he 
was Deputy Assistant Director for Engineering and Development and Chief 
of the Spacecraft Technology Division at MSC. 
Mr. Mathews transferred to MSC (then the Space Task Group) when 
Project Mercury became an official national program in 1958. He served 
as Chief of the Operation Division. He had been at the Langley Research 
Center, Hampton, Virginia, since 1943 engaged in aircraft flight research 
and automatic control of airplanes. He became involved in manned space- 
craft studies prior to the first Sputnik flights, and he conducted early 
studies on reentry. Mr. Mathews was chairman of the group which developed 
detailed specifications for the Mercury spacecraft. 
Mr. Mathews has been awarded the NASA Distinguished Service Medal 
and the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal. He has received the NASA 
Group Achievement Award - Gemini Program Team. 
He is a Fellow of the American Astronautical Society and an Associate 
Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He is 
the author of numerous technical articles published by NASA. 
Mr. Mathews, a native of Duluth, Minnesota, has a B.S. degree in 
aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, 
New York. 
Mr. and Mrs. Mathews live in Vienna, Virginia. They have two 
children. 
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APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD OBSERVERS 
WILLIAM A. ANDERS 
National Aeronautics and Space Council 
William A. Anders, 36, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics 
and Space Council, Washington, D.C., is an official observer of the 
Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Prior to being appointed to his present position in 1969, Mr. Anders 
was a NASA astronaut and an Air Force lieutenant colonel. He was lunar 
module pilot on the Apollo 8 lunar orbital mission, man's first visit 
to the vicinity of another celestial body. 
Mr. Anders joined the NASA astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft 
Center, Houston, Texas, in 1963. In addition to his Apollo 8 flight, he 
served as backup pilot for Gemini 11 and backup command module pilot for 
Apollo 11, the first lunar landing mission. 
Mr. Anders was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Force 
upon graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. After flight training, he 
served as a pilot in all-weather interceptor squadrons of the Air Defense 
Command. Prior to becoming an astronaut, he was a nuclear engineer and 
instructor pilot at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force 
Base, New Mexico. 
He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and has been awarded 
the Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Astronaut Wings, the NASA 
Distinguished Service Medal, and the New York State Medal for Valor. 
Mr. Anders was born in Hong Kong. He received a B.S. degree from 
the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. degree in nuclear engineering from 
the Air Force Institute of Technology. 
Mr. and Mrs. Anders are the parents of five children. 
CHARLES D. HARRINGTON 
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc. 
Dr Charles D Harrington, 59, President and General Manager, 
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc., Richland, Washington, is an official 
observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Dr. Harrington, who has been associated with all phases of the 
chemical and nuclear industrial fields since 1941, is Chairman of the 
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a statutory body created by Congress. 
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From 1941 to 1961, he was employed by the Mallinckrodt Chemical 
Works, St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. Harrington started with.the company 
as a research chemist and in 1960, after a procession of research and 
management positions, was appointed Vice President, Mallinckrodt Nuclear 
Corporation and Vice President, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. 
In 1961, when the fuel material processing plant of Mallinckrodt 
became the Chemicals Division of United Nuclear Corporation, Dr. Harrington 
was named Vice President of that division. 
He became Senior Vice President, United Nuclear Corporation, 
Centreville, Maryland, in 1963. 
In 1965, Dr. Harrington was appointed President and General Manager, 
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc. The company manages production reactors 
and fuels fabrication facilities at Hanford, Washington, for the Atomic 
Energy Commission. 
He is the co-author of a book, "Uranium Production Technology," and 
has written numerous technical papers. He has received the Mid-West 
Award of the American Chemical Society for contributions to technology 
in the nuclear energy field. 
He is director of several corporations, including United Nuclear, 
as well as professional councils and societies. 
Dr. Harrington has M.S., M.A., and Ph. D. degrees in chemistry from 
Harvard University. 
I. IRVING PINKEL 
NASA Lewis Research Center 
I. Irving Pinkel, 57, Director, Aerospace Safety Research and Data 
Institute at the NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, is an 
official observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Until recently, he directed research at Lewis Research Center on 
rocket propellant and electric power generation systems for space 
vehicles, compressors and turbines for advanced aircraft engines, and 
lubrication systems for rotating machines for these systems. 
Mr. Pinkel entered Government scientific service in 1935 as a 
physicist with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 
1940, he joined the staff of the Langley Research Center, Hampton, 
Virginia, as a physicist. When the Lewis Research Center was built in 
1942, he transferred there. 
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He has been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, honorary scientific 
society, and Pi Mu Epsilon, honorary mathematics fraternity. He is an 
Ohio Professional Engineer, served on the former NACA subcommittees on 
Meteorological Problems, Icing Problems, Aircraft Fire Prevention and 
Flight Safety, and is a member of the NASA Research and Technology Advi- 
sory Subcommittee on Aircraft Operating Problems. He has been a Special 
Lecturer, Case Institute of Technology Graduate School. 
Mr. Pinkel has received the Flight Safety Foundation Award for con- 
tributions to the safe utilization of aircraft, the Laura Taber Barbour 
Award for development of a system for suppressing aircraft crash fires, 
the NACA Distinguished Service Medal, and the NASA Sustained Superior 
Performance Award. 
He was born in Gloversville, New York, and was graduated from the 
University of Pennsylvania. 
Mr. and Mrs. Pinkel live in Fairview Park, Ohio. They are the 
parents of two sons. 
JAMES E. WILSON, JR. 
Committee on Science and Astronautics 
United States House of Representatives 
James E. Wilson, Jr., 39, Technical Consultant, United States House 
of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, is an official 
observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Mr. Wilson has been technical consultant to the Committee since 
1963. From 1961 to 1963, he was Director of Research and Development, 
U.S. Naval Propellant Plant, Indian Head, Maryland. Mr. Wilson managed 
the Polaris Program at Indian Head from 1956 to 1961. 
From 1954 to 1956, Mr. Wilson served as an officer in the U.S. Army 
Signal Corps. He was a development engineer with E. I. DuPont, Wilmington, 
Delaware, from 1953 to 1954. 
Mr. Wilson is a member of Phi Sigma Alpha, a National Honor Society; 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers; American Chemical Society; and 
American Ordnance Association. 
Mr. Wilson is co-author of several publications of the House Cotnmit- 
tee on Science and Astronautics. 
He received a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from the Univer- 
sity of Maine and a Master of Engineering Administration degree from 
George Washington University. 
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Mr. and Mrs. Wilson live in LaPlata, Maryland. They have two 
children. 
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD PANEL CHAIRMEN 
SEYMOUR C. HIMMEL 
NASA Lewis Research Center 
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles, 
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, heads the Design Panel of the 
Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Dr. Himmel joined Lewis in 1948 as an aeronautical research scien- 
tist. He has occupied supervisory positions since 1953. 
He has been awarded the NASA Exceptional Service Medal and the NASA 
Group Achievement Award as manager of the Agena Project Group. Dr. Himmel 
has served on a number of advisory committees. He is an Associate Fellow 
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member 
of Tau Beta Pi and Pi Tau Sigma. He is the author of more than 25 tech- 
nical papers. 
Dr. Himmel has a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from the 
College of the City of New York and M.S. and Ph. D. degrees from Case 
Institute of Technology. 
Dr. and Mrs. Himmel live in Lakewood, Ohio. 
EDWIN C. KILGORE 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Edwin C. Kilgore, 47, Deputy Chief, Engineering and Technical Serv- 
ices, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, heads the Project 
Management Panel of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Mr. Kilgore joined the Langley science staff in 1944 and served in 
a variety of technical and management positions until promotion to his 
present position in 1968. 
He has received the Honorary Group Achievement Award for his role 
in achieving a record of 97 consecutive successes for solid propellant 
rocket motors and the NASA-Lunar Orbiter Project Group Achievement Award 
for outstanding performance. He is a member of Pi Tau Sigma, honorary 
mechanical engineering society. 
Mr. Kilgore was born in Coeburn, Virginia. He was graduated from 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute with a B.S. degree in mechanical engi- 
neering. 
Mr. and Mrs. Kilgore and their two daughters live in Hampton. 
HARRIS M. SCmIER 
California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Harris M. Schurmeier, 45, Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for 
Flight Projects, California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Lab- 
oratory, Pasadena, California, heads the Manufacturing and Test Panel 
of the Apollo 13 Review Board. 
Mr. Schurmeier was appointed to his current position in 1969. Prior 
to that he was Mariner Mars 1969 Project Manager, Voyager Capsule System 
Manager and Deputy Manager of the Voyager Project, and Ranger Project 
Manager at JPL. 
He has received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Scientific Achieve- 
ment and Exceptional Service. In addition, he has received the Astro- 
nautics Engineer Award, and the NASA Public Service Award. 
He was born in St. Paul, Minnesota. He has received a B.S. degree 
in mechanical engineering, M.S. degree in aeronautical engineering, and 
a professional degree in aeronautical engineering from the California 
Institute of Technology. 
Mr. Schurmeier was a naval officer in World War II. He and his 
wife and four children live in Altadena, California. 
FRANCIS B. SMITH 
NASA Headquarters 
Francis B. Smith, 47, Assistant Administrator for University Affairs, 
NASA Headquarters, is leader of the Mission Events Panel of the Apollo 13 
Review Boards 
Mr. Smith has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to 
that he had been Assistant Director, Langley Research Center, Hampton, 
Virginia, since 1964. He joined the Langley science staff in 1947. He 
is an expert in several fields, including radio telemetry, radar, elec- 
tronic tracking systems, and missile and range instrumentation. 
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Mr. Smith was born in Piedmont, South Carolina, and received a B.S. 
degree in electrical engineering from the University of South Carolina, 
where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He remained at the University 
as an instructor from 1943 to 1944 and then served in the U.S. Navy until 
1946. 
Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their three children live in Reston, Virginia. 
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PART 3. BOARD ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR BOARD PANELS 
BOARD ORGANIZATION 
After reviewing the scope of the Board's charter, the Chairman and 
Board Members agreed upon the Panel and Support Office structure depicted 
on the following organization chart. Each Panel was assigned specific 
responsibilities for reviewing major elements of the overall Board task, 
with particular emphasis upon establishing a sound and independent 
technical data base upon which findings, determinations, and recommenda- 
tions by the Board could be based. The Panels were staffed with in- 
dividual NASA specialists and established working arrangements with the 
Manned Space Flight line organization personnel working in analogous 
areas. 
The Board's support offices were structured to provide necessary 
staff, logistics, and administrative support without duplication of 
available MSC assistance. 
In addition to this structure, the Board and Panels also utilized 
the special assistance of expert consultants. 
Panel assignments, complete Panel membership, and the official Board 
organization approved by the Chairman are included in this part of the 
Board report. 
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APOLIA 13 REVIm BOARD ORGANT7PTION 
GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR BOARD PANELS 
:AS DOCUMENTED IN THE BOARD'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES) 
Panell- Mission Events Panel 
It shall be the task of the Mission Events Panel to provide a de- 
tailed and accurate chronology of all pertinent events and actions 
leading to, during, and subsequent to the Apollo 13 incident. This 
information, in narrative and graphical time history form, will provide 
the Apollo 13 Review Boardan official events record on which their 
analysis and conclusions may be based. This record will be published 
in a form suitable for inclusion in the Review Board's official report. 
The Panel will report all significant events derived from telemetry 
records, air-to-ground communications transcripts, crew and control 
center observations, and appropriate documents such as the flight plan, 
mission technique description, Apollo Operation Handbook, and crew check- 
lists. Correlation between various events and other observations related 
to the failure will be noted. Where telemetry data are referenced, the 
Panel will comxnent as appropriate on its significance, reliability, 
accuracy, and on spacecraft conditions which might have generated the 
data. 
The chronology will consist of three major sections: Preincident 
Events, Incident Events, and Postincident Events. The decision-making 
process leading to the safe recovery, referencing the relevant contin- 
gency plans and available alternates, will be included. 
Preincident Events. - This section will chronicle the progress of 
the flight from the countdown to the time of the incident. All action 
and data relevant to the subsequent incident will be included. 
Incident Events. - This section will cover that period of time be- 
ginning at 55 hours and 52 minutes after lift-off and continuing so long 
as abnormal system behavior is relevant to the failure. 
Postincident Events. - This section will document the events and 
activities subsequent to the incident and continuing to mission termina- 
tion (Splash). Emphasis will be placed on the rationale used on mission 
completion strategy. 
Panel 1 Membership 
Mr. F. B. Smith, Panel Chairman 
Assistant Administrator for University Affairs 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, D. C. 
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Dr. Tom B. Ballard 
Aerospace Technologist 
Flight Instrument Division 
Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 
Mr. M. P. Frank 
Flight Director 
Flight Control Division 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Houston, Texas 
Mr. John J. Williams 
Director, Spacecraft Operations 
Kennedy Space Center 
Florida 
Mr. Neil Armstrong, Board Member and Panel Monitor 
Astronaut 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Houston, Texas 
Panel2 - Manufacturing and Test Panel 
The Manufacturing and Test Panel shall review the manufacturing and 
testing, including the associated reliability and quality assurance 
activities, of the flight hardware components involved in the flight 
failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the analysis 
of the design. The purpose of this review is to ascertain the adequacy 
of the manufacturing procedures, including any modifications, and the pre- 
flight test and checkout program, and any possible correlation of these 
activities with the inflight events. 
The Panel shall consist of three activities: 
Fabrication and Acceptance Testing.- This will consist of reviewing 
the fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing steps actually used 
during the manufacturing of the specific flight hardware elements in- 
volved. Fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing procedures and 
records will be reviewed, as well as observation of actual operations 
when appropriate. 
Subsjystem and System Testing.- This will consist of reviewing all 
the flight qualification testing from the completion of the component- 
level acceptance testing up through the countdown to lift-off for the 
specific hardware involved. Test procedures and results will be reviewed 
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as well as observing specific tests where appropriate. Results of tests 
on other serial number units will also be reviewed when appropriate. 
Reliability and Quality Assurance.- This will be an overview of both 
the manufacturing and testing, covering such things as parts and material 
qualification and control, assembly and testing procedures, and inspection 
and problem/failure reporting and closeout. 
Panel 2 Membership 
Mr. Harris M. Schurmeier, Panel Chairman 
Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Pasadena, California 
Mr. Edward F. Baehr 
Assistant Chief, Launch Vehicles Division 
Deputy Manager, Titan Project 
Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Mr. Karl L. Heimburg 
Director, Astronautics Laboratory 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
Huntsville, Alabama 
Mr. Brooks T. Morris 
Manager, Quality Assurance and Reliability Office 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Pasadena, California 
Dr. John F. Clark, Board Member and Panel Monitor 
Director 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
Greenbelt, Maryland 
Panel3 - Design Panel 
The Design Panel shall examine the design of the oxygen and asso- 
ciated systems to the extent necessary to support the theory of failure. 
After such review the Panel shall indicate a course of corrective action 
which shall include requirements for further investigations and/or re- 
design. In addition, the Panel shall establish requirements for review 
of other Apollo spacecraft systems of similar design. 
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The Panel shall consist of four subdivisions: 
Design Evaluation.- This activity shall review the requirements and 
specifications governing the design of the systems, subsystems and com- 
ponents, their derivation, changes thereto and the reasons therefor; and 
the design of the system in response to the requirements, including such 
elements as design approach, material selection, stress analysis, de- 
velopment and qualification test programs, and results. This activity 
shall also review and evaluate proposed design modifications, including 
changes in operating procedures required by such modifications. 
Failure Modes and Mechanisms.- This activity shall review the design 
of the systems to ascertain the possible sources of failure and the manner 
in which failures may occur. In this process, they shall attempt to 
correlate such modes with the evidence from flight and ground test data. 
This shall include considerations such as: energy sources, materials 
compatibility, nature of pressure vessel failure, effects of environment 
and service, the service history of any suspect systems and components, 
and any degradation that may have occurred. 
Electrical.- This activity shall review the design of all electrical 
components associated with the theory of failure to ascertain their 
adequacy. This activity shall also review and evaluate proposed design 
modifications, including changes in operating procedures required by such 
modifications. 
Related Systems.- This activity shall review the design of all 
svstems similar to that involved in the Apollo 13 incident with the view 
” 
to establishing any commonality of design-that may indicate a need for 
redesign. They shall also consider the possibility of design modifica- 
tions to permit damage containment in the event of a failure. 
Panel 3 Membership 
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Fanel Chairman 
Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles 
Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Mr. William F. Brown, Jr. 
Chief, Strength of Materials Branch 
Materials and Structures Division 
Administration Directorate 
Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 
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Mr. R. N. Lindley 
Special Assistant to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, D. C. 
Dr. William R. Lucas 
Director, Program Development 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
Huntsville, Alabama 
Mr. J. F. Saunders, Jr. 
Project Officer for Command and Service Module 
Office of Manned Space Flight 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, D. C. 
Mr. Robert C. Wells 
Head, Electric Flight Systems Section 
Vehicles Branch 
Flight Vehicles and Systems Division 
Office of Engineering and Technical Services 
Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 
Mr. Vincent L. Johnson, Board Member and Panel Monitor 
Deputy Associate Administrator for Engineering 
Office of Space Science and Applications 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, D. C. 
Panel 4 - Project Management Panel 
The Project Management Panel will undertake the following tasks: 
1. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management struc- 
ture employed in Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13 
incident. This review will encompass the organization, the responsi- 
bilities of organizational elements, and the adequacy of the staffing. 
2. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management systems 
employed on Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13 incident. 
This task will include the management systems employed to control the 
appropriate design, manufacturing, and test operations; the processes 
used to assure adequate communications between organizational elements; 
the processes used to control hardware and functional interfaces; the 
safety processes involved; and protective security. 
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3. Review the project management lessons learned from the Apollo 
13 mission from the standpoint of their applicability to subsequent 
Apollo missions. 
Tasks 1 and 2, above, should encompass both the general review of 
the processes used in Apollo 13 and specific applicability to the pos- 
sible cause or causes of the mission incident as identified by the Board. 
Panel 4 Membership 
E. C. Kilgore, Panel Chairman 
Deputy Chief, Office of Engineering and Technical Services 
Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 
R. D. Ginter 
Director of Special Programs Office 
Office of Advanced Research and Technology 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, D.C. 
I\;lerrill H. Mead 
Chief of Programs and Resources Office 
Ames Research Center 
Moffett Field, California 
James B. Whitten 
Assistant Chief, Aeronautical and Space Mechanics Division 
Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 
Milton Klein, Board Member and Panel Monitor 
Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office 
Washington, D.C. 
Board Observers 
William A. Anders 
Executive Secretary 
National Aeronautics and Space Council 
Washington, D.C. 
Dr. Charles D. Harrington 
Chairman 
NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
Washington, D.C. 
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I. Irving Pinkel 
Director 
Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute 
Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Mr. James E. Wilson 
Technical Consultant to the Committee on Science and Astronautics 
United States House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 
Apollo 13 Review Board Support Staff 
Brian M. Duff 
Public Affairs Officer 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Houston, Texas 
Gerald J. Mossinghoff 
Director of Congressional Liaison 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, D.C. 
Edward F. Parry 
Counsel to Office of Manned Space Flight 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, D.C. 
Raymond G. Romatowski 
Deputy Assistant Director for Administration 
Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 
Ernest P. Swieda 
Deputy Chief, Skylab Program Control Office 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 
Consultants to the Board 
Dr. Wayne D. Erickson, Head 
Aerothermochemistry Branch 
Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 
Dr. Robert Van Dolah 
Acting Research Director 
Safety Research Center 
Bureau of Mines 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
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MSC Support to the Board 
These persons were detailed by MSC to support the Apollo 13 Review 
Board during its review activity at MSC. They are identified by MSC 
position title. 
ROY C. Aldridge 
Assistant to the Director of Administration 
Mary Chandler Jamie Moon 
Secretary Technical Editor 
Rex Cline 
Technical Writer/Editor 
Dorothy Xewberry 
Administrative Assistant 
Even Collins 
Program Analyst 
Lettie Reed 
Editorial Assistant 
Leroy Cotton 
Equipment Specialist 
Charlene Rogozinski 
Secretary 
Maureen Cruz 
Travel Clerk 
Joanne Sanchez 
Secretary 
Janet Harris 
Clerk Stenographer 
Billie Schmidt 
Employee Development Specialist 
Marjorie Harrison 
Secretary 
Frances Smith 
Secretary 
Fhyllis Hayes 
Secretary 
George Sowers 
Management Presentations Officer 
William N. Henderson 
Management Analyst 
Elaine Stemerick 
Secretary 
Sharon Laws 
Secretary 
Mary Thompson 
Administrative Assistant 
Carolyn Lisenbee 
Secretary 
Alvin C. Zuehlke 
Electrical Engineer 
Judy Miller 
Secretary 
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PAXT 4. SLPvPlA.RY OF BOARD ACTIXITIES 
Chairman E. M. Cortright met with Langley officials to begin planning 
t'he @ollo 13 Eieview Ward approach. Tentative list of Panel Members and 
other specialists were de~ielcped for consideration. 
APRIL 20, l-970 
Chairman Cortright met with the KASA Administrator, Deputy Adminis- 
tratcr, and key NASA officials in Washington, D.C., 'co tiiscuss Board 
membership. 
The Chairman met with KASA Office of Kanned Space Flight top offi- 
cials while enroute to MSC on NASA aircraft and discussed program organi- 
zation plans for review of the accident, and coordination with Apollo 13 
Review Board activity. 
APRIL 21, 1970 
Chairman Ccrtright met with MSC officials to discuss Apollo 13 
Review Board support. 
A formal MSC debriefing cf the Apollo 13 crew was conducted for MSC 
officials and Apcllo 13 Review Eoard personnel already at ?4SC. 
Detailed discussions between early arrivals on the Review Board and 
the MSC Investigation Team were held to provide quick-look data on the 
Apollo 13 accident and to develop detailed procedures for MSC s-@port of 
t'ne Apollo 13 Boar.. 
Chairman Cortright met with members of the Press to report on early 
activity of the Board and to inform them of plans for keeping the Press 
current on Board activities. 
The first meeting of the Board was held at 8 p.m. to discuss Board 
compcsition, structure, assignments, and scope of review. Preliminary 
plans were developed for appointing TJarious specialists to assist the 
Board in its analysis and evaluation. 
2-27 
APRIL 22, 1370 
The Board met with Colonel Mc3ivitt's MSC Investigation Team to re- 
view the progress made by XSC in identifying causes of the accident and 
in developing an understanding of sequences and relationships between 
known inflight events. In a'ddition, MSC officials briefed the Board on 
MSC Investigation 'Team structure and assignments. 
The Board met with Panel 1 of the MSC Investigation Team for de- 
tailed disc-ussicn cf inflight events and consideration of early con- 
clusions on implicaticns of preliminary data analysis. 
The Board held its second meeting to discuss MSC investigative 
efforts an. additional appointments of Panel specialists. 
Board members attended Panel 1 evening roundup of day's evaluation 
activities, which included detailed discussions of specific studies, 
data reducticns, and support test activities already underway. 
APRIL 23, 1970 
The Apollo 13 Review Board established itself in proximity to the 
MSC Investigation Team in Building 45, and arranged for all administra- 
ti?re and logistics support to the Board. 
A daily schedule of meetings, reviews, briefings, and discussions 
was established, including preliminary plans for contractor meetings, 
special support tests, and accumulation Gf accident-related informaticn. 
Initial task assignments and responsibilities were made to Board 
Panels as guidance for detailed review work. Individual Board members 
were assigned Panel overview responsibilities or other special tasks. 
Administrative procedures were developed for Board activity, par- 
ticularly to provide efficient interface with MSC personnel. 
Board and Panel Mem.bers again met with MSC cfficials to further re- 
view the sequence of events in the Apollo 13 mission and to examine early 
hypotheses concerning causes of these events, 
The Board convened for an evening meeting to discuss the progress to 
date and to coordinate Panel activities for the next few days. Xscussion 
centered upon immediate requirements fcr data collection and analysis. 
Chairman Cortright appointed addi 
bring Panels up to strength. 
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APRIL 24, 1970 
Board Members, Panel Chairmen, and MSC officials reviewed additional 
data analysis made by MSC and contractor personnel with particular empha- 
sis upon the service mcdule (SM) cryogenic system. 
The Board convened and reviewed the progress to date. Tentative 
approvals were given for Board trips to Xorth American Rockwell (NR), 
Downey, California, Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, and other loca- 
tions. 
Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on progress to date. 
Panel Chairmen and Members continued their detailed analysis of 
failure mcdes, test histories, mission events, and other data bearing 
upon the accident. 
Board Members and Panel Chairmen met with Mr. IVorman Ryker of NR on 
NR's activities involving design, qualification, and tests of SM cryo- 
genic oxygen tanks. 
APRIL 25, 1970 
The Board met to discuss details of onsite inspections of command 
service module (CSM) flight hardware at principal contractor installa- 
tions. 
Panels examined in detail probable failure modes based on data 
analyzed at that time. 
Specific plans were discussed by the Board relating to evaluation 
of oxygen tank assembly and checkout operations, including review of 
component histories. 
The MSC Investigation Team members briefed Board personnel on 
Kennedy Space Center checkout operations of the service module cryogenic 
and electric power systems, including a detailed briefing covering oxygen 
tank detanking operations. 
APRIL 26, 1970 
Board and Panel Members traveled to North American Rockwell, Downey, 
for detailed briefings by NR engineers and management. NR reviewed its 
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progress ln an intensive analysis of the Apollo 13 malfunction, including 
a review of approved special tests. Oxygen tank, fuel cell components, 
assembli PC L'"; and ether hardware were also inspected. 
ApmL 27, 1970 
An Executive Session of the Eoard met to discuss progress of specific 
analyses required to verify tentative conclusions on cxygen tank failure 
and service mcd-Ale EPS failure, 
Additicnal Board specialists arrived at MX and received detailed 
bri.efings by MSC and Board personnel on selected aspects of the Apollo 13 
data. 
Panel Members recel-red and assessed a preliminary MSC evalu.at,ion of 
the Apollo 13 accident, including tentative conclusions on the most 
probable failure modes. 
Frccedures were established to pro-Jide information flow on the status 
of review to Board observers. 
The Board reviewed work plans for the coming week with each Panel and 
established review priorities and special task assignments. 
APRII, 28: 1970 
Chairman Cortright outlined a plan for t'ne Board's preliminary report 
scheduled for presentation to the Deputy Administrator during his visit to 
W3C on May 1. Each Fanel Chairman was to summarize the status of his 
Panel's activities for Dr. George Low on Friday, April 29, 1970. 
Board Member Neil Armstrong completed arrangements to provide each 
Board Member and Panel. Chairman an opportunity for detailed simulation of 
the Apollo 13 inflight accident using MSC's CSM simulation equipment. 
Board and Panel Members reviewed enhanced photographs of the 
Apollo 13 service module at the MSC Photographic Laboratory. 
Dr. van Elbe of Atlantic Research Company briefed Board and Panel 
Members on cryogenics and combustion phenomena. 
A representative of the Manufacturing and Test Panel perfcrmed an 
onsite inspection at Beech Aircraft, Boulder. 
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Manufacture and Test Panel personnel reviewed detankizlg procedures 
loilowed at KSC during the Ayollc *, '7 countdown demcnstration test (CDDT). 
Board and Panel personnel revievTed progress t0 d-ate at a general 
Eoard meeting in\:op;ing all Review Board Fersonnel. 
3r. Charles Harrington, Board Observer and Chajrman of the Aerospace 
Safety Advisory Fanel, arri-fedi for a 2-day detailed review of Bzard pro- 
cedures and progress in The accident review. 
The Eoard revI 'ewe& 3crtl-1 P,merican Rockwell preliminary recommenda- 
$ Lry,C _ l:l:rolving oxygen tank redesign. 
The 3oard ccntillued to review an;i examine ox3;gen tank ignition 
somsrces and ccmbustion propagation processes with specialists from MSC, 
0ther KASA Centers, and contractor personnel. 
We Mission E;-ents Panel continued to examine and record details pf 
all significant missicin events as a basis for other Panel eval!zations and 
study. 
Chairman Ccrtright ccnv -~ned two Board meetings to review Pagel pro- 
gress to date and to discuss work plans for the next several days. 
??ie Projecl; Islanagement Panel visited Korth American Iiockwell at 
Donrney to re-l-iew detaiLed procedures for acceptance tests, subcontractor 
inspections, prnject documentation, and other management rnterface areas. 
'P-e Safety kdviscry Panel continued discussions with Board Chairman 
and KSC officials on progress of total Apo110 lj re‘.riew efforts. 
Panel Xembers re-,riewed instrumentation used irk Apollo 13 spacecraft 
in order t0 establish the validity of telemetry data being used in aoard 
analysis. 
Chairman Cartright convened two Board meetings to review progress of 
the work and to discuss preliminary findings of the Eoard. 
Project Management personnel visited Beech Aircraft Corporation to 
review pr0cedures used for assembly of cryogenic oxygen tanks and to dis- 
CIXS communication and information systems within the Apoilo Program. 
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Panels ccntinued to review detailed data in their respective areas. 
Board and Panel personnel participated in a joint MSC/Apollo 13 
Review Board status presentation to the NASA 3eputy Administrator. The 
meeting co-fered ail significant Apollo L -3 findings and early conclusions 
3n the callse of the accident and appropriate remedial actions. 
The MSC staff briefed Board Members on initial evaluations cf pro- 
posed design changes in oxygen tank system. 
Panel Members continued to assess data accumulated from the Apollo 13 
mission with particuiar emphasis upon the design and performance of elec- 
tric power system used in the service module. 
Board Members and Panel Chairmen reviewed specific test matrix being 
proposed by Apollo 13 Review Board specialists covering most significant 
unknowns in?rob;ed in understanding failure mechanisms. 
MAY 2, 1970 
Board Members met in General Session to discuss preparation of a com- 
plete "failure tree" as an additional guide in conducting a complete re- 
xriew and investigation. Specific aspects of this approach were reviewed. 
'The Project Management Panel reviewed oxygen tank reliability history 
and quality assurance criteria used in assembly, test, and checkout of 
these systems. 
Panel specialists continued reTiiewing data from the mission with 
emphasis upon integrating various data points intc logical failure mode 
patterns established by MSC and Board personnel. 
MAY 3, 19’70 
Chairman Cortright and Board Members conducted a detailed review of 
individual Panel status and prcgress and established milestones for 
additional analytical work and preparation of preliminary findings. 
The Board and Panel agreed to tentative report structure, including 
required exhibits, tables, drawings, and other reference data. 
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The Board established a system for tabulating all sig:lificant mission 
events and explanatory data, including the support tests required to 
clarify questions raised by events. 
Panel Members wcrked on individual analyses with particular attention 
to developing requirements for additional test activity in support of ten- 
tative conclusions. 
The Board agreed to strengthen its technical reviews of combustion 
propagation and electrical design by adding specialists in these areas. 
MAY 4, 1970 
The Design Panel continued its intensive review of the "shelf drop" 
incident at NR involving the cryogenic oxygen flight tank used in 
Apollo 13 in order to understand possible results of this event. 
The Mission Events Panel continued to analyze telemetry data received 
by MSC, with particular attention on data received in proximity to the 
data dropout period during the Apollo 13 mission and on fan turnons during 
the flight. 
The Board transmitted a formal listing of 62 requests for data, 
analyses, and support tests required for Board re-:iew activity. 
The Board continued to meet with individual Panels and support 
offices to review the status of preliminary findings and work completed. 
The Board met in General Session to discuss the scope and conduct cf 
support test activity, including careful documentation of test methods and 
application of test results. 
MSC personnel briefed Panel Members on availability of additional 
telemetry data in the MSC data bank in order to insure Board considera- 
tion of all possible useful data. 
Panels commenced initial drafting of preliminary findings in specific 
areas, including summary descriptions of system performance during the 
Apollo 13 flight. 
The Board met with the MSC Investigation Team for complete review of 
the proposed test program. 
PLYY 6, 1970 
Scard Members, NSC personnel, and Members of KASA's Aerospace Safe:?; 
Advisory Panel met for detailed discilssions and eval;lation of accident 
ITViebT status and prOgreSS. The review ccT/ered oxygen tank ques%iona, 
reco~rery opersticns. :ig,% a y,i;sio:l simulation by VSC astronauts. 
Panel Members continued to work on ttie preparation of preliminary 
Panel drafts. 
Chairman Ccrtrigh': transmitted additional requests for tests io MSC 
and modified procedures for control of o\rerail test activity relating to 
the Apollo lj accident. 
The General Board Session reviewed complete analysis and test support 
activities being conducted for the Board and MSC at various governmental 
and contractor installations. 
3oard and Panel Members ret to discuss Ames laboratory tests con- 
cerning liquid oxygen combustion initlatlon energies required in the 
:ryogenic oxygen tank used in the Apollo 13 SM. 
Panel 1 Members reviewed mission control equipment and operating 
procedures used during the Apollo 13 mission and reviewed actual missicn 
events in detail. 
The Panels continued to develop preliminary drafts of their reviews 
and analyses for consideration by the Board. 
MAY 8, 2970 
Dr. Robert Van Do&h, Sureau of Mines, joined the Board as a con- 
sultant on combustion propagation and rerriewed Apollo 13 Review Board 
data developed to date. 
The General Board Session convened to review proposed report format 
and scope. An agreement was reached cn appendices, on the structure of 
the report, and on the degree of detail to be included in individual Panel 
reports. 
Chairman Sortright assigned additional specific test overview re- 
sponsibilities to members of the Apollo 13 ReT.;iew activity. 
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Panel 1 conducted a formal interview with she MSC Flight Director 
covering all significant mission evenJ +s from the standpoint of ground 
controllers. 
Panels 2 through 4 continued developing preliminary reports. Panel 4 
announced a formal schedule of interviews of MSC, contractors, and NASA 
Headquarters personnel. 
Board Members explored in detail possible failure mcde sequences 
developed by MSC persL,* -8nnel involving ignition and combustion within the 
SM crycgenic oxygen tank. 
The Board recessed for 3 days, leaving a cadre of personnel at MSC 
to edit preliminary drafts developed by the Panels and to schedule further 
activity for the week of May 11. 
MAY 9, 1970 
Board in recess. 
MAY 10, 1970 
Board in recess. 
MAY 11, 1970 
Board in recess. MSC support personnel continued work obtaining 
additional technical data for Board review. 
MAY 12, 1970 
Board Members returned to MSC. 
Board Members attended a General Session to review progress and 
status of the report. 
Panel Chairmen reported on individual progress of work and estab- 
llshed schedules for completion of analyses and evaluations. 
Chairman Cortright reported on the Langley Research Center support 
test program aimed at simulation of SM panel ejection energy pulses. 
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MAY 13, 1970 
Board Members reviewed preliminary drafts of report chapter on Re- 
view and Analysis and Panel 1 report on Mission Events. 
Mission Events Panel Members interviewed Electrical, Electronic, and 
Communications Engineer (EECOM) and one of the Apollo 13 Flight Directors 
cn activities which took place in the Mission Control Center (MCC) during 
and after the flight accident period. 
Panel 4, Project Management Panel, conducted interviews with princi- 
pal Apollo 13 program personnel from MSC and contract organizations. 
Panel Members continued drafting preliminary versions of Panel re- 
ports for review by the Board. 
Manufacturing and Test Panel representatives discussed program for 
oxygen tank testing to be conducted at Beech Aircraft. 
Board Members met in General Session to review report milestones and 
required test data for the week ahead. 
MAY 14, 1970 
Board met in General Session to review Panel report progress and to 
agree to firm schedules for completion of all Review Board assignments. 
Project Management Panel continued to interview key Apollo project 
personnel from NASA Centers and contractors. 
Panel Members circulated first drafts of all Panel reports to Board 
Members for review and correction. 
MAY 15, 1970 
Mission Events Panel personnel interviewed Apollo 13 Command Module 
Pilct John Swigert to verify event chronology compiied by the Panel and 
to review crew responses during Apollo 13 mission. 
Project Management Panel continued interviewing key project personnel 
with NASA Centers and contractors. 
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MSC personnel provide Board Members and Panel Chairmen with a de- 
tailed briefing on all s-~pport tests and analyses being performed in 
connection with the MSC and Board reviews, 
Board Members met in Executive Session to review preliminary drafts 
of Panel reports and findings and determinations and to provide additional 
instructions and guLdance to Panel Chairmen. 
Panel Members continued to review and edit early Panel drafts and to 
compile reference data in support of findings. 
MAY 16, 1970 
Board met in General Session to review further revisions of prelimi- 
nary findings and determinations and to establish working schedules for 
completion of the Board report. 
Panel Members continued to edit and refine Panel reports on basis of 
dlscussicns with MSC personnel and further analysis of Apollo 13 documen- 
tation. 
MAY 17, 1970 
Draft material for all parts of Board report was reviewed by Panel 
Members and staff. Changes were incorporated in ail draft material and 
recirculated for additional review and comment. 
Board Members met in General Session to review report progress and 
to examine results from recent support tests and analyses being conducted 
at various Government and contractor installations. 
The Apollo 13 Review Board discussed a continuing series of support 
tests for recommendation to MSC following presentation of report and re- 
cess of the Board. 
MAY 18, 1970 
Board Members reviewed Special Tests and Analyses Appendix of the 
report and examined results of completed tests. 
Board met in General Session to discuss control procedures for re- 
production and distribution of Board report. 
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Mission Events Panel distributed a final draft of their report for 
review by Board Members. 
Eoard reviewed a preliminary draft of findings and determinations 
prepared by Panel Chairmen, Board Members, and Board Chairman. 
A Manufacture and Test Panel representative reviewed special oxygen 
tank test programs at Beech Aircraft. 
MAY 19? 1970 
Board Members met in Executive Session to continue evaluation and 
assessment of preliminary findings, determinations, and recommendations 
prepared by individual Board Members and Panel Chairmen. 
Board met in General Session to review final draft of Mission Events 
Panel report. 
Manufacture and Test Panel preliminary repcrt was distributed to 
Board Members for review and comment. 
Design Panel preliminary report was distributed to Board Members for 
review and comment. 
Design Panel Members met with MSC Team officials to discuss further 
test and analyses support for the Board. 
MAY 20, 1970 
Board Members met in Executive Session to review and evaluate reports 
from the Design Fanel and from the Manufacturing and Test Panel. 
Project Management Panel distributed final draft of its report to 
Board Members for review and comment. 
Chairman Cortright met with Mr. Bruce Lundin of the Aerospace Safety 
Advisory Panel to discuss progress of Board review and analysis. 
MAY 21, 1970 
Beard Members met in Executive Session for final review of Project 
Management panel report. 
Board Members and others met with MSC officials to review in detail 
the activities and actions taken after the Apollo 204 accident concerning 
ignition flammability for materials and control in the CSM. 
A third draft of preliminary findings, determinations, and recommen- 
dations was developed and ciratilated by- the Chairman for review and 
comment. 
Arrangements were made with NASA Headquarters officials for pack- 
aging, delivery, and distribution of the Board's final report. 
Mission Events Panel conducted an interview with Lunar Mod-tile Pilot 
iiaise to review selected misslon extents bearing on the accident. 
MAY 22, 1970 
Mission Events Panel representatives met with MSC officials to review 
in detail several events which occurred during later flight stages. 
Board met in Executive Session to assess latest drafts of findings, 
determinations, and recommendations circulated by the Chairman. 
Board met in General Session to review total progress in all report 
areas and to establish final schedule for preparation of Board report. 
Langley Research Center representative M. Ellis briefed the Board on 
ignition and combustion of materials in oxygen atmosphere tests being con- 
ducted in support of the Apollo 13 BeTriew. 
Board Observer I. I. Pinkel briefed the Board on Lewis Research 
Center fire propagation tests involving Teflon. 
MAY 23, 1970 
Board Members reviewed Chapter 4 of Board report entitled "Review 
and Analysis." 
Panel Chairmen reviewed draft findings and determinations prepared 
by the Board. 
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MAY 24, 1970 
Board Members reviewed NASA Aerospace Safety Panel report covering 
Apollc activities during the period of 1968-69. 
Board met in Executive Session for detailed review of support test 
status and progress and of dccumentation describing the results of test 
activity. 
Board met in Executive Sessicn for further re-view of findings, 
determinations, and recommendations. 
MAY 25, 1970 
Board met in Executive Session to review test progress and decided 
to postpone submittal of final repcrt until June 8 in order to consider 
results of Langley Research Center panel ejection tests. 
Board Members continued to review MSC Investigation Team preliminary 
draf;s and refine Apc;lo 13 data in the various Board appendices. 
Board met in Executive Session for further consideration of findings, 
determinations, and recommendations. 
MAY 26, 1970 
Board met in General Session and interviewed Astronaut James Love11 
regarding crew understanding of inflight accident. 
Board Members reviewed proposed MSC tank combustion test and agreed 
to test methodology and objectives. 
Panel Members continued preparation of individual Panel reports. 
MAY 27, 1970 
Board and Panel Members received a detailed briefing on thermostatic 
switch failure during MSC heater tube temperature tests. 
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel met with Chairman Cc&right, Board 
Members, and Panel Chairmen to review Board progress and status of 
*indings and conclusions. / 
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Board met in General Session to review status of Panel reports, 
documentation of test data and results, and plans for report typing and 
review. 
Board agreed to recess for several days to accumulate additional 
test information on panel separation and full scale tank ignition data. 
MAY 28, 1970 
Board in recess. 
Board in recess. 
MAY 30, 1970 
Board in recess. 
MAY 31, 1970 
Board in recess. 
JUNE 1, 1970 
Board Members returned to MSC. 
Board and Panel Members met in General Session to discuss revisions 
of Panel reports in light of latest information regarding thermostatic 
switch failure during CDDT at KSC. 
Board approved new schedule for Board report calling for final 
versions of Panel reports by Monday, June 8. 
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JLJITE 2, 1970 
Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on the status of the Board's 
work and future plans. 
Board and Panel Members participated in a detailed interview and 
discussion with MSC and contractor personnel regarding specific coordina- 
tion steps taken during oxygen tank no. 2 detanking operations at KSC. 
Board Members met in Executive Session to review latest test results 
and to assess status of Board findings and determinations. 
JUNE 3, 1970 
Board and Panel Members met with MSC Program Office personnel for a 
detailed update of recent MSC information and analyses stemming from on- 
going test programs. 
Board Members and Panel Chairmen completed final reviews of Panel 
reports and also reviewed final draft of findings, determinations, and 
recommendations. 
Board and Panel Members received a detailed briefing on thermostatic 
switch questions with emphasis upon actions of various organizations 
during and after detanking operations at KSC. 
JurvE 4, 1970 
Board Members met in Executive Session and completed final revisions 
of Chapter 4 of the Board summary. 
Board and Panel Members witnessed a special full-scale tank ignition 
test performed at MSC. 
Panel Chairmen completed final revisions of individual Panel reports 
and submitted copy to the Reports Editorial Office. 
Board met in Executive Session and agreed to final schedule for re- 
port printing and delivery to the Administrator on June 15, 1970. 
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JLTNE 5, 1970 
Board Members met in Executive Session and completed work on Chap- 
ter 5 of the Board Summary Report (Findings, Determinations, and Recom- 
mendations). 
Board Members reviewed final version of Project Management Panel 
report and authorized printing as Appendix E. 
Board Members Hedrick and Mark completed final tabulation of test 
support activities performed for the Board. 
Board Members reviewed films of special test activities performed 
at various NASA Centers. 
JUNE 6, 1970 
Board met in Executive Session throughout the day and completed 
its review of Chapter 5 of its report (Findings, Determinations, and 
Recommendations). 
Board Members completed review of analyses to be incorporated in 
Appendix F, Special Tests and Analyses. 
JUNE 7, 1970 
The Board met in Executive Session and approved plans and schedules 
for final editorial review and publication of the Board report. 
The Chairman recessed the Board until June 15 at which time the 
Board is scheduled to reconvene in Washington, D.C., to present its 
report to the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator. 
2-43 
This page left blank intentionally. 
CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE 
AND MISSION SUMMARY 
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This chapter is extracted from Mission Operation Report 
No. M-932-70, Revision 3, published by the Program and Special Reports 
Division (XP), Executive Secretariat, NASA Headquarters, Washington, 
D.C. 
Discussion in this chapter is broken into two parts. Part 1 is 
designed to acquaint the reader with the flight hardware and with 
the mission monitoring, support, and control functions and capabilities. 
Part 2 describes the Apollo 13 mission and gives a mission sequence 
of events summary. 
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PART 1 APOLLO/SATURN V SPACE VEHICLE 
The primary flight hardware of the Apollo Program consists of the 
Saturn V launch vehicle and Apollo spacecraft (fig. 3-l). Collectively, 
they are designated the Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle (SV). Selected 
major systems and subsystems of the space vehicle may be summarized as 
follows. 
SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE 
The Saturn V launch vehicle (LV) is designed to boost up to 
300,000 pounds into a 105-nautical mile earth orbit and to provide for 
lunar payloads of over 100,000 pounds. The Saturn V LV consists of 
three propulsive stages (S-IC, S-II, S-IVB), two interstages, and an 
instrument unit (IU). 
S-IC Stage 
The S-IC stage (fig. 3-2) is a large cylindrical booster, 138 feet 
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant F-l 
rocket engines. These engines develop a nominal sea level thrust total 
of approximately 7,650,000 pounds. The stage dry weight is approximately 
288,000 pounds and the total loaded stage weight is approximately 
5,031,500 pounds. The S-IC stage interfaces structurally and electri- 
cally with the S-II stage. It also interfaces structurally, elec- 
trically, and pneumatically with ground support equipment (GSE) through 
two umbilical service arms, three tail service masts, and certain 
electronic systems by antennas. The S-IC stage is instrumented for 
operational measurements or signals which are transmitted by its inde- 
pendent telemetry system. 
S-II Stage 
The S-II stage (fig. 3-3) is a large cylindrical booster, 81.5 feet 
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant J-2 
rocket engines which develop a nominal vacuum thrust of 230,000 pounds 
each for a total of 1,150,OOO pounds. Dry weight of the S-II stage is 
approximately 78,050 pounds. The stage approximate loaded gross weight 
is 1,075,OOO pounds. The S-IC/S-II interstage weighs 10,460 pounds. 
The S-II stage is instrumented for operational and research and develop- 
ment measurements which are transmitted by its independent telemetry 
system. The S-II stage has structural and electrical interfaces with 
the S-IC and S-IVB stages, and electric, pneumatic, and fluid interfaces 
with GSE through its umbilicals and antennas. 
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S-IVB Stage 
The S-IVB stage (fig. 3-4) is a large cylindrical booster 59 feet 
long and 21.6 feet in diameter , powered by one J-2 engine. The S-IVB 
stage is capable of multiple engine starts. Engine thrust is 
203,000 pounds. This stage is also unique in that it has an attitude 
control capability independent of its main engine. Dry weight of the 
stage is 25,050 pounds. The launch weight of the stage is 261,700 pounds. 
The interstage weight of 8100 pounds is not included in the stated 
weights. The stage is instrumented for functional measurements or sig- 
nals which are transmitted by its independent telemetry system. 
The high performance J-2 engine as installed in the S-IVB stage 
has a multiple start capability. The S-IVB J-2 engine is scheduled 
to produce a thrust of 203,000 pounds during its first burn to earth 
orbit and a thrust of 178,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of 4.5:1) 
during the first 100 seconds of translunar injection. The remaining 
translunar injection acceleration is provided at a thrust level of 
203,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of 5.O:l). The engine valves are 
controlled by a pneumatic system powered by gaseous helium which is 
stored in a sphere inside a start bottle. An electrical control system 
that uses solid stage logic elements is used to sequence the start and 
shutdown operations of the engine. 
Instrument Unit 
The Saturn V launch vehicle is guided from its launch pad into 
earth orbit primarily by navigation, guidance, and control equipment 
located in the instrument unit (IU). The instrument unit is a cylindri- 
cal structure 21.6 feet in diameter and 3 feet high installed on top of 
the S-IVB stage. The unit weighs 4310 pounds and contains measurements 
and telemetry, command communications, tracking, and emergency detection 
system components along with supporting electrical power and the environ- 
mental control system. 
APOLLO SPACECRAFT 
The Apollo spacecraft (S/C) is designed to support three men in space 
for periods up to 2 weeks, docking in space, landing on and returning 
from the lunar surface, and safely entering the earth's atmosphere. The 
Apollo S/C consists of the spacecraft-to-LM adapter (SLA), the service 
module (SM), the command module (CM), the launch escape system (LES), and 
the lunar module (IN). The CM and SM as a unit are referred to as the 
command and service module (CSM). 
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Spacecraft-to-LM Adapter 
The SLA (fig. 3-5) is a conical structure which provides a structural 
load path between the LV and SM and also supports the IX. Aerodynami- 
cally, the SLA smoothly encloses the irregularly shaped LM and transitions 
the space vehicle diameter from that of the upper stage of the LV to that 
of the SM. The SLA also encloses the nozzle of the SM engine and the high 
gain antenna. 
Spring thrusters are used to separate the LM from the SLA. After 
the CSM has docked with the LM, mild charges are fired to release the 
four adapters which secure the LM in the SLA. Simultaneously, four 
spring thrusters mounted on the lower (fixed) SLA panels push against 
the LM landing gear truss assembly to separate the spacecraft from the 
launch vehicle. 
Service Module 
The service module (SM)(fig. 3-6) provides the main spacecraft pro- 
pulsion and maneuvering capability during a mission. The SM provides 
most of the spacecraft consumables (oxygen, water, propellant, and 
hydrogen) and supplements environmental, electrical power, and propul- 
sion requirements of the CM. The SM remains attached to the CM until 
it is jettisoned just before CM atmospheric entry. 
Structure.- The basic structural comnonents are forward and aft 
L 
(upper and lower) bulkheads, six radial beams, four sector honeycomb 
panels, four reaction control system honeycomb panels, aft heat shield, 
and a fairing. The forward and aft bulkheads cover the top and bottom 
of the SM. Radial beam trusses extending above the forward bulkhead 
support and secure the CM. The radial beams are made of solid aluminum 
alloy which has been machined and them-milled to thicknesses varying 
between 2 inches and 0.018 inch. Three of these beams have compression 
pads and the other three have shear-compression pads and tension ties. 
Explosive charges in the center sections of these tension ties are used 
to separate the CM from the SM. 
An aft heat shield surrounds the service propulsion engine to 
protect the SM from the engine's heat during thrusting. The gap between 
the CM and the forward bulkhead of the SM is closed off with a fairing 
which is composed of eight electrical power system radiators alternated 
with eight aluminum honeycomb panels. The sector and reaction control 
system panels are 1 inch thick and are made of aluminum honeycomb core 
between two aluminum face sheets. The sector panels are bolted to the 
radial beams. Radiators used to dissipate heat from the environmental 
control subsystem are bonded to the sector panels on opposite sides of 
the SM. These radiators are each about 30 square feet in area. 
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The SM interior is divided into six sectors, or bays, and a center 
section. Sector one is currently void. It is available for installation 
of scientific or additional equipment should the need arise. Sector 
two has part of a space radiator and a reaction control system (RCS) 
engine quad (module) on its exterior panel and contains the service pro- 
pulsion system (SPS) oxidizer sump tank. This tank is the larger of 
the two tanks that hold the oxidizer for the SPS engine. Sector three 
has the rest of the space radiator and another RCS engine quad on its 
exterior panel and contains the oxidizer storage tank. This tank is 
the second of two SPS oxidizer tanks and feeds the oxidizer sump tank 
in sector two. Sector four contains most of the electrical power gener- 
ating equipment. It contains three fuel cells, two cryogenic oxygen 
and two cryogenic hydrogen tanks, and a power control relay box. The 
cryogenic tanks supply oxygen to the environmental control subsystem 
and oxygen and hydrogen to the fuel cells. Sector five has part of an 
environmental control radiator and an RCS engine quad on the exterior 
panel and contains the SPS engine fuel sump tank. This tank feeds the 
engine and is also connected by feed lines to the storage tank in 
sector six. Sector six has the rest of the environmental control radi- 
tor and an RCS engine quad on its exterior and contains the SPS engine 
fuel storage tank which feeds the fuel sump tank in sector five. The 
center section contains two helium tanks and the SPS engine. The tanks 
are used to provide helium pressurant for the SPS propellant tanks. 
Propulsion.- Main spacecraft propulsion is provided by the 
20500-pound thrust SPS. The SPS engine is a restartable, non-throttleable 
engine which uses nitrogen tetroxide (fi204) as an oxidizer and a 50-50 
mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical-dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as fuel. 
(These propellants are hypergolic, i.e., they burn spontaneously when 
combined without need for an igniter.) This engine is used for major 
velocity changes during the mission, such as midcourse corrections, 
lunar orbit insertion, transearth injection, and CSM aborts. The SPS 
engine responds to automatic firing commands from the guidance and 
navigation system or to commands from manual controls. The engine as- 
sembly is gimbal-mounted to allow engine thrust-vector alignment with the 
spacecraft center of mass to preclude tumbling. Thrust-vector alignment 
control is maintained by the crew. The SM RCS provides for maneuvering 
about and along three axes. 
Additional SM systems.- In addition to the systems already described, 
the SM has communication antennas, umbilical connections, and several 
exterior mounted lights. The four antennas on the outside of the SM are 
the steerable S-band high-gain antenna, mounted on the aft bulkhead; two 
VHF omnidirectional antennas, mounted on opposite sides of the module 
near the top; and the rendezvous radar transponder antenna, mounted in 
the SM fairing. 
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Seven lights are mounted in the aluminum panels of the fairing. 
Four lights (one red, one green, and two amber) are used to aid the 
astronauts in docking: one is a floodlight which can be turned on to 
give astronauts visibility during extravehicular activities, one is a 
flashing beacon used to aid in rendezvous, and one is a spotlight used 
in rendezvous from 500 feet to docking with the LM. 
SM/CM separation.- Separation of the SM from the CM occurs shortly 
before entry. The sequence of events during separation is controlled 
automatically by two redundant service module jettison controllers (SMJC) 
located on the forward bulkhead of the SM. 
Command Module 
The command module (CM) (fig. 3-7) serves as the command, control, 
and communications center for most of the mission. Supplemented by the 
SM, it provides all life support elements for three crewmen in the mis- 
sion environments and for their safe return to the earth's surface. It 
is capable of attitude control about three axes and some lateral lift 
translation at high velocities in earth atmosphere. It also permits I&l 
attachment, CM/IX ingress and egress, and serves as a buoyant vessel in 
open ocean. 
Structure.- The CM consists of two basic structures joined together: 
the inner structure (pressure shell) and the outer structure (heat 
shield). The inner structure, the pressurized crew compartment, is made 
of aluminum sandwich construction consisting of a welded aluminum inner 
skin, bonded aluminum honeycomb core, and outer face sheet. The outer 
structure is basically a heat shield and is made of stainless steel- 
brazed honeycomb brazed between steel alloy face sheets. Parts of the 
area between the inner and outer sheets are filled with a layer of 
fibrous insulation as additional heat protection. 
Display and controls.- The main display console (MDC!) (fig. 3-8) 
has been arranged to provide for the expected duties of crew members. 
These duties fall into the categories of Commander, CM Pilot, and LM 
Pilot, occupying the left, center, and right couches, respectively. The 
CM Pilot also acts as the principal navigator. All controls have been 
designed so they can be operated by astronauts wearing gloves. The con- 
trols are predominantly of four basic types: toggle switches, rotary 
switches with click-stops, thumb-wheels, and push buttons. Critical 
switches are guarded so that they cannot be thrown inadvertently. In 
addition, some critical controls have locks that must be released before 
they can be operated. 
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Flight controls are located on the left center and left side of the 
MDC, opposite the Commander. These include controls for such subsystems 
as stabilization and control, propulsion, crew safety, earth landing, 
and emergency detection. One of two guidance and navigation computer 
panels also is located here, as are velocity, attitude, and altitude 
indicators. 
The CM Pilot faces the center of the console, and thus can reach 
many of the flight controls, as well as the system controls on the right 
side of the console. Displays and controls directly opposite him include 
reaction control, propellant management, caution and warning, environ- 
mental control, and cryogenic storage systems. The rotation and trans- 
lation controllers used for attitude, thrust vector, and translation 
maneuvers are located on the arms of two crew couches. In addition, a 
rotation controller can be mounted at the navigation position in the 
lower equipment bay. 
Critical conditions of most spacecraft systems are monitored by a 
caution and warning system. A malfunction or out-of-tolerance condition 
results in illumination of a status light that identifies the abnormal- 
ity. It also activates the master alarm circuit, which illuminates two 
master alarm lights on the MDC and one in the lower equipment bay and 
sends an alarm tone to the astronauts' headsets. The master alarm 
lights and tone continue until a crewman resets the master alarm circuit. 
This can be done before the crewmen deal with the problem indicated. The 
caution and warning system also contains equipment to sense its own 
malfunctions. 
Lunar Module 
The lunar module (IN) (fig. 3-g) is designed to transport two men 
safely from the CSM, in lunar orbit, to the lunar surface, and return 
them to the orbiting CSM. The LM provides operational capabilities such 
as communications, telemetry, environmental support, transportation of 
scientific equipment to the lunar surface, and returning surface samples 
with the crew to the CSM. 
The lunar module consists of two stages: the ascent stage and the 
descent stage. The stages are attached at four fittings by explosive 
bolts. Separable umbilicals and hardline connections provide subsystem 
continuity to operate both stages as a single unit until separate ascent 
stage operation is desired. The LM is designed to operate for 48 hours 
after separation from the CSM, with a maximum lunar stay time of 44 hours. 
Table 3-I is a weight summary of the Apollo/Saturn 5 space vehicle for 
the Apollo 13 mission. 
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TABLE 3-1.- APOLLO 13 WEIGHT SUMMARY (WEIGHT IN POUNDS) 
Stage/module Total 
Final 
Inert weight expendables Total weight separation weight 
s-IC 
s-IC/S-II 
interstage 
S-II stage 
s-II/S-IVB 
interstage 
288000 4746870 5034870 363403 
11464 --- 11464 --- 
78050 99696o 1075010 92523 
8100 --- 8100 em- 
S-IVB stage 25050 236671 261721 35526 
Instrument unit 4482 --- 4482 --- 
Launch vehicle at ignition 6,x95,647 
Spacecraft-I&l 
adapter 
Lunar module 
Service module 
Command module 
Launch escape 
system 
4044 m-m 4044 --- 
9915 23568 
10532 40567 
12572 --- 
9012 --- 
33483 "33941 
51099 **14076 
12572 **11269 
(Landing) 
9012 --- 
* CSM/LM separation 
** CM/SM separation 
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TABLE 3-I.- APOLLO 13 WEIGHT SUMMARY (WEIGHT IN POUNDS) - Concluded 
Total Final Stage/module Inert weight expendables Total weight separation weight 
Spacecraft at ignition 110,210 
Space vehicle at ignition 6505857 
S-IC thrust buildup C-)84598 
Space vehicle at lift-off 6421259 
Space vehicle at orbit insertion 299998 
Main propulsion.- Main propulsion is provided by the descent pro- 
pulsion system (DPS) and the ascent propulsion system (APS). Each 
system is wholly independent of the other. The DPS provides the thrust 
to control descent to the lunar surface. The APS can provide the thrust 
for ascent from the lunar surface. In case of mission abort, the APS 
and/or DPS can place the LM into a rendezvous trajectory with the CSM 
from any point in the descent trajectory. The choice of engine to be 
used depends on the cause for abort, on how long the descent engine 
has been operating, and on the quantity of propellant remaining in the 
descent stage. Both propulsion systems use identical hypergolic pro- 
pellants. The fuel is a 50-50 mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical- 
dimethylhydrazine and the oxidizer is nitrogen tetroxide. Gaseous 
helium pressurizes the propellant feed systems. Helium storage in the 
DPS is at cryogenic temperatures in the super-critical state and in the 
APS it is gaseous at ambient temperatures. 
Ullage for propellant settling is required prior to descent engine 
start and is provided by the +X axis reaction engines. The descent 
engine is gimbaled, throttleable, and restartable. 
throttled from 1050 pounds of thrust to 6300 pounds. 
The engine can be 
Throttle positions 
above this value automatically‘produce full thrust to reduce combustion 
chamber erosion. Nominal full thrust is 9870 pounds. Gimbal trim of 
the engine compensates for a changing center of gravity of the vehicle 
and is automatically accomplished by either the primary guidance and 
navigation system (PGNS) or the abort guidance system (AGS). Automatic 
throttle and on/off control is available in the PGNS mode of operation. 
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The AGS commands on/off operation but has no automatic throttle control 
capability. Manual control capability of engine firing functions has 
been provided. Manual thrust control override may, at any time, com- 
mand more thrust than the level commanded by the LM guidance computer 
(LGC). 
The ascent engine is a fixed, non-throttleable engine. The engine 
develops 3500 pounds of thrust, sufficient to abort the lunar descent 
or to launch the ascent stage from the lunar surface and place it in 
the desired lunar orbit. Control modes are similar to those described 
for the descent engine. The APS propellant is contained in two spheri- 
cal titanium tanks, one for oxidizer and the other for fuel. Each tank 
has a volume of 36 cubic feet. Total fuel weight is 2008 pounds, of 
which 71 pounds are unusable. Oxidizer weight is 3170 pounds, of which 
92 pounds are unusable. The APS has a limit of 35 starts, must have a 
propellant bulk temperature between 50° F and 90' F prior to start, 
must not exceed 460 seconds of burn time, and has a system life of 
24 hours after pressurization. 
Electrical power system.- The electrical power system (EPS) con- 
tains six batteries which supply the electrical power requirements of 
the LM during undocked mission phases. Four batteries are located in 
the descent stage and two in the ascent stage. Batteries for the 
explosive devices system are not included in this system description. 
Postlaunch LM power is supplied by the descent stage batteries until 
the LM and CSM are docked. While docked, the CSM supplies electrical 
power to the LM up to 296 watts (peak). During the lunar descent phase, 
the two ascent stage batteries are paralleled with the descent stage 
batteries for additional power assurance. The descent stage batteries 
are utilized for LM lunar surface operations and checkout. The ascent 
stage batteries are brought on the line just before ascent phase 
staging. All batteries and busses may be individually monitored for 
load, voltage, and failure. Several isolation and combination modes 
are provided. 
Two inverters, each capable of supplying full load, convert the 
dc to ac for ll+volt, boo-hertz supply. Electrical power is distributed 
by the following busses: LM Pilot's dc bus, Commander's dc bus, and ac 
busses A and B. 
The four descent stage silver-zinc batteries are identical and have 
a 400 ampere-hour capacity at 28 volts. Because the batteries do not 
have a constant voltage at various states of charge/load levels, "high" 
and r'lo~lr voltage taps are provided for selection. The "low voltage" 
tap is selected to initiate use of a fully charged battery. Cross-tie 
circuits in the busses facilitate an even discharge of the batteries 
regardless of distribution combinations. The two silver-zinc ascent 
stage batteries are identical to each other and have a 296 ampere-hour 
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capacity at 28 volts. The ascent stage batteries are normally connected 
in parallel for even discharge. Because of design load characteristics, 
the ascent stage batteries do not have and do not require high and low 
voltage taps. 
Nominal voltage for ascent stage and descent stage batteries is 
30.0 volts. Reverse current relays for battery failure are one of many 
components designed into the EPS to enhance EPS reliability. Cooling 
of the batteries is provided by the environmental control system cold 
rail heat sinks. Available ascent electrical energy is 17.8 kilowatt 
hours at a maximum drain of 50 amps per battery and descent energy is 
46.9 kilowatt hours at a maximum drain of 25 amps per battery. 
MISSION MONITORING, SUPPORT, AND CONTROL 
Mission execution involves the following functions: prelaunch 
checkout and launch operations; tracking the space vehicle to determine 
its present and future positions; securing information on the status of 
the flight crew and space vehicle systems (via telemetry); evaluation 
of telemetry information; commanding the space vehicle by transmitting 
real-time and updata commands to the onboard computer; and voice com- 
munication between flight and ground crews. 
These functions require the use of a facility to assemble and 
launch the space vehicle (see Launch Complex), a central flight control 
facility, a network of remote stations located strategically around the 
world, a method of rapidly transmitting and receiving information 
between the space vehicle and the central flight control facility, and 
a real-time data display system in which the data are made available 
and presented in usable form at essentially the same time that the data 
event occurred. 
The flight crew and the following organizations and facilities 
participate in mission control operations: 
a. Mission Control Center (MCC), Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), 
Houston, Texas. The MCC contains the communication, computer display, 
and command systems to enable the flight controllers to effectively 
monitor and control the space vehicle. 
b. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Cape Kennedy, Florida. The space 
vehicle is launched from KSC and controlled from the Launch Control 
Center (LCC). Prelaunch, launch, and powered flight data are collected 
at the Central Instrumentation Facility (CIF) at KSC from the launch 
pads, CIF receivers, Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA), and the down- 
range Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) stations. These data are 
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transmitted to MCC via the Apollo Launch Data System (ALDS). Also 
located at KSC (AFETR) is the Impact Predictor (IP), for range safety 
purposes. 
C. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Greenbelt, Maryland. GSFC 
manages and operates the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) and the 
NASA communications (NASCOM) network. During flight, the MSFN is 
under the operational control of the MCC. 
d. George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Huntsville, 
Alabama. MSFC, by means of the Launch Information Exchange Facility 
(LIEF) and the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) provides 
launch vehicle systems real-time support to KSC and MCC for preflight, 
launch, and flight operations. 
A block diagram of the basic flight control interfaces is shown 
in figure 3-10. 
Vehicle Flight Control Capability 
Flight operations are controlled from the MCC. The MCC has two 
flight control rooms, but only one control room is used per mission. 
Each control room, called a Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR), is 
capable of controlling individual Staff Support Rooms (SSR's) located 
adjacent to the MOCR. The SSR's are manned by flight control special- 
ists who provide detailed support to the MOCR. Figure 3-11 outlines 
the organization of the MCC for flight control and briefly describes 
key responsibilities. Information flow within the MOCR is shown in 
figure 3-12. 
The consoles within the MOCR and SSR's permit the necessary inter- 
face between the flight controllers and the spacecraft. The displays 
and controls on these consoles and other group displays provide the 
capability to monitor and evaluate data concerning the mission and, 
based on these evaluations, to recommend or take appropriate action on 
matters concerning the flight crew and spacecraft. 
Problems concerning crew safety and mission success are identified 
to flight control personnel in the following ways: 
a. Flight crew observations 
b. Flight controller real-time observations 
C. Review of telemetry data received from tape recorder playback 
d. Trend analysis of actual and predicted values 
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e. Review of collected data by systems specialists 
f. Correlation and comparison with previous mission data 
g* Analysis of recorded data from launch complex testing 
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ALDS - Apollo Launch Data System 
LIEF - Launch Information Exchange Facility 
Figure 3-lO.- Basic telemetry, command, and communication 
interfaces for flight control. 
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PART 2. APOLLO 13 MISSION DESCRIPTION 
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES 
The primary mission objectives were as follows: 
Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials 
in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro Formation. 
Deploy and activate an Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package 
(ALSEP). 
Develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment. 
Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites. 
Table 3-11 lists the Apollo 13 mission sequence of major events and 
the time of occurrence in ground elapsed time. 
TABLE 3-11. - APOLLO 13 MISSION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
Event Ground elapsed time 
(hr:min:sec) 
Range zero (02:13:00.0 p.m. e.s.t., April 11) 
Earth parking orbit insertion 
Second S-IVB ignition 
Translunar injection 
CSM/S-IVB separation 
Spacecraft ejection from S-IVB 
S-IVB APS evasive maneuver 
S-IVB APS maneuver for lunar impact 
Midcourse correction - 2 (hybrid transfer) 
Cryogenic oqgen tank anomaly 
Midcourse correction - 4 
S-IVB lunar impact 
Pericynthion plus 2-hour maneuver 
Midcourse correction - 5 
Midcourse correction - 7 
Service module jettison 
Lunar module jettison 
Entry interface 
Landing 
oo:oo:oo 
00:12:40 
02:35:46 
02:41:47 
03:06:3g 
04:01:03 
04:18:01 
05:59:59 
30:40:50 
y;:g 
7$56i40 
79:x:39 
105:18:32 
137:39:49 
138:02:06 
141:30:02 
142:40:47 
142:54:41 
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Launch and Earth Parking Orbit 
Apollo 13 was successfully launched on schedule from Launch Complex 
39A, Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13 p.m. e.s.t., April 11, 1970. 
The launch vehicle stages inserted the S-IVB/instrument unit (ILJ)/ 
spacecraft combination into an earth parking orbit with an apogee of 
100.2 nautical miles (n. mi.) and a perigee of 98.0 n. mi. (100-n. mi. 
circular planned). During second stage boost, the center engine of the 
S-II stage cut off about 132 seconds early, causing the remaining four 
engines to burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted. Space 
vehicle velocity after S-II boost was 223 feet per second (fps) lower 
than planned. As a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approx- 
imately 9 seconds longer than predicted with cutoff velocity within 
about 1.2 fps of planned. Total launch vehicle burn time was about 
44 seconds longer than predicted. A greater than 3-sigma probability of 
meeting translunar injection (TLI) cutoff conditions existed with re- 
maining S-IVB propellants. 
After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems 
were verified and preparation was made for translunar injection (TLI). 
Onboard television was initiated at 01:35 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.) 
for about 5.5 minutes. The second S-IVB burn was initiated on schedule 
for TLI. All major systems operated satisfactorily and all end con- 
ditions were nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory. 
Translunar Coast 
The CSM separated from the I.N/IU/S-IVB at about 03:07 g.e.t. On- 
board television was then initiated for about 7'2 minutes and clearly 
showed CSM "hard docking," ejection of the CSM/LM from the S-IVB at 
about 04:Ol g.e.t., and the S-IVB auxiliary propulsion system (APS) 
evasive maneuver as well as spacecraft interior and exterior scenes. 
The SM RCS propellant usage for the separation, transposition, docking, 
and ejection was nominal. All launch vehicle safing activities were 
performed as scheduled. 
The S-IVB APS evasive maneuver by an 8-second APS Ullage burn was 
initiated at 04:18 g.e.t. and was successfully completed. The liquid 
oxygen dump was initiated at Oh:39 g.e.t. and was also successfully 
accomplished. The first S-IVB APS burn for lunar target point impact 
was initiated at 06:00 g.e.t. The burn duration was 217 seconds, pro- 
ducing a differential velocity of approximately 28 fps. Tkacking infor- 
mation available at 08:00 g.e.t. indicated that the S-IVB/IU would impact 
at 6’53’ S., 30'53' W. versus the targeted 3O S., 30° W. Therefore, the 
second S-IVB APS (trim) burn was not required. The gaseous nitrogen pres- 
sure dropped in the IU ST-124-M3 inertial platform at 18:25 g.e.t. and 
the S-IVB/IU no longer had attitude control but began tumbling slowly. 
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At approximately 19:17 g.e.t., a step input in tracking data indicated a 
velocity increase of approximately 4 to 5 fps. No conclusions have been 
reached on the reason for this increase. The velocity change altered 
the lunar impact point closer to the target. The S-IVB/IU impacted the 
lunar surface at 77:56:40 g.e.t. (08:09:40 p.m. e.s.t. April 14) at 
2.4' S., 27.9' W., and the seismometer deployed during the Apollo 12 
mission successfully detected the impact. The targeted impact point was 
125 n. mi. from the seismometer. The actual impact point was 74 n. mi. 
from the seismometer, well within the desired 189-n. mi. (350-km) radius. 
The accuracy of the TLI maneuver was such that spacecraft midcourse 
correction No. 1 (MCC-l), scheduled for 11:41 g.e.t., was not required. 
MCC-2 was performed as planned at 30:&l g.e.t. and resulted in placing 
the spacecraft on the desired, non-free-return circumlunar trajectory 
with a predicted closest approach to the moon on 62 n. mi. All SPS burn 
parameters were normal. The accuracy of MCC-3 was such that MCC-3, 
scheduled for 55:26 g.e.t., was not performed. Good quality television 
coverage of the preparations and performance of MCC-2 was received for 
49 minutes beginning at 30:13 g.e.t. 
At approximately 55:55 g.e.t. (lo:08 p.m. e.s.t.), the crew re- 
ported an undervoltage alarm on the CSM main bus B. Pressure was rapid- 
ly lost in SM oxygen tank no. 2 and fuel cells 1 and 3 current dropped 
to zero due to loss of their oxygen supply. A decision was made to 
abort the mission. The increased load on fuel cell 2 and decaying pres- 
sure in the remaining oxygen tank led to the decision to activate the 
I&l, power down the CSM, and use the LM systems for life support. 
At 61:30 g.e.t., a 38-fps midcourse maneuver (MCC-4) was performed 
by the L&l DPS to place the spacecraft in a free-return trajectory on 
which the CM would nominally land in the Indian Ocean south of Mauritius 
at approximately 152:oo g.e.t. 
Transearth Coast 
At pericynthion plus 2 hours (79:28 g.e.t.), a LM DPS maneuver was 
performed to shorten the return trip time and move the earth landing 
point. The 263.4-second burn produced a differential velocity of 860.5 
fps and resulted in an initial predicted earth landing point in the mid- 
Pacific Ocean at 142:53 g.e.t. Both LM guidance systems were powered 
up and the primary system was used for this maneuver. Following the 
maneuver, passive thermal control was established and the LM was powered 
down to conserve consumables; only the LM environmental control system 
(ECS) and communications and telemetry systems were kept powered up. 
The LM DPS was used to perform MCC-5 at 105:19 g.e.t. The 15-second 
burn (at lo-percent throttle) produced a velocity change of about '7.8 fps 
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and successfully raised the entry flight path angle to -6.52O. 
The CSM was partially powered up for a check of the thermal condi- 
tions of the CM with first reported receipt of S-band signal at 101: 53 
g.e.t. Thermal conditions on all CSM systems observed appeared to be in 
order for entry. 
Due to the unusual spacecraft configuration, new procedures leading 
to entry were developed and verified in ground-based simulations. The 
resulting timeline called for a final midcourse correction (MCC-7) at 
entry interface (EI) -5 hours, jettison of the SM at EI -4.5 hours, then 
jettison of the LM at EI -1 hour prior to a normal atmospheric entry by 
the CM. 
MCC-7 was successfully accomplished at 137:40 g.e.t. The 22.4-second 
I&I RCS maneuver resulted in a predicted entry flight path angle of -6.49’. 
The SM was jettisoned at 138:02 g.e.t. The crew viewed and photographed 
the SM and reported that an entire panel was missing near the S-band high- 
gain antenna and a great deal of debris was hanging out. The CM was pow- 
ered up and then the LM was jettisoned at 141:30 g.e.t. The EI at 40,000 
feet was reached at 142:41 g.e.t. 
Entry and Recovery 
Weather in the prime recovery area was as follows: broken stratus 
clouds at 2000 feet; visibility 10 miles; 6-knot ENE winds; and wave 
height 1 to 2 feet. Drogue and main parachutes deployed normally. 
Visual contact with the spacecraft was reported at 142:50 g.e.t. Landing 
occurred at 142:54:41 g.e.t. (01:07:41 p.m. e.s.t., April 17). The land- 
ing point was in the mid-Pacific Ocean, approximately 21'40' S., 165O22’ W. 
The CM landed in the stable 1 position about 3.5 n. mi. from the prime 
recovery ship, USS IWO JIMA. The crew , picked up by a recovery heli- 
copter, was safe aboard the ship at 1:53 p.m. e.s.t., less than an hour 
after landing. 
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CHAPTER4 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF APOLLO 13 ACCIDENT 

PART 1. INTRODUCTION 
It became clear in the course of the Board's review that the acci- 
dent during the Apollo 13 mission was initiated in the service module 
cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2. Therefore, the following analysis centers 
on that tank and its history. In addition, the recovery steps taken in 
the period beginning with the accident and continuing to reentry are 
discussed. 
Two oxygen tanks essentially identical to oxygen tank no. 2 on 
Apollo 13, and two hydrogen tanks of similar design, operated satisfac- 
torily on several unmanned Apollo flights and on the Apollo 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, and 12 manned missions. With this in mind, the Board placed particu- 
lar emphasis on each difference in the history of oxygen tank no. 2 from 
the history of the earlier tanks, in addition to reviewing the design, 
assembly, and test history. 
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PART 2. OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 HISTORY 
DESIGN 
On February 26, 1966, the North American Aviation Corporation, now 
North American Rockwell (NR), prime contractor for the Apollo command 
and service modules (CSM), awarded a subcontract to the Beech Aircraft 
Corporation (Beech) to design, develop, fabricate, assemble, test, and 
deliver the Block II Apollo cryogenic gas storage subsystem. This was 
a follow-on to an earlier subcontract under which the somewhat different 
Block I subsystem was procured. 
As the simplified drawing in figure 4-l indicates, each oxygen tank 
has an outer shell and an inner shell, arranged to provide a vacuum 
space to reduce heat leak, and a dome enclosing paths into the tank for 
transmission of fluids and electrical power and signals. The space be- 
tween the shells and the space in the dome are filled with insulating 
materials. Mounted in the tank are two tubular assemblies. One, called 
the heater tube, contains two thermostatically protected heater coils 
and two small fans driven by 1800 rpm motors to stir the tank contents. 
The other, called the quantity probe, consists of an upper section which 
supports a cylindrical capacitance gage used to measure electrically the 
quantity of fluid in the tank. The inner cylinder of this probe serves 
both as a fill and drain tube and as one plate of the capacitance gage. 
In addition, a temperature sensor is mounted on the outside of the quan- 
tity probe near the head. Wiring for the gage, the temperature sensor, 
the fan motors, and the heaters passes through the head of the quantity 
probe to a conduit in the dome. From there the wiring runs to a con- 
necter which ties it electrically to the appropriate external circuits 
in the CSM. The routing of wiring and lines from the tank through the 
dome is shown in figure 4-2. 
As shown in figure 4-2, the fill line from the exterior of the SM 
enters the oxygen tank and connects to the inner cylinder of the capaci- 
tance gage through a coupling of two Teflon adapters or sleeves and a 
short length of Inconel tubing. The dimensions and tolerances selected 
are such that if "worst case" variations in an actual system were to 
occur, the coupling might not reach from the fill line to the gage cylin- 
der (fig. 4-3). Thus, the variations might be such that a very loose 
fit would result. 
The supply line from the tank leads from the head of the quantity 
probe to the dome and thence, after passing around the tank between the 
inner and outer shells, exits through the dome to supply oxygen to the 
fuel cells in the service module (SM) and the environmental control 
system (ECS) in the command module (CM). The supply line also connects 
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to a relief valve. Under normal conditions , pressure in the tank is 
measured by a pressure gage in the supply line and a pressure switch 
near this gage is provided to turn on the heaters in the oxygen tank if 
the pressure drops below a preselected value. This periodic addition of 
heat to the tank maintains the pressure at a sufficient level to satisfy 
the demand for oxygen as tank quantity decreases during a flight mission. 
The oxygen tank is designed for a capacity of 320 pounds of super- 
critical oxygen at pressures ranging between 865 to 935 pounds per 
square inch absolute (psia). The tank is initially filled with liquid 
oxygen at -297" F and operates over the range from -340° F to +80’ F. 
The term "supercritical" means that the oxygen is maintained at a temper- 
ature and pressure which assures that it is a homogeneous, single-phase 
fluid. 
The burst pressure of the oxygen tank is about 2200 psi at -150° F, 
over twice the normal operating pressure at that temperature. The relief 
valve is designed to relieve pressure in the oxygen tank overboard at a 
pressure of approximately 1000 psi. The oxygen tank dome is open to the 
vacuum between the inner and outer tank shell and contains a rupture 
disc designed to blow out at about 75 psi. 
The approximate amounts of principal materials within the oxygen 
tank are set forth in table 4-I. 
TABLE 4-I.- MATERIALS WITHIN OXYGEN TANK 
s 
Material 
Teflon-wire insulation 
sleeving and solid 
Aluminum (all forms) 
Stainless steel 
Inconel alloys 
Approximate Available 
quantity, lb energy, Btu 
1.1 2,400 
0.8 20,500 
2.4 15,000 
1.7 2,900 
Two oxygen tanks are mounted on a shelf in bay 4 of the SM, as . - 
hewn in figure 4-4. Figures 4-5 through 4-B are photographs of portions 
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of the Apollo 13 service module (SM 109) at the North American Rockwell 
plant prior to shipment to KSC. Figure 4-5 shows the fuel cell shelf, 
with fuel cell 1 on the right, fuel cell 3 on the left, and fuel cell 2 
behind cells 1 and 3. 'The top of oxygen tank no. 2 can be seen at the 
lower left. Figure 4-6 shows the oxygen tank shelf, with oxygen tank 
no. 2 at left center. Figure 4-7 shows the hydrogen tank shelf with 
hydrogen tank no. 1 on top and hydrogen tank no. 2 below. The bottom 
of the oxygen shelf shows some of the oxygen system instrumentation and 
wiring, largely covered by insulation. Figure 4-8 is a photograph of 
the bay 4 panel, which was missing from the service module after the 
accident. 
A more detailed description of the oxygen tank design is contained 
in Appendix D to this report. 
MANUFACTURE 
The manufacture of oxygen tank no. 2 began in 1966. Under subcon- 
tracts with Beech, the inner shell of the tank was manufactured by the 
Airite Products Division of Electrada Corporation; the quantity probe 
was made by Simmonds Precision Products, Inc.; and the fans and fan 
motors were produced by Globe Industries, Inc. 
The Beech serial number assigned to the oxygen tank no. 2 flown 
in the Apollo 13 was 10024XTAOOO8. It was the eighth Block II oxygen 
tank built. Twenty-eight Block I oxygen tanks had previously been built 
by Beech. 
The design of the oxygen tank is such that once the upper and lower 
halves of the inner and outer shells are assembled and welded, the 
heater assembly must be inserted in the tank, moved to one side, and 
bolted in place. Then the quantity probe is inserted into the tank and 
the heater assembly wires (to the heaters, the thermostats, and the fan 
motors) must be pulled through the head of the quantity probe and the 
32-inch coiled conduit in the dome. Thus, the design requires during 
assembly a substantial amount of wire movement inside the tank, where 
movement cannot be readily observed, and where possible damage to wire 
insulation by scraping or flexing cannot be easily detected before the 
tank is capped off and welded closed. 
Several minor manufacturing flaws were discovered in oxygen tank 
no. 2 in the course of testing. A porosity in a weld on the lower half 
of the outer shell necessitated grinding and rewelding. Rewelding was 
also required when it was determined that incorrect welding wire had 
been inadvertently used for a small weld on a vacuum pump mounted on 
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the outside of the tank dome. The upper fan motor originally installed 
was noisy and drew excessive current. The tank was disassembled and the 
heater assembly, fans, and heaters were replaced with a new assembly 
and new fans. The tank was then assembled and sealed for the second 
time, and the space between the inner and outer shells was pumped down 
over a 28-day period to create the necessary vacuum. 
TANK TESTS AT BEECH 
Acceptance testing of oxygen tank no. 2 at Beech included extensive 
dielectric, insulation, and functional tests of heaters, fans, and vac- 
ion pumps. The tank was then leak tested at 500 psi and proof tested 
at 1335 psi with helium. 
After the helium proof test, the tank was filled with liquid oxygen 
and pressurized to a proof pressure of 1335 psi by use of the tank 
heaters powered by 65 V Etc. Extensive heat-leak tests were run at 
900 psi for 25 to 30 hours over a range of ambient conditions and out- 
flow rates. At the conclusion of the heat-leak tests, about 100 pounds 
of oxygen remained in the tank. About three-fourths of this was released 
by venting the tank at a controlled rate through the supply line to 
about 20 psi. The tank was then emptied by applying warm gas at about 
30 psi to the vent line to force the liquid oxygen (LOX) in the tank out 
the fill line (see fig. h-2). No difficulties were recorded in this 
detanking operation. 
The acceptance test indicated that the rate of heat leak into the 
tank was higher than permitted by the specifications. After some re- 
working, the rate improved, but was still somewhat higher than specified. 
The tank was accepted with a formal waiver of this condition. Several 
other minor discrepancies were also accepted. These included oversized 
holes in the support for the electrical plug in the tank dome, and an 
oversized rivet hole in the heater assembly just above the lower fan. 
None of these items were serious, and the tank was accepted, filled with 
helium at 5 psi, and shipped to NR on May 3, 1967. 
ASSEMBLY AND TEST AT NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL 
The assembly of oxygen shelf serial number 0632AAG3277, with Beech 
oxygen tank serial number 10024XTAOOOg as oxygen tank no. 1 and serial 
number 10024XTAOOO8 as oxygen tank no. 2, was completed on March 11, 1968. 
The shelf was to be installed in SM 106 for flight in the Apollo 10 
mission. 
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Beginning on April 27, the assembled oxygen shelf underwent stand- 
ard proof-pressure, leak, and functional checks. One valve on the shelf 
leaked and was repaired, but no anomalies were noted with regard to 
oxygen tank no. 2, and therefore no rework of oxygen tank no. 2 was 
required. None of the oxygen tank testing at NR requires use of LOX 
in the tanks. 
On June 4, 1968, the shelf was installed in SM 106. 
Between August 3 and August 8, 1968, testing of the shelf in the 
SM was conducted. No anomalies were noted. 
Due to electromagnetic interference problems with the vat-ion 
pumps on cryogenic tank domes in earlier Apollo spacecraft, a modifica- 
tion was introduced and a decision was made to replace the complete 
oxygen shelf in SM 106. An oxygen shelf with approved modifications was 
prepared for installation in SM 106. On October 21, 1968, the oxygen 
shelf was removed from SM 106 for the required modification and instal- 
lation in a later spacecraft. 
The oxygen shelf was removed in the manner shown in figure 4-9. 
After various lines and wires were disconnected and bolts which hold 
the shelf in the SM were removed, a fixture suspended from a crane was 
placed under the shelf and used to lift the shelf and extract it from 
bay 4. One shelf bolt was mistakenly left in place during the initial 
attempt to remove the shelf; and as a consequence, after the front of 
the shelf was raised about 2 inches, the fixture broke, allowing the 
shelf to drop back into place. Photographs of the underside of the 
fuel cell shelf in SM 106 indicate that the closeout cap on the dome 
of oxygen tank no. 2 may have struck the underside of that shelf during 
this incident. At the time, however, it was believed that the oxygen 
shelf had simply dropped back into place and an analysis was performed 
to calculate the forces resulting from a drop of 2 inches. It now 
seems likely that the shelf was first accelerated upward and then 
dropped. 
The remaining bolt was then removed, the incident recorded, and 
the oxygen shelf was removed without further difficulty. Following 
removal, the oxygen shelf was retested to check shelf integrity, in- 
cluding proof-pressure tests, leak tests, and functional tests of 
pressure transducers and switches, thermal switches, and vat-ion pumps. 
No cryogenic testing was conducted. Visual inspection revealed no 
problem. These tests would have disclosed external leakage or serious 
internal malfunctions of most types, but would not disclose fill line 
leakage within oxygen tank no. 2. Further calculations and tests con- 
ducted during this investigation, however, have indicated that the 
forces experienced by the shelf were probably close to those originally 
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calculated assuming a 2-inch drop only. The probability of tank damage 
from this incident, therefore, is now considered to be rather low, 
although it is possible that a loosely fitting fill tube could have 
been displaced by the event. 
The shelf passed these tests and was installed in SM 109 on 
November 22, 1968. The shelf tests accomplished earlier in SM 106 
were repeated in SM 109 in late December and early January, with no 
significant problems, and SM 109 was shipped to Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) in June of 1969 for further testing, assembly on the launch 
vehicle, and launch. 
TESTING AT KSC 
At the Kennedy Space Center the CM and the SM were mated, checked, 
assembled on the Saturn V launch vehicle, and the total vehicle was 
moved to the launch pad. 
The countdown demonstration test (CDDT) began on March 16, 1970. 
Up to this point, nothing unusual about oxygen tank no. 2 had been 
noted during the extensive testing at KSC. The oxygen tanks were 
evacuated to 5mm Hg followed by an oxygen pressure of about 80 psi. 
After the cooling of the fuel cells, cryogenic oxygen loading and tank 
pressurization to 331 psi were completed without abnormalities. At the 
time during CDDT when the oxygen tanks are normally partially emptied 
to about 50 percent of capacity, oxygen tank no. lbehaved normally, 
but oxygen tank no. 2 only went down to 92 percent of its capacity. 
The normal procedure during CDDT to reduce the quantity in the tank is 
to apply gaseous oxygen at 80 psi through the vent line and to open 
the fill line. When this procedure failed, it was decided to proceed 
with the CDDT until completion and then look at the oxygen detanking 
problem in detail. An Interim Discrepancy Report was written and 
transferred to a Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Discrepancy Report, 
since a GSE filter was suspected. 
On Friday, March 27, 1970, detanking operations were resumed, after 
discussions of the problem had been held with KSC, MSC, NR, and Beech 
personnel participating, either personally or by telephone. As a first 
step, oxygen tank no. 2, which had self-pressurized to 178 psi and was 
about 83 percent full, was vented through its fill line. The quantity 
decreased to 65 percent. Further discussions between KSC, MSC, NR, 
and Beech personnel considered that the problem might be due to a leak 
in the path between the fill line and the quantity probe due to loose 
fit in the sleeves and tube. Referring to figure 4-2, it will be noted 
that such a leak would allow the gaseous oxygen (GOX) being supplied 
to the vent line to leak directly to the fill line without forcing any 
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significant amount of LOX out of the tank. At this point, a discrep- 
ancy report against the spacecraft system was written. 
A "normal" detanking procedure was then conducted on both oxygen 
tanks, pressurizing through the vent line and opening the fill lines. 
Tank no. 1 emptied in a few minutes. Tank no. 2 did not. Additional 
attempts were made with higher pressures without effect, and a decision 
was made to try to "boil off" the remaining oxygen in tank no. 2 by 
use of the tank heaters. The heaters were energized with the 65 V dc. 
GSE power supply, and, about l-1/2 hours later, the fans were turned 
on to add more heat and mixing. After 6 hours of heater operation, 
the quantity had only decreased to 35 percent, and it was decided to 
attempt a pressure cycling technique. With the heaters and fans still 
energized, the tank was pressurized to about 300 psi, held for a few 
minutes, and then vented through the fill line. The first cycle 
produced a 'I-percent quantity decrease, and the process was continued, 
with the tank emptied after five pressure/vent cycles. The fans and 
heaters were turned off after about 8 hours of heater operation. 
Suspecting the loosely fitting fill line connection to the quantity 
probe inner cylinder, KSC personnel consulted with cognizant personnel 
at MSC and at NR and decided to test whether the oxygen tank no. 2 
could be filled without problems. It was decided that if the tank could 
be filled, the leak in the fill line would not be a problem in flight, 
since it was felt that even a loose tube resulting in an electrical 
short between the capacitance plates of the quantity gage would result 
in an energy level too low to cause any other damage. 
Replacement of the oxygen shelf in the CM would have been difficult 
and would have taken at least 45 hours. In addition, shelf replacement 
would have had the potential of damaging or degrading other elements of 
the SM in the course of replacement activity. Therefore, the decision 
was made to test the ability to fill oxygen tank no. 2 on March 30, 
1970, twelve days prior to the scheduled Saturday, April 11, launch, 
so as to be in a position to decide on shelf replacement well before 
the launch date. 
Accordingly, flow tests with GOX were run on oxygen tank no. 2 
and on oxygen tank no. 1 for comparison. No problems were encountered, 
and the flow rates in the two tanks were similar. In addition, Beech 
was asked to test the electrical energy level reached in the event of 
a short circuit between plates of the quantity probe capacitance gage. 
This test showed that very low energy levels would result. On the 
filling test, oxygen tanks no. 1 and no. 2 were filled with LOX to 
about 20 percent of capacity on March 30 with no difficulty. Tank no. 1 
emptied in the normal manner, but emptying oxygen tank no. 2 again 
required pressure cycling with the heaters turned on. 
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As the launch date approached, the oxygen tank no. 2 detsnking 
problem was considered by the Apollo organization. At this point, 
the "shelf drop" incident on October 21, 1968, at NR was not considered 
and it was felt that the apparently normal de-tanking which had occurred 
in 1967 at Beech was not pertinent because it was believed that a 
different procedure was used by Beech. In fact, however, the last 
portion of the procedure was quite similar, although a slightly lower 
GOX pressure was utilized. 
Throughout these considerations, which involved technical and 
management personnel of KSC, MSC, NR, Beech, and NASA Headquarters, 
emphasis was directed toward the possibility and consequences of a loose 
fill tube; very little attention was paid to the extended operation of 
heaters and fans except to note that they apparently operated during 
and after the detsnking sequences. 
Many of the principals in the discussions were not aware of the 
extended heater operations. Those that did know the details of the 
procedure did not consider the possibility of damage due to excessive 
heat within the tank, and therefore did not advise management officials 
of any possible consequences of the unusually long heater operations. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, and shown in figure 4-2, each 
heater is protected with a thermostatic switch, mounted on the heater 
tube, which is intended to open the heater circuit when it senses a 
temperature of 80' F. In tests conducted at MSC since the accident, 
however, it was found that the switches failed to open when the 
heaters were powered from a 65 V dc supply similar to the power used 
at KSC during the detanking sequence. Subsequent investigations have 
shown that the thermostatic switches used, while rated as satisfactory 
for the 28 V dc spacecraft power supply, could not open properly at 
65 V dc. Qualification and test procedures for the heater assemblies 
and switches do not at any time test the capability of the switches 
to open while under full current conditions. A review of the voltage 
recordings made during the de-tanking at KSC indicates that, in fact, 
the switches did not open when the temperature indication from within 
the tank rose past 80' F. Further tests have shown that the tempera- 
tures on the heater tube may have reached as much as 1000° F during 
the de-tanking. This temperature will cause serious damage to adjacent 
Teflon insulation, and such damage almost certainly occurred. 
None of the above, however, Fras known at the time and, after 
extensive consideration was given to all possibilities of damage from 
a loose fill tube, it was decided to leave the oxygen shelf and oxygen 
tank no. 2 in the SM and to proceed with preparations .for the launch 
of Apollo 13. 
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The manufacture and test history of oxygen tank no. 2 is discussed 
in more detail in Appendix C to this report. 
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PART 3. THE APOLLO 13 FLIGHT 
The Apollo 13 mission was designed to perform the third manned 
lunar landing. The selected site was in the hilly uplands of the Fra 
Mauro formation. A package of five scientific experiments was planned 
for emplacement on the lunar surface near the lunar module (LM) landing 
point: (1) a 1 unar passive seismometer to measure and relay meteoroid 
impact and moonquakes and to serve as the second point in a seismic net 
begun with the Apollo 12 seismometer; (2) a heat flow device for measur- 
ing the heat flux from the lunar interior to the surface and surface 
material conductivity to a depth of 3 meters; (3) a charged-particle 
lunar environment experiment for measuring solar wind proton and electron 
effects on the lunar environment; (4) a cold cathode gage for measuring 
density and temperature variations in the lunar atmosphere; and (5) a 
dust detector experiment. 
Additionally, the Apollo 13 landing crew was to gather the third 
set of selenological samples of the lunar surface for return to earth 
for extensive scientific analysis. Candidate future landing sites were 
scheduled to be photographed from lunar orbit with a high-resolution 
topographic camera carried aboard the command module. 
During the week prior to launch, backup Lunar Module Pilot Charles 
M. Duke, Jr., contracted rubella. Blood tests were performed to deter- 
mine prime crew immunity, since Duke had been in close contact with the 
prime crew. These tests determined that prime Commander James A. Love11 
and prime Lunar Module Pilot Fred Haise were immune to rubella, but that 
prime Command Module Pilot Thomas K. Mattingly III did not have immunity. 
Consequently, following 2 days of intensive simulator training at the 
Kennedy Space Center, backup Command Module Pilot John L. Swigert, Jr., 
was substituted in the prime crew to replace Mattingly. Swigert had 
trained for several months with the backup crew, and this additional 
work in the simulators was aimed toward integrating him into the prime 
crew so that the new combination of crewmen could function as a team 
during the mission. 
Launch was on time at 2:l3 p.m., e.s.t., on April 11, 1970, from the 
KSC Launch Complex 39A. The spacecraft was inserted into a loo-nautical- 
mile circular earth orbit. The only significant launch phase anomaly was 
premature shutdown of the center engine of the S-II second stage. As a 
result, the remaining four S-II engines burned 34 seconds longer than 
planned and the S-IVB third stage burned a few seconds longer than plan- 
ned. At orbital insertion, the velocity was within 1.2 feet per second 
of the planned velocity. Moreover, an adequate propellant margin was 
maintained in the S-IVB for the translunar injection burn. 
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Orbital insertion was at 00:12:39 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.). 
The initial one and one-half earth orbits before translunar injection 
(TLI) were spent in spacecraft systems checkout and included television 
transmissions as Apollo 13 passed over the Merritt Island Launch Area, 
Florida, tracking station. 
The S-IVB restarted at 02:35:46 g.e.t. for the translunar injection 
burn, with shutdown coming some 5 minutes 51 seconds later. Accuracy of 
the Saturn V instrument unit guidance for the TLI burn was such that a 
planned midcourse correction maneuver at 11:41:23 g.e.t, was not neces- 
sary. After TLI, Apollo 13 was calculated to be on a free-return trajec- 
tory with a predicted closest approach to the lunar surface of 210 
nautical miles. 
The CSM was separated from the S-IVB about 3 hours after launch, 
and after a brief period of stationkeeping, the crew maneuvered the CSM 
to dock with the LM vehicle in the LM adapter atop the S-IVB stage. The 
S-IVB stage was separated from the docked CSM and L&I shortly after 4 
hours into the mission. 
In manned lunar missions prior to Apollo 13, the spent S-IVB third 
stages were accelerated into solar orbit by a "slingshot" maneuver in 
which residual liquid oxygen was dumped through the J-2 engine to pro- 
vide propulsive energy. On Apollo 13, the plan was to impact the S-IVB 
stage on the lunar surface in proximity to the seismometer emplaced in 
the Ocean of Storms by the crew of Apollo 12. 
Two hours after TLI, the S-IVB attitude thrusters were ground com- 
manded on to adjust the stage's trajectory toward the designated impact 
at latitude 3' S. by longitude 30' W. Actual impact was at latitude 
2.4O S. by longitude 27.9' W.--74 nautical miles from the Apollo 12 
seismometer and well within the desired range. Impact was at 77:56:40 
g.e.t. Seismic signals relayed by the Apollo 12 seismometer as the 
30,700-pound stage hit the Moon lasted almost 4 hours and provided lunar 
scientists with additional data on the structure of the Moon. 
As in previous lunar missions, the Apollo 13 spacecraft was set up 
in the passive thermal control (PTC) mode which calls for a continuous 
roll rate of three longitudinal axis revolutions each hour. During crew 
rest periods and at other times in translunar and transearth coast when 
a stable attitude is not required, the spacecraft is placed in PTC to 
stabilize the thermal response by spacecraft structures and systems. 
At 30:40:49 g.e.t., a midcourse correction maneuver was made using 
the service module propulsion system. The crew preparations for the 
burn and the burn itself were monitored by the Mission Control Center 
(MMC) at MSC by telemetered data and by television from the spacecraft. 
This midcourse correction maneuver was a 23.2 feet per second hybrid 
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transfer burn which took Apollo 13 off a free-return trajectory and 
placed it on a non-free-return trajectory. A similar trajectory had been 
flown on Apollo 12. The objective of leaving a free-return trajectory 
is to control the arrival time at the Moon to insure the proper lighting 
conditions at the landing site. Apollo 8, 10, and 11 flew a pure free- 
return trajectory until lunar orbit insertion. The Apollo 13 hybrid 
transfer maneuver lowered the predicted closest approach, or pericyn- 
thion, altitude at the Moon from 210 to 64 nautical miles. 
From launch through the first 46 hours of the mission, the perform- 
ance of oxygen tank no. 2 was normal, so far as telemetered data and 
crew observations indicate. At 46:40:02, the crew turned on the fans in 
oxygen tank no. 2 as a routine operation. Within 3 seconds, the oxygen 
tank no. 2 quantity indication changed from a normal reading of about 
82 percent full to an obviously incorrect reading "off-scale high," of 
over 100 percent. Analysis of the electrical wiring of the quantity gage 
shows that this erroneous reading could be caused by either a short cir- 
cuit or an open circuit in the gage wiring or a short circuit between 
the gage plates. Subsequent events indicated that a short was the more 
likely failure mode. 
At 47:54:50 and at 51:07:44, the oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned 
on again, with no apparent adverse effects. The quantity gage continued 
to read off-scale high. 
Following a rest period, the Apollo 13 crew began preparations for 
activating and powering up the L&l for checkout. At 53:27 g.e.t., the 
Commander (CMR) and Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) were cleared to enter the 
LM to commence inflight inspection of the LM. Ground tests before launch 
had indicated the possibility of a high heat-leak rate in the LM descent 
stage supercritical helium tank. Crew verification of actual pressures 
found the helium pressure to be within normal limits. Supercritical 
helium is stored in the LM for pressurizing propellant tanks. 
The I&l was powered down and preparations were underway to close the 
LM hatch and run through the presleep checklist when the accident in 
oxygen tank no. 2 occurred. 
At 55:52:30 g.e.t., a master alarm on the CM caution and warning 
system alerted the crew to a low pressure indication in the cryogenic 
hydrogen tank no. 1. This tank had reached the low end of its normal 
operating pressure range several times previously during the flight. 
At 55:52:58, flight controllers in the MCC requested the crew to turn 
on the cryogenic system fans and heaters. 
The Command Module Pilot (CMP) acknowledged the fan cycle request 
at 55:53:06 g.e.t., and data indicate that current was applied to the 
oxygen tank no. 2 fan motors at 55:53:20. 
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About l-1/2 minutes later, at 55:54:53.555, telemetry from the 
spacecraft was lost almost totally for 1.8 seconds. During the period 
of data loss, the caution and warning system alerted the crew to a low 
voltage condition on dc main bus B. At about the same time, the crew 
heard a loud "bang" and realized that a problem existed in the 
spacecraft. 
The events between fan turnon at 55:53:20 and the time when the 
problem was evident to the crew and Mission Control are covered in some 
detail in Part 4 of this chapter, "Summary Analysis of the Accident." 
It is now clear that oxygen tank no. 2 or its associated tubing lost 
pressure integrity because of combustion within the tank, and that ef- 
fects of oxygen escaping from the tank caused the removal of the panel 
covering bay 4 and a relatively slow leak in oxygen tank no. 1 or its 
lines or valves. Photos of the SM taken by the crew later in the mis- 
sion show the panel missing, the fuel cells on the shelf above the 
oxygen shelf tilted, and the high-gain antenna damaged. 
The resultant loss of oxygen made the fuel cells inoperative, leav- 
ing the CM with batteries normally used only during reentry as the sole 
power source and with only that oxygen contained in a surge tank and 
repressurization packages (used to repressurize the CM arter cabin vent- 
ing). The LM, therefore, became the only source of sufficient electri- 
cal power and oxygen to permit safe return of the crew to Earth, 
The various telemetered parameters of primary interest are shown 
in figure 4-10 and listed in table b-11. 
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TABLE '+-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT 
Time, g.e.t. Event 
Events During 52 Seconds Prior to First Observed Abnormality 
55:52:31 Master caution and warning triggered by low hydrogen 
pressure in tank no. 1. Alarm is turned off after 
4 seconds. 
55:52:58 Ground requests tank stir. 
55:53:06 Crew acknowledges tank stir. 
55:53:18 Oxygen tank no. 1 fans on. 
55:53:19 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure decreases 8 psi. 
55:53:20 Oxygen tank no. 2 fans turned on. 
55:53:20 Stabilization control system electrical disturbance 
indicates a power transient. 
55:53:21 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure decreases 4 psi. 
Abnormal Events During 90 Seconds Preceding the Accident 
55:53:22.718 
55:53:22.757 
55:53:22.772 
55:53:36 
55:53:38.057 
55:53:38.085 
Stabilization control system electrical disturbance 
indicates a power transient. 
1.2-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage. 
11.1~amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one 
sample. 
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins rise lasting 
for 24 seconds. 
U-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage for one 
sample. 
Stabilization control system electrical disturbance 
indicates a power transient. 
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TABLE &II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Continued 
Time, g.e.t. Event 
55:53:41.172 
55:53:41.192 
22.9-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one sample. 
Stabilization control system electrical disturbance 
indicates a power transient. 
55:54:00 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise ends at a pressure 
of 953.8 psia. 
55:54:15 
55:54:30 
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise. 
Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity drops from full scale 
for 2 seconds and then reads 75.3 percent. 
55:54:31 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins to rise 
rapidly. 
55:54:43 Flow rate of oxygen to all three fuel cells begins 
to decrease. 
55:54:45 Oxygen.tank no. 2 pressure reaches maximum value 
of 1008.3 psia. 
55:54:48 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature rises 40" F for one 
sample (invalid reading). 
55:54:51 
55:54:52 
55:54:52.703 
Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity jumps to off-scale high 
and then begins to drop until the time of telemetry 
loss, indicating failed sensor. 
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads -151.3' F. 
55:54:52.763 
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature suddenly goes off- 
scale low, indicating failed sensor. 
Last telemetered pressure from oxygen tank no. 2 
before telemetry loss is 995.7 psia. 
55:54:53.182 Sudden accelerometer activity on X, Y, and Z axes. 
55:54:53.220 Stabilization control system body rate changes 
begin. 
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TABLE b-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Continued 
Time, g.e.t. Event 
55:54:53.323 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure drops 4.2 psi. 
55:54:53.5 2.8~amp rise in total fuel cell current. 
X, Y, and Z accelerations in CM indicate l.l7g, 
0.65g aa 0.65g, respectively. 
1.8-Second Data Loss 
55:54:53.555 Loss of telemetry begins. 
55:54:53*555+ Master caution and warning triggered by dc main 
bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 6 
seconds. All indications are that the cryogenic 
oxygen tank no. 2 lost pressure in this time period 
and the panel separated. 
55:54:54.741 Nitrogen pressure in fuel cell 1 is off-scale low 
indicating failed sensor. 
55:54:55.35 Recovery of telemetry data. 
Events During 5 Minutes Following the Accident 
55:54:56 Service propulsion system engine valve body tempera- 
ture begins a rise of 1.65O F in 7 seconds. 
55:54:56 DC main bus A decreases 0.9 volt to 28.5 volts and 
dc main bus B decreases 0.9 volt to 29.0 volts. 
55:54:56 Total fuel cell current is 15 amps higher than the 
final value before telemetry loss. High current 
continues for 19 seconds. 
55:54:56 
55:54:56 
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads off-scale high 
after telemetry recovery, probably indicating failed 
sensors. 
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads off-scale low fol- 
lowing telemetry recovery, indicating a broken supply 
line, a tank pressure below 19 psi, or a failed sensor. 
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TABLE b-II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Continued 
Time, g.e.t. Event 
55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure reads 781.9 psia and 
begins to drop steadily. 
55:54:57 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity reads off-scale high 
following telemetry recovery indicating failed sensor. 
55:54:59 The reaction control system helium tank C temperature 
begins a 1.66" F increase in 36 seconds. 
55:55:01 Oxygen flow rates to fuel cells 1 and 3 approached 
zero after decreasing for 7 seconds. 
55:55:02 The surface temperature of the service module oxi- 
dizer tank in bay 3 begins a 3.8' F increase in a 
15-second period. 
55:55:02 The service propulsion system helium tank temperature 
begins a 3.8O F increase in a 32-second period. 
55:55:09 DC main bus A voltage recovers to 29.0 volts; dc 
main bus B recovers to 28.8 volts. 
55:55:20 Crew reports, "I believe we've had a problem here." 
55:55:35 Crew reports, "We've had a main B bus undervolt." 
55:55:49 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins steady drop 
lasting 59 seconds, probably indicating failed sensor. 
55:56:10 Crew reports, "Okay right now, Houston. The voltage 
is looking good, and we had a pretty large bang 
associated with the caution and warning there. And 
as I recall, main B was the one that had had an amp 
spike on it once before." 
55:56:38 Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity becomes erratic for 69 
seconds before assuming an off-scale-low state, 
indicating failed sensor. 
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TABLE &II.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM 
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Concluded 
Time, g.e.t. Event 
55: 57:04 Crew reports, "That jolt must have rocked the 
sensor on--see now--oxygen quantity 2. It was 
oscillating down around 20 to 60 percent. Now 
it's full-scale high again." 
55:57:39 
55:57:40 
55:57:44 
55:57:45 
55:57:59 
55:58:02 
55:58:06 
55:58:07 DC main bus A drops below 26.25 volts and in the 
next few seconds levels off at 25.5 volts. 
55:58:07 Crew reports, rrac 2 is showing zip." 
55:58:25 Crew reports, tlYes, we got a main bus A undervolt 
now, too, showing. It's reading about 25-l/2. 
Main B is reading zip right now." 
56:00:06 
Master caution and warning triggered by dc main 
bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 
6 seconds. 
DC main bus B drops below 26.25 volts and continues 
to fall rapidly. 
AC bus 2 fails within 2 seconds 
Fuel cell 3 fails. 
Fuel cell 1 current begins to decrease. 
Master caution and warning caused by ac bus 2 
being reset. Alarm is turned off after 2 seconds. 
Master caution and warning triggered by dc main 
bus A undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 13 
seconds. 
Master caution and warning triggered by high hydrogen 
flow rate to fuel cell 2. Alarm is turned off in 
2 seconds. 
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PART 4. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT 
Combustion in oxygen tank no. 2 led to failure of that tank, damage 
to oxygen tank no. 1 or its lines or valves adjacent to tank no. 2, 
removal of the bay 4 panel and, through the resultant loss of all three 
fuel cells, to the decision to abort the Apollo 13 mission. In the 
attempt to determine the cause of ignition in oxygen tank no. 2, the 
course of propagation of the combustion, the mode of tank failure, and 
the way in which subsequent damage occurred, the Board has carefully 
sifted through all available evidence and examined the results of spe- 
cial tests and analyses conducted by the Apollo organization and by or 
for the Board after the accident. (For more information on details of 
mission events, design, manufacture and test of the system, and special 
tests and analyses conducted in this investigation, refer to Appendices 
B, C, D, E, and F of this report.) 
Although tests and analyses are continuing, sufficient information 
is now available to provide a reasonably clear picture of the nature of 
the accident and the events which led up to it. It is now apparent that 
the extended heater operation at KSC damaged the insulation on wiring 
in the tank and thus made the wiring susceptible to the electrical short 
circuit which probably initiated combustion within the tank. While the 
exact point of initiation of combustion may never be known with cer- 
tainty, the nature of the occurrence is sufficiently understood to per- 
mit taking corrective steps to prevent its recurrence. 
The Board has identified the most probable failure mode. 
The following discussion treats the accident in its key phases: 
initiation , propagation of combustion, loss of oxygen tank no. 2 system 
integrity, and loss of oxygen tank no. 1 system integrity. 
INITIATION 
Key Data 
55:53:20* Oxygen tank no. 2 fans turned on. 
55:53:22.757 1.2-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage. 
*In evaluating telemetry data, consideration must be given to the 
fact that the Apollo pulse code modulation (PCM) system samples data in 
time and quantitizes in amplitude. For further information, reference 
may be made to Part B7 of Appendix B. 
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55:53:22.772 ll.l-ampere "spike" recorded in fuel cell 3 current 
followed by drop in current and rise in voltage typ- 
ical of removal of power from one fan motor--indicat- 
ing opening of motor circuit. 
55:53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise. 
The evidence points strongly to an electrical short circuit with 
arcing as the initiating event. About 2.7 seconds after the fans were 
turned on in the SM oxygen tanks, an ll.l-ampere current spike and 
simultaneously a voltage-drop spike were recorded in the spacecraft 
electrical system. Immediately thereafter, current drawn from the fuel 
cells decreased by an amount consistent with the loss of power to one 
fan. No other changes in spacecraft power were being made at the time. 
No power was on the heaters in the tanks at the time and the quantity 
gage and temperature sensor are very low power devices. The next anom- 
alous event recorded was the beginning of a pressure rise in oxygen 
tank no. 2, 13 seconds later. Such a time lag is possible with low- 
level combustion at the time. These facts point to the likelihood that 
an electrical short circuit with arcing occurred in the fan motor or its 
leads to initiate the accident sequence. The energy available from the 
short circuit was probably 10 to 20 joules. Tests conducted during 
this investigation have shown that this energy is more than ade- 
quate to ignite Teflon of the type contained within the tank. (The 
quantity gage in oxygen tank no. 2 had failed at 46:40 g.e.t. There 
is no evidence tying the quantity gage failure directly to accident 
initiation, particularly in view of the very low energy available 
from the gage.) 
This likelihood of electrical initiation is enhanced by the high 
probability that the electrical wires within the tank were damaged dur- 
ing the abnormal detanking operation at KSC prior to launch. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence pointing to any other mechanism 
of initiation. 
PROPAGATION OF COMBUSTION 
Key Data 
55:53:36 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins rise (same event 
noted previously). 
55:53:38.057 U-volt decrease recorded in ac bus 2 voltage. 
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55:53:41.172 22.9-ampere "spike" recorded in fuel cell 3 current, 
followed by drop in current and rise in voltage typ- 
ical of one fan motor -- indicating opening of another 
motor circuit. 
55:54:00 
55:54:15 
55:54:30 
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure levels off at 954 psia. 
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise again. 
Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage reading drops from 
full scale (to which it had failed at 46:40 g.e.t.) 
to zero and then read 75-percent full. This behav- 
ior indicates the gage short circuit may have cor- 
rected itself. 
55:54:31 Oxygen tank no, 2 temperature begins to rise rapidly. 
55:54:45 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reading reaches maximum 
recorded value of 1008 psia. 
55:54:52.763 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reading had dropped to 
996 psia. 
The available evidence points to a combustion process as the cause 
of the pressure and temperature increases recorded in oxygen tank no. 2. 
The pressure reading for oxygen tank no. 2 began to increase about 13 
seconds after the first electrical spike, and about 55 seconds later the 
temperature began to increase. The temperature sensor reads local tem- 
perature, which need not represent bulk fluid temperature. Since the 
rate of pressure rise in the tank indicates a relatively slow propaga- 
tion of burning, it is likely that the region immediately around the 
temperature sensor did not become heated until this time. 
There are materials within the tank that can, if ignited in the 
presence of supercritical oxygen, react chemically with the oxygen in 
exothermic chemical reactions. The most readily reactive is Teflon 
used for electrical insulation in the tank. Also potentially reactive 
are metals, particularly aluminum. There is more than sufficient Tef- 
lon in the tank, if reacted with oxygen, to account for the pressure and 
temperature increases recorded. Furthermore, the pressure rise took 
place over a period of more than 69 seconds, a relatively long period, 
and one which would be more likely characteristic of Teflon combustion 
than metal-oxygen reactions. 
While the data available on the combustion of Teflon in supercrit- 
ical oxygen in zero-g are extremely limited, those which are available 
indicate that the rate of combustion is generally consistent with these 
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observations. The cause of the 15-second period of relatively constant 
pressure first indicated at 55:53:59.763 has not been precisely deter- 
mined; it is believed to be associated with a change in reaction rate as 
combustion proceeded through various Teflon elements. 
While there is enough electrical power in the tank to cause ignition 
in the event of a short circuit or abnormal heating in defective wire, 
there is not sufficient electric power to account for all of the energy 
required to produce the observed pressure rise. 
LOSS OF OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 SYSTEM II'JTEGRITY 
Key Data 
55:54:52 Last valid temperature indication (-151" F) from 
oxygen tank no. 2. 
55:54:52.763 Last pressure reading from oxygen tank no. 2 before 
loss of data--996 psia. 
55:54:53.182 Sudden accelerometer activity on X, Y, and Z axes. 
55:54:53.220 Stabilization control system body rate changes begin. 
55:54:53.555* Loss of telemetry data begins. 
55:54:55.35 Recovery of telemetry data. 
55:54:56 Various temperature indications in SM begin slight 
rises. 
55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads off-scale high. 
55:54:56 Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads off-scale low. 
After the relatively slow propagation process described above took 
place, there wa.s a relatively abrupt loss of oxygen tank no. 2 integ- 
rity. About 69 seconds after the pressure began to rise, it reached the 
peak recorded, 1008 psia, the pressure at which the cryogenic oxygen 
tank relief valve is designed to be fully open. Pressure began a decrease 
for 8 seconds, dropping to 996 psia before readings were lost. Virtually 
*Several bits of data have been obtained from this "loss of teleme- 
try data" period. 
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all signals from the spacecraft were lost about 1.85 seconds after the 
last presumably valid reading from within the tank, a temperature read- 
ing, and 0.8 second after the last presumably valid pressure reading 
(which may or may not reflect the pressure within the tank itself since 
the pressure transducer is about 20 feet of tubing length distant). 
Abnormal spacecraft accelerations were recorded approximately 0.42 sec- 
ond after the last pressure reading and approximately 0.38 second before 
the loss of signal. These facts all point to a relatively sudden loss 
of integrity. At about this time, several solenoid valves, including 
the oxygen valves feeding two of the three fuel cells, were shocked to 
the closed position. The "bang" reported by the crew also probably 
occurred in this time period. Telemetry signals from Apollo 13 were 
lost fox a period of 1.8 seconds. When signal was reacquired, all instru- 
ment indicators from oxygen tank no. 2 were off-scale, high or low. Tem- 
peratures recorded by sensors in several different locations in the SM 
showed slight increases in the several seconds following reacquisition 
of signal. Photographs taken later by the Apollo 13 crew as the SM was 
jettisoned show that the bay 4 panel was ejected, undoubtedly during 
this event. 
Data are not adequate to determine precisely the way in which the 
oxygen tank no. 2 system lost its integrity. However, available infor- 
mation, analyses, and tests performed during this investigation indicate 
that most probably the combustion within the pressure vessel ultimately 
led to localized heating and failure at the pressure vessel closure. It 
is at this point, the upper end of the quantity probe, that the l/2-inch 
Inconel conduit is located, through which the Teflon-insulated wires 
enter the pressure vessel. It is likely that the combustion progressed 
along the wire insulation and reached this location where all of the 
wires come together. This , possibly augmented by ignition of the metal 
in the upper end of the probe, led to weakening and failure of the 
closure or the conduit, or both. 
Failure at this point would lead immediately to pressurization of 
the tank dome, which is equipped with a rupture disc rated at about 75 
psi. Rupture of this disc or of the entire dome would then release 
oxygen, accompanied by combustion products, into bay 4. The a~ccelera- 
tions recorded were probably caused by this release. 
Release of the oxygen then began to pressurize the oxygen shelf 
space of bay 4. If the hole formed in the pressure vessel were large 
enough and formed rapidly enough, the escaping oxygen alone would be 
adequate to blow off the bay 4 panel. However, it is also quite possi- 
ble that the escape of oxygen was accompanied by combustion of Mylar and 
Kapton (used extensively as thermal insulation in the oxygen shelf com- 
partment, figure 4-11, and in the tank dome) which would augment the 
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FigureX~-WXX Closeup view of oxygen tank shelf. 
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pressure caused by the oxygen itself. The slight temperature increases 
recorded at various SM locations indicate that combustion external to 
the tank probably took place. Further testing may shed additional light 
on the exact mechanism of panel ejection. The ejected panel then struck 
the high-gain antenna, disrupting communications from the spacecraft for 
the 1.8 seconds. 
LOSS OF OXYGEN TANK NO. 1 INTEGRITY 
Key Data 
55:54:53.323 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure drops 4 psia (from 883 psia 
to 879 psia). 
55:54:53.555 to Loss of telemetry data. 
55:54:55.35 
55: 54:56 Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure reads 782 psia and drops 
steadily. Pressure drops over a period of 130 min- 
utes to the point at which it was insufficient to 
sustain operation of fuel cell no. 2. 
There is no clear evidence of abnormal behavior associated with 
oxygen tank no. 1 prior to loss of signal, although the one data bit 
(4 psi) drop in pressure in the last tank no. 1 pressure reading prior 
to loss of signal may indicate that a problem was beginning. Immediately 
after signal strength was regained, data show that tank no. 1 system had 
lost its integrity. Pressure decreases were recorded over a period of 
approximately 130 minutes, indicating that a relatively slow leak had 
developed in the tank no. 1 system. Analysis has indicated that the 
leak rate is less than that which would result from a completely rup- 
tured line, but could be consistent with a partial line rupture or a 
leaking check or relief valve. 
Since there is no evidence that there was any anomalous condition 
arising within oxygen tank no. 1, it is presumed that the loss of oxygen 
tank no. 1 integrity resulted from the oxygen tank no. 2 system failure. 
The relatively sudden, and possibly violent, event associated with loss 
of integrity of the oxygen tank no. 2 system could have ruptured a line 
to oxygen tank no. 1, or have caused a valve to leak because of mechani- 
cal shock. 
4-43 
PART 5. APOLLO 13 RECOVERY 
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM 
In the period immediately following the caution and warning alarm 
for main bus B undervoltage, and the associated "bang" reported by the 
crew, the cause of the difficulty and the degree of its seriousness 
were not apparent. 
The 1.8-second loss of telemetered data was accompanied by the 
switching of the CSM high-gain antenna mounted on the SM adjacent to 
bay 4 from narrow beam width to wide beam width. The high-gain antenna 
does this automatically 200 milliseconds after its directional lock on 
the ground signal has been lost. 
A confusing factor was the repeated firings of various SM attitude 
control thrusters during the period after data loss. In all probability, 
these thrusters were being fired to overcome the effects that oxygen 
venting and panel blowoff were having on spacecraft attitude, but it 
was believed for a time that perhaps the thrusters were malfunctioning. 
The failure of oxygen tank no. 2 and consequent removal of the bay 4 
panel produced a shock which closed valves in the oxygen supply lines to 
fuel cells 1 and 3. These fuel cells ceased to provide power in about 3 
minutes, when the supply of oxygen between the closed valves and the 
cells was depleted. Fuel cell 2 continued to power ac bus 1 through dc 
main bus A, but the failure of fuel cell 3 left dc main bus B and ac 
bus 2 unpowered (see fig. 4-12). The oxygen tank no. 2 temperature and 
quantity gages were connected to ac bus 2 at the time of the accident. 
Thus, these parameters could not be read once fuel cell 3 failed at 
55:57:44 until power was applied to ac bus 2 from main bus A. 
The crew was not alerted to closure of the oxygen feed valves to 
fuel cells 1 and 3 because the valve position indicators in the CM were 
arranged to give warning only if both the oxygen and hydrogen valves 
closed. The hydrogen valves remained open. The crew had not been 
alerted to the oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise or to its subsequent drop 
because a hydrogen tank low pressure warning had blocked the cryogenic 
subsystem portion of the caution and warning system several minutes be- 
fore the accident. 
When the crew heard the bang and got the master alarm for low dc 
main bus B voltage, the Commander was in the lower equipment bay of the 
command module, stowing a television camera which had just been in use. 
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Figure 4-12.- Electrical configuration at 55:54:53 g.e.t. 
The Lunar Module Pilot was in the tunnel between the CSM and the LM, 
returning to the CSM. The Command Module Pilot was in the left-hand 
couch, monitoring spacecraft'3perfor&nce. Because of the master alarm 
indicating low voltage, the CMP moved across to the right-hand couch 
where CSM voltages can be observed. He reported that voltages were 
fllooking good" at 55:56:10. At this time, main bus B had recovered and 
fuel cell 3 did not fail for another l-1/2 minutes. He also reported 
fluctuations in the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity, followed by a return 
to the off-scale high position. 
ment). 
(See fig. h-13 for CM panel arrange- 
When fuel cells 1 and 3 electrical output readings went to zero, 
the ground controllers could not be certain that the cells had not some- 
how been disconnected from their respective busses and were not otherwise 
all right. Attention continued to be focused on electrical problems. 
Five minutes after the accident, controllers asked the crew to 
connect fuel cell 3 to de main bus B in order to be sure that the config- 
uration was known. When it was realized that fuel cells 1 and 3 were 
not functioning, the crew was directed to perform an emergency powerdown 
to lower the load on the remaining fuel cell. Observing the rapid decay 
in oxygen tank no. 1 pressure, controllers asked the crew to switch power 
to the oxygen tank no. 2 instrumentation. When this was done, and it 
was realized that oxygen tank no. 2 had failed, the extreme seriousness 
of the situation became clear. 
During the succeeding period, efforts were made to save the remain- 
ing oxygen in the oxygen tank no. 1. Several attempts were made, but 
had no effect. The pressure 
It was obvious by about 
oxygen tank no. 1 leak could 
necessary to use the LM as a 
continued to decrease. 
l-1/2 hours after the accident that the 
not be stopped and that shortly it would be 
"lifeboat" for the remainder of the mission. 
By 58:40 g.e.t., the LM had been activated, the inertial guidance 
reference transferred from the CSM guidance system to the LM guidance 
system, and the CSM systems were turned off. 
RETURN TO EARTH 
The remainder of the mission was characterized by two main activ- 
ities --planning and conducting the necessary propulsion maneuvers to 
return the spacecraft to Earth , and managing the use of consumables in 
such a way that the LM, which is designed for a basic mission with two 
crewmen for a relatively short duration, could support three men and serve 
as the actual control vehicle for the time required. 
. 
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Gne significant anomaly was noted during the remainder of the 
mission. At about 97 hours 14 minutes into the mission, the LMP 
reported hearing a "thump" and observing venting from the LM. Subsequent 
data review shows that the LN electrical power system experienced a 
brief but major abnormal current flow at that time. There is no evidence 
that this anomaly was related to the accident. Analysis by the Apollo 
organization is continuing. 
A number of propulsion options were developed and considered. It 
was necessary to return the spacecraft to a free-return trajectory and 
to make any required midcourse corrections. Normally, the service pro- 
pulsion system (SPS) in the SM would be used for such maneuvers. How- 
ever, because of the high electrical power requirements for using that 
engine, and in view of its uncertain condition and the uncertain nature 
of the structure of the SM after the accident, it was decided to use 
the LM descent engine if possible. 
The minimum practical return time was 133 hours g.e.t. to the 
Atlantic Ocean, and the maximum was 152 hours g.e.t. to the Indian 
Ocean. Recovery forces were deployed in the Pacific. The return path 
selected was for splashdown in the Pacific Ocean at lk?:kO g.e.t. This 
required a minimum of two burns of the LM descent engine. A third burn 
was subsequently made to correct the normal maneuver execution variations 
in the first two burns. One small velocity adjustment was also made with 
reaction control system thrusters. All burns were satisfactory. Figures 
k-14 and k-15 depict the flight plan followed from the time of the acci- 
dent to splashdown. 
The most critical consumables were water, used to cool the CSM and 
LM systems during use; CSM and LM battery power, the CSM batteries being 
for use during reentry and the LM batteries being needed for the rest 
of the mission; I&l oxygen for breathing; and lithium hydroxide (LiOH) 
filter cannisters used to remove carbon dioxide from the spacecraft 
cabin atmosphere. These consumables, and in particular the water and 
LiOH cannisters, appeared to be extremely marginal in quantity shortly 
after the accident, but once the LM was powered down to conserve electric 
power and to generate less heat and thus use less water, the situation 
improved greatly. Engineers at MSC developed a method which allowed the 
crew to use materials on board to fashion a device allowing use of the 
CM LiOH cannisters in the LM cabin atmosphere cleaning system (see 
fig. 4-16). At splashdown, many hours of each consumable remained 
available (see figs. k-17 through k-19 and table b-111). 
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Figure b-14.- Translunar trajectory phase. 
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Figure 4-16 .- Lithium hydroxide canister modification. 
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Figure b-19.- Usable remaining oxygen. 
TABLE b-III.- CABIN ATMOSPHERE CARBON DIOXIDE 
RFSIOVAL BY LITHIUM HYDROXIDE 
Required 85 hours 
Available in LM 53 hours 
Available in CM 182 hours 
A more detailed recounting of the events during the Apollo 13 
launch countdown and mission will be found in Appendix B to this report. 
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PART 1. INTRODUCTION 
The following findings, determinations, and recommendations are the 
product of about 7 weeks of concentrated review of the Apollo 13 accident 
by the Apollo 13 Review Board. They are based on that review, on the 
accident investigation by the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) and its con- 
tractors, and on an extensive series of special tests and analyses per- 
formed by or for the Board and its Panels. 
Sufficient work has been done to identify and understand the nature 
of the malfunction and the direction which the corrective actions must 
take. All indications are that an electrically initiated fire in oxygen 
tank no. 2 in the service module (SM) was the cause of the accident. Ac- 
cordingly, the Board has concentrated on this tank; on its design, manu- 
facture, test, handling, checkout, use, failure mode, and eventual effects 
on the rest of the spacecraft. The accident is generally understood, and 
the most probable cause has been identified. However, at the time of this 
report, some details of the accident are not completely clear. 
Further tests and analyses, which will be carried out under the over- 
all direction of MSC, will continue to generate new information relative 
to this accident. It is possible that this evidence may lead to conclu- 
sions differing in detail from those which can be drawn now. However, it 
is most unlikely that fundamentally different results will be obtained. 
Recommendations are provided as to the general direction which the 
corrective actions should take. Significant modifications should be made 
to the SM oxygen storage tanks and related equipments. The modified 
hardware should go through a rigorous requalification test program. This 
is the responsibility of the Apollo organization in the months ahead. 
In reaching its findings, determinations, and recommendations,it was 
necessary for the Board to review critically the equipment and the organi- 
zational elements responsible for it. It was found that the accident was 
not the result cf a chance malfunction in a statistical sense, but rather 
resulted from an unusual combination of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat 
deficient and unforgiving design. In brief, this is what happened: 
a. After assembly and acceptance testing, the oxygen tank no. 2 
which flew on Apollo 13 was shipped from Beech Aircraft Corporation to 
North American Rockwell (NR) in apparently satisfactory condition. 
b. It is now known, however, that the tank contained two protective 
thermostatic switches on the heater assembly, which were inadequate and 
would subsequently fail during ground test operations at Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC). 
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c. In addition, it is probable that the tank contained a loosely 
fitting fill tube assembly. This assembly was probably displaced during 
subsequent handling, which included an incident at the prime contractor's 
plant in which the tank was jarred. 
d. In itself, the displaced fill tube assembly was not particularly 
serious, but it led to the use of improvised detanking procedures at KSC 
which almost certainly set the stage for the accident. 
e. Although Beech did not encounter any problem in detanking during 
acceptance tests, it was not possible to detank oxygen tank no. 2 using 
normal procedures at KSC. Tests and analyses indicate that this was due 
to gas leakage through the displaced fill tube assembly. 
f. The special detanking procedures at KSC subjected the tank to an 
extended period of heater operation and pressure cycling. These proce- 
dures had not besn used before, and the tank had not been qualified by 
test for the conditions experienced. However, the procedures did not 
violate the specifications which governed the operation of the heaters at 
KSC. 
g. In reviewing these procedures before the flight, officials of 
NASA, NR, and Beech did not recognize the possibility of damage due to 
overheating. Many of these officials were not aware of the extended 
heater operation. In any event, adequate thermostatic switches might 
have been expected to protect the tank. 
h. A number of factors contributed to the presence of inadequate 
thermostatic switches in the heater assembly. The original 1962 specifi- 
cations from NR to Beech Aircraft Corporation for the tank and heater 
assembly specified the use of 28 V dc power, which is used in the space- 
craft. In 1965, NB issued a revised specification which stated that the 
heaters should use a 65 V dc power supply for tank pressurization; this 
was the power supply used at KSC to reduce pressurization time. Beech 
ordered switches for the Block II tanks b-tit did not change the switch 
specifications to be compatible with 65 V dc. 
1. The thermostatic switch discrepancy was not detected by NASA, NR, 
or Beech in their review of documentation, nor did tests identify the in- 
compatibility of the switches with the ground support equipment (GSE) at 
KSC, since neither qualification nor acceptance testing required switch 
cycling under load as should have been done. It was a serious oversight 
in which all parties shared. 
j. The thermostatic switches could accommodate the 65 V dc during 
tank pressurization because they normally remained cool and closed. How- 
ever, they could not open without damage with 65 V dc power applied. They 
were never required to do so until the special detanking. During this 
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procedure, as the switches started to open when they reached their upper 
temperature limit, they were welded permanently closed by the resulting 
arc and were rendered inoperative as protective thermostats. 
k. Failure of the thermostatic switches to open could have been 
detected at KSC if switch operation had been checked by observing heater 
current readings on the oxygen tank heater control panel. Although it 
was not recognized at that time, the tank temperature readings indicated 
that the heaters had reached their temperature limit and switch opening 
should have been.expected. 
1. As shown by subsequent tests, failure of the thermostatic switches 
probably permitted the temperature of the heater tube assembly to reach 
about 1000" F in spots during the continuous 8-hour period of heater 
operation. Such heating has been shown by tests to severely damage the 
Teflon insulation on the fan motor wires in the vicinity of the heater 
assembly. From that time on, including pad occupancy, the oxygen tank 
no. 2 was in a hazardous condition when filled with oxygen and electri- 
cally powered. 
m. It was not until nearly 56 hours into the mission, however, that 
the fan motor wiring, possibly moved by the fan stirring, short circuited 
and ignited its insulation by means of an electric arc. The resulting 
combustion in the oxygen tank probably overheated and failed the wiring 
conduit where it enters the tank, and possibly a portion of the tank it- 
self. 
n. The rapid expulsion of high-pressure oxygen which followed, 
possibly augmented by combustion of insulation in the space surrounding 
the tank, blew off the outer panel to bay 4 of the SM, caused a leak in 
the high-pressure system of oxygen tank no. 1, damaged the high-gain an- 
tenna, caused other miscellaneous damage, and aborted the mission. 
The accident is judged to have been nearly catastrophic. only out- 
standing performance on the part of the crew, Mission Control, and other 
members of the team which supported the operations successfully returned 
the crew to Earth. 
In investigating the accident to Apollo 13, the Board has also 
attempted to identify those additional technical and management lessons 
which can be applied to help assure the success of future space flight 
missions; several recommendations of this nature are included. 
The Board recognizes that the contents of its report are largely of 
a critical nature. The report highlights in detail faults or deficiencies 
in equipment and procedures that the Board has identified. This is the 
nature of a review board report. 
5-3 
It is important, however, to view the criticisms in this report in 
a broader context. The Apollo spacecraft system is not without short- 
comings, but it is the only system of its type ever built and success- 
fully demonstrated. It has flown to the Moon five times and landed 
twice. The tank which failed, the design of which is criticized in this 
report, is one of a series which had thousands of hours of successful 
operation in space prior to Apollo 13. 
While the team of designers, engineers, and technicians that build 
and operate the Apollo spacecraft also has shortcomings, the accomplish- 
ments speak for themselves. By hardheaded self-criticism and continued 
dedication, this team can maintain this nation's preeminence in space. 
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PART 2. ASSESSmNT OF ACCIDENT 
FAILUFB OF OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 
1. Findings 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
h. 
i. 
The Apollo 13 mission was aborted as the direct result of 
the rapid loss of oxygen from oxygen tank no. 2 in the SM, 
followed by a gradual loss of oxygen from tank no. 1, and 
a resulting loss of power from the oxygen-fed fuel cells. 
There is no evidence of any forces external to oxygen tank 
no. 2 during the flight which might have caused its failure. 
Oxygen tank no. 2 contained materials, including Teflon and 
aluminum, which if ignited will burn in supercritical 
oxygen. 
Oxygen tank no, 2 contained potential ignition sources: 
electrical wiring, unsealed electric motors, and rotating 
aluminum fans. 
During the special detanking of oxygen tank no. 2 following 
the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) at KSC, the thermo- 
static switches on the heaters were required to open while 
powered by 65 V dc in order to protect the heaters from over- 
heating. The switches were only rated at 30 V dc and have 
been shown to weld closed at the higher voltage. 
Data indicate that in flight the tank heaters located in 
oxygen tanks no. 1 and no. 2 operated normally prior to the 
accident, and they were not on at the time of the accident. 
The electrical circuit for the quantity probe would generate 
only about 7 millijoules in the event of a short circuit and 
the temperature sensor wires less than 3 millijoules per 
second. 
Telemetry data immediately prior to the accident indicate 
electrical disturbances of a character which would be caused 
by short circuits accompanied by electrical arcs in the fan 
motor or its leads in oxygen tank no. 2. 
The pressure and temperature within oxygen tank no. 2 rose 
abnormally during the l-1/2 minutes immediately prior to the 
accident. 
Determinations 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
03) 
The cause of the failure of oxygen tank no. 2 was combustion 
within the tank. 
Analysis showed that the electrical energy flowing into the 
tank could not account for the observed increases in pressure 
and temperature. 
The heater, temperature sensor, and quantity probe did not 
initiate the accident sequence. 
The cause of the combustion was most probably the ignition 
of Teflon wire insulation on the fan motor wires, caused by 
electric arcs in this wiring. 
The protective thermostatic switches on the heaters in 
oxygen tank no. 2 failed closed during the initial portion 
of the first special detanking operation. This subjected 
the wiring in the vicinity of the heaters to very high tem- 
peratures which have been subsequently shown to severely 
degrade Teflon insulation. 
The telemetered data indicated electrical arcs of sufficient 
energy to ignite the Teflon insulation, as verified by sub- 
sequent tests. These tests also verified that the l-ampere 
fuses on the fan motors would pass sufficient energy to ig- 
nite the insulation by the mechanism of an electric arc. 
The combustion of Teflon wire insulation alone could release 
sufficient heat to account for the observed increases in 
tank pressure and local temperature, and could locally over- 
heat and fail the tank or its associated tubing. The possi- 
bility of such failure at the top of the tank was demon- 
strated by subsequent tests. 
The rate of flame propagation along Teflon-insulated wires 
as measured in subsequent tests is consistent with the in- 
dicated rates of pressure rise within the tank. 
SECONDARY EFFECTS OF TANK FAILURE 
2. Findings 
a. Failure of the tank was accompanied by several events in- 
cluding: 
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A 'bang" as heard by the crew. 
Spacecraft motion as felt by the crew and as measured by 
the attitude control system and the accelerometers in the 
command module (CM). 
Momentary loss of telemetry. 
Closing of several valves by shock loading. 
Loss of integrity of the oxygen tank no. 1 system. 
Slight temperature increases in bay 4 and adjacent sectors 
of the SM. 
Loss of the panel covering bay 4 of the SM, as observed and 
photographed by the crew. 
Displacement of the fuel cells as photographed by the crew. 
Damage to the high-gain antenna as photographed by the crew. 
b. The panel covering of bay 4 could be blown off by pressuri- 
zation of the bay. About 25 psi of uniform pressure in bay 4 
is required to blow off the panel. 
C. The various bays and sectors of the SM are interconnected 
with open passages so that all would be pressurized if any 
one were supplied with a pressurant at a relatively slow 
rate. 
d. The CM attachments would be failed by an average pressure of 
about 10 psi on the CM heat shield and this would separate 
the CM from the SM. 
Determinations 
(1) Failure of the oxygen tank no. 2 caused a rapid local 
pressurization of bay 4 of the SM by the high-pressure 
oxygen that escaped from the tank. This pressure pulse may 
have blown off the panel covering bay 4. This possibility 
was substantiated by a series of special tests. 
(2) The pressure pulse from a tank failure might have been 
augmented by combustion of Mylar or Kapton insulation or 
both when subjected to a stream of oxygen and hot particles 
emerging from the top of the tank, as demonstrated in sub- 
sequent tests. 
5-7 
(3) Combustion or vaporization of the Mylar or Kapton might 
account for the discoloration of the SM engine nozzle as 
observed and photographed by the crew. 
(4) Photographs of the SM by the crew did not establish the 
condition of the oxygen tank no. 2. 
(5) The high-gain antenna damage probably resulted from striking 
by the panel, or a portion thereof, as it left the SM. 
(6) The loss of pressure on oxygen tank no. 1 and the subsequent 
loss of power resulted from the tank no. 2 failure. 
(7) Telemetry, although good, is insufficient to pin down the 
exact nature, sequence, and location of each event of the 
accident in detail. 
(8) The telemetry data, crew testimony, photographs, and special 
tests and analyses already completed are sufficient to under- 
stand the problem and to proceed with corrective actions. 
OXYGEN TANK NO. 2 DESIGN 
3. Findings 
a. ,The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks contained a combination 
of oxidizer, combustible material, and potential ignition 
sources. 
b. Supercritical oxygen was used to minimize the weight, 
volume, and fluid-handling problems of the oxygen supply 
system. 
c. The heaters, fans, and tank instrumentation are used in the 
measurement and management of the oxygen szpply. 
Determinations 
(1) The storage of supercritical oxygen was appropriate for the 
Apollo system. 
(2) Heaters are required to maintain tank pressure as the oxygen 
supply is used. 
(3) Fans were used to prevent excessive pressure drops due to 
stratification, to mix the oxygen to improve accuracy of 
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quantity measurements, and to insure adequate heater input 
at.low densities and high oxygen utilization rates. The 
need for oxygen stirring on future flights requires further 
investigation. 
(4) The amount of material in the tank which could be ignited 
and burned in the given environment could have been reduced 
significantly. 
(5) The potential ignition sources constituted an undue hazard 
when considered in the light of the particular tank design 
with its assembly difficulties. 
(6) NASA, the prime contractor, and the supplier of the tank 
were not fully aware of the extent of this hazard. 
(7) Examination of the high-pressure oxygen system in the service 
module following the Apollo 204 fire, which directed atten- 
tion to the danger of fire in a pure oxygen environment, 
failed to recognize the deficiencies of the tank. 
PREFLIGHT DAMAGE TO TANK WIRING 
a. The oxygen tank no. 2 heater assembly contained two thermo- 
static switches designed to protect the heaters from over- 
heating. 
b. The thermostatic switches were designed to open and interrupt 
the heater current at 80" + 10" F. 
C. The heaters are operated on 28 V de in flight and at NE?. 
d. The heaters are operated on 65 V ac at Beech Aircraft Cor- 
poration and 65 V dc at the Kennedy Space Center. These 
higher voltages are used to accelerate tank pressurization. 
e. The thermostatic switches were rated at 7 amps at 30 V dc. 
While they would carry this current at 65 V dc in a closed 
position, they would fail if they started to open to inter- 
rupt this load. 
f. Neither qualification nor acceptance testing of the heater 
assemblies or the tanks required thermostatic switch opening 
to be checked at 65 V dc. The only test of switch opening 
4. Findings 
5-9 
Is__l_.- ." ," -_.--_-_. - ,,---.. .m^__-- -----.a" --- 
was a continuity check at Beech in which the switch was 
cycled open and closed in an oven. 
g* The thermostatic switches had never operated in flight be- 
cause this would only happen if the oxygen supply in a tank 
were depleted to nearly zero. 
h. The thermostatic switches had never operated on the ground 
under load because the heaters had only been used with a 
relatively full tank which kept the switches cool and closed. 
i. During the CDDT, the oxygen tank no. 2 would not detank in 
a normal manner. On March 27 and 28, a special detanking 
procedure was followed which subjected the heater to about 
8 hours of continuous operation until the tanks were nearly 
depleted of oxygen. 
j. A second special detanking of shorter duration followed on 
March 30, 1970. 
k. The oxygen tanks had not been qualification tested for the 
conditions encountered in this procedure. However, speci- 
fied allowable heater voltages and currents were not exceeded. 
1. The recorded internal tank temperature went off-scale high 
early in the special detanking. The thermostatic switches 
would normally open at this point but the electrical records 
show no thermostatic switch operation. These indications 
were not detected at the time. 
m. The oxygen tank heater controls at KSC contained ammeters 
which would have indicated thermostatic switch operation. 
Determinations 
(1) During the special detanking of March 27 and 28 at KSC, when 
the heaters in oxygen tank no. 2 were left on for an extended 
period, the thermostatic switches started to open while 
powered by 65 V dc and were probably welded shut. 
(2) Failure of the thermostatic switches to open could have been 
detected at KSC if switch operation had been checked by 
observing heater current readings on the oxygen tank heater 
control panel. Although it was not recognized at the time, 
the tank temperature readings indicated that the heaters had 
reached their temperature limit and switch opening should 
have been expected. 
._- 
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(3) The fact that the switches were not rated to open at 65 V de 
was not detected by NASA, NR, or Beech in their reviews of 
documentation or in qualification and acceptance testing. 
(4) The failed switches resulted in severe overheating. Subse- 
quent tests showed that heater assembly temperatures could 
have reached about 1000" F. 
(5) The high t emperatures severely damaged the Teflon insulation 
on the wiring in the vicinity of the heater assembly and set 
the stage for subsequent short circuiting. As shown in 
subsequent tests, this damage could range from cracking to 
total oxidation and disappearance of the insulation. 
(6) During and following the special detanking, the oxygen tank 
no. 2 was in a hazardous condition whenever it contained 
oxygen and was electrically energized. 
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PART 3. SUPPORTING CONSIDERATIONS 
DESIGN, MANUFACTURING, AND TEST 
5. Finding 
The pressure vessel of the supercritical oxygen tank is con- 
structed of Inconel 718, and is moderately stressed at normal 
operating pressure. 
Determination 
From a structural viewpoint, the supercritical oxygen pressure 
vessel is quite adequately designed, employing a tough material 
well chosen for this application. The stress analysis and the 
results of the qualification burst test program confirm the 
ability of the tank to exhibit adequate performance in its in- 
tended application. 
6. Findings 
a. The oxygen tank design includes two unsealed electric fan 
motors immersed in supercritical oxygen. 
b. Fan motors of this design have a test history of failure 
during acceptance test which includes phase-to-phase and 
phase-to-ground faults. 
c. The fan motor stator windings are constructed with Teflon- 
coated, ceramic-insulated, number 36 AWG wire. Full phase- 
to-phase and phase-to-ground insulation is not used in the 
motor design. 
d. The motor case is largely aluminum. 
Determinations 
(1) The stator winding insulation is brittle and easily fractured 
during manufacture of the stator coils. 
(2) The use of these motors in supercritical oxygen was a ques- 
tionable practice. 
7. Findings 
a. The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks contained materials that 
could be ignited and which will burn under the conditions 
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prevailing within the tank, including Teflon, aluminum, 
solder, and Drilube 822. 
b. The tank contained electrical wiring exposed to the super- 
critical oxygen. The wiring was insulated with Teflon. 
c. Some wiring was in close proximity to heater elements and 
to the rotating fan. 
d. The design was such that the assembly of the equipment was 
essentially "blind" and not amenable to inspection after 
.completion. 
e. Teflon insulation of the electrical wiring inside the cryo- 
genic oxygen storage tanks of the SM was exposed to rela- 
tively sharp metal edges of tank inner parts during manu- 
facturing assembly operations. 
f. Portions of this wiring remained unsupported in the tank on 
completion of assembly. 
Determinations 
(1) The tank contained a hazardous combination of materials and 
potential ignition sources. 
(2) Scraping of the electrical wiring insulation against metal 
inner parts of the tank constituted a substantial cumulative 
hazard during assembly, handling, test, checkout, and opera- 
tional use. 
(3) "Cold flow" of the Teflon insulation, when pressed against 
metal corners within the tank for an extended period of 
time, could result in an eventual degradation of insulation 
protection. 
(4) The externally applied electrical tests (500-volt Hi-pot) 
could not reveal the extent of such possible insulation 
damage but could only indicate that the relative positions 
of the wires at the time of the tests were such that the 
separation or insulation would withstand the 500-volt po- 
tential without electrical breakdown. 
(5) The design was such that it was difficult to insure against 
these hazards. 
(6) There is no evidence that the wiring was damaged during man- 
ufacturing. 
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9. Findings 
a. Dimensioning of the short Teflon and Inconel tube segments 
of the cryogenic oxygen storage tank fill line was such that 
looseness to the point of incomplete connection was possible 
in the event of worst-case tolerance buildup. 
b. The insertion of these segments into the top of the tank 
quantity probe assembly at the point of its final closure 
and welding was difficult to achieve. 
c. Probing with a hand tool was used in manufacturing to com- 
pensate for limited visibility of the tube segment positions. 
Determination 
It was possible for a tank to have been assembled with a set of 
relatively loose fill tube parts that could go undetected in 
final inspection and be subsequently displaced. 
10. Findings 
a. The Apollo spacecraft system contains numerous pressure 
vessels, many of which carry oxidants, plus related valves 
and other plumbing. 
b. Investigation of potential hazards associated with these 
other systems was not complete at the time of the report, 
but is being pursued by the Manned Spacecraft Center. 
C. One piece of equipment, the fuel cell oxygen supply valve 
module, has been identified as containing a similar combina- 
tion of high-pressure oxygen, Teflon, and electrical wiring 
as in the oxygen tank no. 2. The wiring is unfused and is 
routed through a lo-amp circuit breaker. 
Determination 
The fuel cell oxygen supply valve module has been identified as 
potentially hazardous. 
11. Findings 
a. In the normal sequence of cryogenic oxygen storage tank in- 
tegration and checkout, each tank undergoes shipping, 
assembly into an oxygen shelf for a service module, factory 
transportation to facilitate shelf assembly test, and then 
integration of shelf assembly to the SM. 
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b. The SM undergoes factory transportation, air shipment to KSC, 
and subsequent ground transportation and handling. 
Determination 
There were environments during the normal sequence of operations 
subsequent to the final acceptance tests at Beech that could 
cause a loose-fitting set of fill tube parts to become displaced. 
12. Findings 
a. At North American Rockwell, Downey, California, in the 
attempt to remove the oxygen shelf assembly from SM 106, 
a bolt restraining the inner edge of the shelf was not re- 
moved. 
b. Attempts to lift the shelf with the bolt in place broke the 
lifting fixture, thereby jarring the oxygen tanks and valves. 
c. The oxygen shelf assembly incorporating S/N XTAOO08 in the 
tank no. 2 position, which had been shaken during removal 
from SM 106, was installed in SM 109 one month later. 
d. An analysis, shelf inspection, and a partial retest empha- 
sizing electrical continuity of internal wiring were accom- 
plished before reinstallation. 
Determinations 
(1) Displacement of fill tube parts could have occurred, during 
the "shelf drop" incident at the prime contractor's plant, 
without detection, 
(2) Other damage to the tank may have occurred from the jolt, 
but special tests and analyses indicate that this is un- 
likely. 
(3) nie "shelf drop" incident was not brought to the attention 
of project officials during subsequent detanking difficulties 
at KSC. 
13. Finding 
Detanking, expulsion of liquid oxygen out the fill line of the 
oxygen tank by warm gas pressure applied through the vent line, 
was a regular activity at Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, in 
emptying a portion of the oxygen used in end-item acceptance 
tests. 
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Determination 
The latter stages of the detanking operation on oxygen tank 
no. 2 conducted at Beech on February 3, 1967, were similar to 
the standard procedure followed at KSC during the CDDT. 
14. Findings 
a. The attempt to detank the cryogenic oxygen tanks at KSC 
after the CDDT by the standard procedures on March 23, 1970, 
was unsuccessful with regard to tank no. 2. 
b. A special detanking procedure was used to empty oxygen tank 
no. 2 after CDDT. This procedure involved continuous pro- 
tracted heating with repeated cycles of pressurization to 
about 300 psi with warm gas followed by venting. 
c. It was employed both after CDDT and after a special test to 
verify that the tank could be filled. 
d. There is no indication from the heater voltage recording 
that the thermostatic switches functioned and cycled the 
heaters off and on during these special detanking procedures. 
e. At the completion of detanking following CDDT, the switches 
are only checked to see that they remain closed at -75" F as 
the tank is warmed up. They are not checked to verify that 
they will open at +80" F. 
f. Tests subsequent to the flight showed that the current 
associated with the KSC 65 V dc ground powering of the 
heaters would cause the thermostatic switch contacts to 
weld closed if they attempted to interrupt this current. 
Q- A second test showed that without functioning thermostatic 
switches, temperatures in the 800 o to 1000° F range would 
exist at locations on the heater tube assembly that were in 
close proximity with the motor wires. These temperatures 
are high enough to damage Teflon and melt solder. 
Determinations 
(1) Oxygen tank no. 2 (XTA 0008) did not detank after CDDT in a 
manner comparable to its performance the last time it had 
contained liquid oxygen, i.e., in acceptance test at Beech. 
(2) Such evidence indicates that the tank had undergone some 
change of internal configuration during the intervening 
events of the previous 3 years. 
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(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
The tank conditions during the special detanking procedures 
were outside all prior testing of Apollo CSM cryogenic oxygen 
storage tanks. Heater assembly temperatures measured in sub- 
sequent tests exceeded 1000" F. 
Severe damage to the insulation of electrical wiring internal 
to the tank, as determined from subsequent tests, resulted 
from the special procedure. 
Damage to the insulation, particularly on the long un- 
supported lengths of wiring, may also have occurred due to 
boiling associated with this procedure. 
MSC, KSC, and NR personnel did not know that the thermostatic 
switches were not rated to open with 65 V de GSE power 
applied. 
15. Findings 
a. The change in detanking procedures on the cryogenic oxygen 
tank was made in accordance with the existing change control 
system during final launch preparations for Apollo 13. 
b. Launch operations personnel who made the change did not have 
a detailed understanding of the tank internal components, or 
the tank history. They made appropriate contacts before 
making the change. 
c. Communications, primarily by telephone, among MSC, KSC, NR, 
and Beech personnel during final launch preparations re- 
garding the cryogenic oxygen system included incomplete and 
inaccurate information. 
d. The MSC Test Specification Criteria Document (TSCD) which 
was used by KSC in preparing detailed tank test procedures 
states the tank allowable heater voltage and current as 65 
to 85 V de and 9 to 17 amperes with no restrictions on time. 
Determinations 
(1) X3 and MSC personnel who prepared the TSCD did not know that 
the tank heater thermostatic switches would not protect 
the tank. 
(2) Launch operations personnel assumed the tank was protected 
from overheating by the switches. 
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(3) Launch operations personnel at KSC stayed within the 
specified tank heater voltage and current limits during the 
detanking at KSC. 
16. Findings 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
After receipt of the Block II oxygen tank specifications 
from NR, which required the tank heater assembly to operate 
with 65 V dc GSE power only during tank pressurization, Beech 
Aircraft did not require their Block I thermostatic switch 
supplier to make a change in the switch to operate at the 
higher voltage. 
NR did not review the tank or heater to assure compatibility 
between the switch and the GSE. 
MSC did not review the tank or heater to assure compati- 
bility between the switch and the GSE. 
No tests were specified by MSC, NR, or Beech to check this 
switch under load. 
Determinations 
(1) NR and Beech specifications governing the powering and the 
thermostatic switch protection of the heater assemblies were 
inadequate. 
(2) The specifications governing the testing of the heater 
assemblies were inadequate. 
17. Finding 
The hazard associated with the long heater cycle during detanking 
was not given consideration in the decision to fly oxygen tank 
no. 2. 
Determinations 
(1) MSC, KSC, and NR personnel did not know that the tank heater 
thermostatic switches did not protect the tank from over- 
heating. 
(2) If the long period of continuous heater operation with failed 
thermostatic switches had been known, the tank would have 
been replaced. 
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18. Findings 
a. Management controls requiring detailed reviews and approvals 
of design, manufacturing processes, assembly procedures, 
test procedures, hardware acceptance, safety, reliability, 
and flight readiness are in effect for all Apollo hardware 
and operations. 
b. When the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen system was originally 
designed, the management controls were not defined in as 
great detail as they are now. 
Determination 
From review of documents and interviews, it appears that the 
management controls existing at that time were adhered to in 
in the case of the cryogenic oxygen system 
Apollo 13. 
incorporated 
19. Finding 
The only oxygen tank no. 2 anomaly during the final countdown 
was a small leak through the vent quick disconnect, which was 
corrected. 
Determination 
No indications of a potential inflight malfunction of the oxygen 
tank no. 2 were present during the launch countdown. 
MISSION EVENTS THROUGH ACCIDENT 
20. Findings 
a. The center engine of the S-II stage of the Saturn V launch 
vehicle prematurely shut down at 132 seconds due to large 
16 hertz oscillations in thrust chamber pressure. 
b. Data indicated less than O.lg vibration in the CM. 
Determinations 
(1) Investigation of this S-II anomaly was not within the purview 
of the Board except insofar as it relates to the Apollo 13 
accident. 
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(2) The resulting oscillations or vibration of the space vehicle 
probably did not affect the oxygen tank. 
21. Findings 
a. Fuel cell current increased between 46:40:05 and 46:40:08 
indicating that oxygen tank no. 1 and tank no. 2 fans were 
turned on during this interval. 
b. The oxygen tank no. 2 quantity indicated off-scale high at 
46:40: 08. 
Determinations 
(1) The oxygen tank no. 2 quantity probe short circuited at 
46:40:08. 
(2) The short circuit could have been caused by either a com- 
pletely loose fill tube part or a solder splash being carried 
by the moving fluid into contact with both elements of the 
probe capacitor. 
22. Findings 
a. The crew acknowledged Mission Control's request to turn on 
the tank fans at 55:53:06. 
b. Spacecraft current increased by 1 ampere at 55:53:19. 
c. The oxygen tank no, 1 pressure decreased 8 psi at 55:53:19 
due to normal destratification. 
Determination 
'The fans in oxygen tank no. 1 were turned on and began rotating 
at 55:53:19. 
23. Findings 
a. Spacecraft current increased by l-1/2 amperes and ac bus 2 
voltage decreased 0.6 volt at 55:53:20. 
b. Stabilization and Control System (SCS) gimbal command telem- 
etry channels, which are sensitive indicators of electrical 
transients associated with switching on or off of certain 
spacecraft electrical loads, showed a negative initial tran- 
sient during oxygen tank no. 2 fan turnon cycles and a posi- 
tive initial transient during oxygen tank no. 2 fan turnoff 
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cycles during the Apollo 13 mission. A negative initial 
transient was measured in the SCS at 55:53:20. 
C. The oxygen tank no, 2 pressure decreased about 4 psi when 
the*fans were turned on at 55: 53:21. 
Determinations 
(1) The fans in oxygen tank no. 2 were turned on at 5.5:53:20. 
(2) It cannot be determined whether or not they were rotating 
because the pressure decrease was too small to conclusively 
show destratification. It is likely that they were. 
24. Finding 
An ll.l-amp spike in fuel cell 3 current and a momentary 
1.2-volt decrease were measured in ac bus 2 at $5:X5:23. 
Determinations 
(1) A short circuit occurred in the circuits of the fans in 
oxygen tank no. 2 which resulted in either blown fuses or 
opened wiring, and one fan ceased to function. 
(2) The short circuit -probably dissipated an energy in excess 
of 10 joules which, as shown in subsequent tests, is more 
than sufficient to ignite Teflon wire insulation by means 
of an electric arc. 
25. Findings 
a. 
b. 
c. 
A momentary U-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage was 
measured at 55:53:38. 
A 22.9~amp spike in fuel cell 3 current was measured at 
55:53:41. 
After the electrical transients, CM current and ac bus 2 
voltage returned to the values indicated prior to the turn- 
on of the fans in oxygen tank no. 2. 
Determination 
Two short circuits occurred in the oxygen tank no. 2 fan cir- 
cuits between 55:53:38 and 55:53:41 which resulted in either 
blown fuses or opened wiring, and the second fan ceased to 
function. 
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26. Finding 
Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure rise from 887 to 
954 psia between 55:53:36 and 55:54:00. It then remained nearly 
constant for about 15 seconds and then rose again from 954 to 
1008 psia, beginning at 55:54:15 and ending at 55:54:45. 
Determinations 
(1) An abnormal pressure rise occurred in oxygen tank no. 2. 
(2) Since no other known energy source in the tank could produce 
this pressure buildup, it is concluded to have resulted from 
combustion initiated by the first short circuit which started 
a wire insulation fire in the tank. 
27. Findings 
a. The pressure relief valve was designed to be fully open at 
about 1000 psi. 
b. Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a pressure drop from 
1008 psia at 55:54:45 to 996 psia at 55:54:53, at which time 
telemetry data were lost. 
Determination 
This drop resulted from the normal operation of the pressure 
relief valve as verified in subsequent tests. 
28. Findings 
a. At 55:54:29, when the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2 exceeded 
the master caution and warning trip level of 975 psia, the CM 
master alarm was inhibited by the fact that a warning of low 
hydrogen pressure was already in effect, and neither the crew 
nor Mission Control was alerted to the pressure rise. 
b. The master caution and warning system logic for the cryogenic 
system is such that an out-of-tolerance condition of one 
measurement which triggers a master alarm prevents another 
master alarm from being generated when any other parameter in 
the same system becomes out-of-tolerance. 
C. The low-pressure trip level of the master caution and warning 
system for the cryogenic storage system is only 1 psi below 
the specified lower limit of the pressure switch which con- 
trols the tank heaters. A small imbalance in hydrogen tank 
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pressures or a shift in transducer or switch calibration can 
cause the master caution and warning to be triggered pre- 
ceding each heater cycle. This occurred several times on 
Apollo 13. 
d. A limit sense light indicating abnormal oxygen tank no. 2 
pressure should have come on in Mission Control about 
30 seconds before oxygen tank no. 2 failed. There is no way 
to ascertain that the light did, in fact, come on. If it 
did come on, Mission Control did not observe it. 
Determinations 
(1) If the pressure switch setting and master caution and warning 
trip levels were separated by a greater pressure differential, 
there would be less likelihood of unnecessary master alarms. 
(2) With the present master caution and warning system, a space- 
craft problem can go unnoticed because of the presence of a 
previous out-of-tolerance condition in the same subsystem. 
(3) Although a master alarm at 55:54:29 or observance of a limit 
sense light in Mission Control could have alerted the crew 
or Mission Control in sufficient time to detect the pressure 
rise in oxygen tank no. 2, no action could have been taken 
at that time to prevent the tank failure. However, the in- 
formation could have been helpful to Mission Control and the 
crew in diagnosis of spacecraft malfunctions. 
(4) The limit sense system in Mission Control can be modified to 
constitute a more positive backup warning system. 
29. Finding 
Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry showed a temperature rise of 38” F 
beginning at 55:54:31 sensed by a single sensor which measured 
local temperature. This sensor indicated off-scale low at 
55:54:53. 
Determinations 
(I) An abnormal and sudden temperature rise occurred in oxygen 
tank no. 2 at approximately 55:54:31. 
(2) The temperature was a local value which rose when combustion 
had progressed to the vicinity of the sensor. 
(3) The temperature sensor failed at 55:54:53. 
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30. Finding 
Oxygen tank no. 2 telemetry indicated the following changes: 
(1) quantity decreased from off-scale high to off-scale low in 
2 seconds at 55:54:30, (2) q uantity increased to 75.3 percent at 
55:54:32, and (3) q uantity was off-scale high at 55:54:51 and 
later became erratic. 
Determinations 
(1) Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity data between 55:54:32 and 
55:54:50 may represent valid measurements. 
(2) Immediately preceding and following this time period, the 
indications were caused by electrical faults. 
31. Findings 
a. At about 55:54:53, or about half a second before telemetry 
loss, the body-mounted linear accelerometers in the command 
module, which are sampled at 100 times per second, began 
indicating spacecraft motions. These disturbances were 
erratic, but reached peak values of l.l7g, 0.65g, and 0.65g 
in the X> Y, and Z directions, respectively, about 13 milli- 
seconds before data loss. 
b. The body-mounted roll, pitch, and yaw rate gyros showed low- 
level activity for l/4 second beginning at 55:54:53.220. 
C. The integrating accelerometers indicated that a velocity 
increment of approximately 0.5 fps was imparted to the space- 
craft between 55:54:53 and 55:54:55. 
d. Doppler tracking data measured an incremental velocity com- 
ponent of 0.26 fps along a line from the Earth to the space- 
craft at approximately 55:54:55. 
e. The crew heard a loud "bang" at about this time. 
f. Telemetry data were lost between approximately 55:54:53 and 
55:54:55 and the spacecraft switched from the narrow-beam 
antenna to the wide-beam antenna. 
g* Crew observations and photographs showed the bay 4 panel to 
be missing and the high-gain antenna to be damaged. 
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Determinations 
(1) The spacecraft was subjected to abnormal forces at approxi- 
mately 55:54:53. These disturbances were reactions resulting 
from failure and venting of the oxygen tank no. 2 system and 
subsequent separation and ejection of the bay 4 panel. 
(2) The high-gain antenna was damaged either by the panel or a 
section thereof from bay 4 atthe time of panel separation. 
32. Finding 
Temperature sensors in bay 3, bay 4, and the central column of 
the SM indicated abnormal increases following reacquisition of 
data at 55:54:55. 
Determination 
Heating took place 
separation. 
33. Findings 
in the SM a t approximately the time of panel 
a. The telemetered nitrogen pressure in fuel cell 1 was off- 
scale low at reacquisition of data at 55:54:55. 
b. Fuel cell 1 continued to operate for about 3 minutes past 
this time. 
c. The wiring to the nitrogen sensor passes along the top of 
the shelf which supports the fuel cells immediately above 
the oxygen tanks. 
Determinations 
(1) The nitrogen pressure sensor in fuel cell 1 or its wiring 
failed at the time of the accident. 
(2) The failure was probably caused by physical damage to the 
sensor wiring or shock. 
(3) This is the only known instrumentation failure outside the 
oxygen system at that time. 
34. Finding 
Oxygen tank no. 1 pressure decreased rapidly from 879 psia to 
782 psia at approximately 55:54:54 and then began to decrease 
more slowly at 55:54:56. 
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Determination 
A leak caused loss of oxygen from tank no. 1 beginning at approxi- 
mately 55:54:54. 
35. Findings 
a. Oxygen flow rates to fuel cells 1 and 3 decreased in a 
5-second period beginning at 55:54:55, but sufficient volume 
existed in lines feeding the fuel cells to allow them to 
operate about 3 minutes after the oxygen supply valves were 
cut off. 
b. The crew reported at 55:57:44 that five valves in the reaction 
control system (RCS) were closed. The shock required to close 
the oxygen supply valves is of the same order of magnitude as 
the shock required to close the RCS valves. 
c. Fuel cells 1 and 3 failed at about 55:58. 
Determination 
The oxygen supply valves to fuel cells 1 and 3, and the five RCS 
valves, were probably closed by the shock of tank failure or panel 
ejection or both. 
MISSION EVENTS AFTER ACCIDENT 
36. Findings 
a. Since data presented to flight controllers in Mission Control 
are updated only once per second, the 1.8-second loss of data 
which occurred in Mission Control was not directly noticed. 
However, the Guidance Officer did note and report a "hardware 
restart" of the spacecraft computer. This was quickly 
followed by the crew's report of a problem. 
b. Immediately after the crew's report of a "bang" and a main 
bus B undervolt, all fuel cell output currents and all bus 
voltages were normal, and the cryogenic oxygen tank indica- 
tions were as follows: 
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c. 
d. 
e. 
Oxygen tank no. 1: Pressure: Several hundred psi below 
normal 
Quantity: Normal 
Temperature: Normal 
Oxygen tank no. 2: Pressure: Off-scale low 
Quantity: Off-scale high 
Temperature: Off-scale high 
The nitrogen pressure in fuel cell 1 indicated zero, which was 
incompatible with the hydrogen and oxygen pressures in this 
fuel cell.: which were normal. The nitrogen pressure is used 
to regulate the oxygen and hydrogen pressure, and hydrogen 
and oxygen pressures in the fuel cell would follow the nitro- 
gen pressure. 
Neither the crew nor Mission Control was aware at the time 
that oxygen tank no. 2 pressure had risen abnormally just 
before the data loss. 
Tne flight controllers believed that a probable cause of 
these indications could have been a cryogenic storage system 
instrumentation faiYJre, and began pursuing this line of in- 
vestigation. 
Determination 
Under these conditions it was reasonable to suspect a cryogenic 
storage system instrumentation problem, and to attempt to verify 
the readings before taking any action. The fact that the oxygen 
tank no. 2 quantity measurement was known to have failed several 
hours earlier also contributed to the doubt about the credita- 
bility of the telemetered data. 
37. Findings 
a. During the 3 minutes following data loss, neither the flight 
controllers nor the crew noticed the oxygen flows to fuel 
cells 1 and 3 were less than 0.1 lb/hr. These were unusually 
low readings for the current being drawn. 
b. Fuel cells 1 and 3 failed at about 3 minutes after the data 
loss * 
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c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
- 
After the fuel cell failures, which resulted in de main 
bus B failure and the undervoltage condition on dc main bus A, 
Mission Control diverted its prime concern from what was 
initially believed to be a cryogenic system instrumentation 
problem to the electrical power system. 
Near-zero oxygen flow to fuel cells 1 and 3 was noted after 
the main bus B failure, but this was consistent with no power 
output from the fuel cells. 
The flight controllers believed that the fuel cells could 
have been disconnected from the busses and directed the crew 
to connect fuel cell 1 to de main bus A and fuel cell 3 to 
de main bus B. 
The crew reported the fuel cells were configured as directed 
and that the talkback indicators confirmed this. 
Determinations 
(1) Under these conditions it was logical for the flight con- 
trollers to attempt to regain power to the busses since the 
fuel cells might have been disconnected as a result of a short 
circuit in the electrical system. Telemetry does not indicate 
whether or not fuel cells are connected to busses, and the 
available data would not distinguish between a disconnected 
fuel cell and a failed one. 
(2) If the crew had been aware of the reactant valve closure, 
they could have opened them before tne fuel cells were starved 
of oxygen. This would have simplified subsequent actions. 
38. Finding 
The fuel cell reactant'valve talkback indicators in the space- 
craft do not indicate closed unless both the hydrogen and oxygen 
valves are closed. 
Determinations 
(1) If these talkbacks were designed so that either a hydrogen 
or oxygen valve closure would indicate "barberpole," the 
Apollo 13 crew could possibly have acted in time to delay 
the failure of fuel cells 1 and 3, although they would never- 
theless have failed when oxygen tank no. 1 ceased to supply 
oxygen. 
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(59 The ultimate outcome would not have been changed, but had the 
fuel cells not failed, Mission Control and the crew would not 
have had to contend with the failure of de main bus B and ac 
bus 2 or attitude control problems while trying to evaluate 
the situation. 
Reaction Control System 
39. Findings 
a. The crew reported the talkback indicators for the helium 
isolation valves in the SM RCS quads B and D indicated closed 
shortly after the de main bus B failure. The secondary fuel 
pressurization valves for quads A and C also were reported 
closed. 
b. The SM RCS quad D propellant tank pressures decreased until 
shortly after the crew was requested to confirm that the 
helium isolation valves were opened by the crew. 
c. During the l-l/2-hour period following the accident, Mission 
Control noted that SM RCS quad C propellant was not being 
used, although numerous firing signals were being sent to it. 
d. Both the valve solenoids and the onboard indications of valve 
position of the propellant isolation valves for quad C are 
powered by dc main bus B. 
e. During the l-l/Z-hour period immediately following the 
accident, Mission Control advised the crew which SM RCS 
thrusters to power and which ones to unpower. 
Determinations 
(1) The following valves were closed by shock at the time of 
the accident: 
Helium isolation valves in quads B and D 
Secondary fuel pressurization valves in quads A and C 
(2) The propellant isolation valves in quad C probably were 
closed by the same shock. 
(3) Mission Control correctly determined the status of the RCS 
system and properly advised the crew on how to regain auto- 
matic attitude control. 
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Management of Electrical System 
- 
40. Findings 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
After fuel cell 1 failed, the total de main bus A load was 
placed on fuel cell 2 and the voltage dropped to approxi- 
mately 25 volts, causing a caution and warning indication 
and a master alarm. 
After determining the fuel cell 2 could not supply enough 
power to dc main bus A to maintain adequate voltage, the crew 
connected entry battery A to this bus as an emergency measure 
to increase the bus voltage to its normal operating value. 
Mission Control directed the crew to reduce the electrical 
load on dc main bus A by following the emergency powerdown 
checklist contained in the onboard Flight Data File. 
When the power requirements were sufficiently reduced so that 
the one remaining fuel cell could maintain adequate bus 
voltage, Mission Control directed the crew to take the entry 
battery off line. 
Mission Control then directed the crew to charge this battery _, 
in order to get as much energy back into it as possible, 
before the inevitable loss of the one functioning fuel cell. 
Determinations 
(1) Emergency use of the entry battery helped prevent potential 
loss of dc main bus A, which could have led to loss of com- 
munications between spacecraft and ground and other vital CM 
functions. 
(2) ilvailable emergency powerdown lists facilitated rapid re- 
duction of loads on the fuel cell and batteries. 
Attempts to Restore Oxygen Pressure 
41. Findings 
a. After determining that the CM problems were not due to in- 
strumentation malfunctions, and after temporarily securing 
a stable electrical system configuration, Mission Control 
sought to improve oxygen pressures by energizing the fan 
and heater circuits in both oxygen tanks. 
- 
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b. When these procedures failed to arrest the oxygen loss, 
Mission Control directed the crew to shut down fuel cells 1 
and 3 by closing the hydrogen and oxygen flow valves. 
Determinations 
(1) Under more normal conditions oxygen pressure might have been 
increased by turning on heaters and fans in the oxygen tanks; 
no other known actions had such a possibility. 
(2) There was a possibility that oxygen was leaking downstream 
of the valves; had this been true, closing of the valves 
might have preserved the remaining oxygen in oxygen tank 
no. 1. 
Lunar Module Activation 
42. Findings 
a. 'iniith imminent loss of oxygen from oxygen tanks no. 1 and 
no. 2, and failing electrical power in the CM, it was 
necessary to use the lunar module (LM) as a "lifeboat" for 
the return to Earth. 
b. Mission Control and the crew delayed LM activation until 
about 15 minutes before the SM oxygen supply was depleted. 
c. There were three different LM activation checklists contained 
in the Flight Data File for normal and contingency situations; 
however, none of these was appropriate for the existing situa- 
tion. It was necessary to activate the LM as rapidly as 
possible to conserve L&l consumables and CM reentry batteries 
to the maximum extent possible. 
d. Mission Control modified the normal LM activation checklist 
and referred the crew to specific pages and instructions. 
This bypassed unnecessary steps and reduced the activation 
time to less than an hour. 
e. The LM inertial platform was aligned during an onboard check- 
list procedure which manually transferred the CM alignment to 
the IX. 
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Determinations 
(1) Initiation of LM activation was not undertaken sooner because 
the crew was properly more concerned with attempts to conserve 
remaining SM oxygen. 
(2) Mission Control was able to make workable on-the-spot modifi- 
cations to the checklists which sufficiently shortened the 
time normally required for powering up the LM. 
43. Findings 
a. 
b. 
c. 
During the LM powerup and the CSM powerdown, there was a brief 
time interval during which Mission Control gave the crew di- 
rections which resulted in neither module having an active 
attitude control system. 
This caused some concern in Mission Control because of the 
possibility of the spacecraft drifting into inertial platform 
gimbal lock condition. 
The Command Module Pilot (CMP) stated that he was not con- 
cerned because he could have quickly reestablished direct 
manual attitude control if it became necessary. 
Determination 
This situation was not hazardous to the crew because had gimbal 
lock actually occurred, sufficient time was available to re- 
establish an attitude reference. 
44. Findings 
a. LM flight controllers were on duty in Mission Control at the 
time of the accident in support of the scheduled crew entry 
into the LM. 
b. If the accident had occurred at some other time during the 
translunar coast phase, LM system specialists would not have 
been on duty, and it would have taken at least 30 minutes to 
get a fully manned team in Mission Control. 
Determination 
Although LM flight controllers were not required until more than 
an hour after the accident, it was beneficial for them to be 
present as the problem developed. 
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LM Consumables Management 
45. Findings 
L 
a. The LM was designed to support two men on a 2-day expedition 
to the lunar surface. Mission Control made major revisions 
in the use rate of water, oxygen, and electrical power to 
sustain three men for the h-day return trip to the Earth. 
b.- An emergency powerdown checklist was available in the Flight 
Data File on board the LM. Minor revisions were made to the 
list to reduce electrical energy requirements to about 
20 percent of normal operational values with a corresponding 
reduction in usage of coolant loop water. 
c. Mission Control determined that this maximum powerdown could 
be delayed until after 80 hours ground elapsed time, allowing 
the LM primary guidance and navigation system to be kept 
powered up for the second abort maneuver. 
d. Mission Control developed contingency plans for further re- 
duction of LM power for use in case an LM battery problem 
developed. Procedures for use of CM water in the LM also 
were developed for use if needed. 
e. Toward the end of the mission, sufficient consumable margins 
existed to allow usage rates to be increased above earlier 
planned levels. This was done. 
f. When the LM was jettisoned at 141:30 the approximate remaining 
margins were: 
Electrical power 4-l/2 hours 
Water 5-1/2 hours 
Oxygen 124 hours 
Determinations 
(1) Earlier contingency plans and available checklists were 
adequate to extend life support capability of the LM well 
beyond its normal intended capability. 
(2) Mission Control maintained the flexibility of being able to 
further increase the LM consumables margins. 
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Modification of I&l Carbon Dioxide Removal System 
46. Findings 
a. The lithium hydroxide (LiOH) cartridges, which remove water 
and carbon dioxide from the LM cabin atmosphere, would have 
become ineffective due to saturation at about 100 hours. 
b. Mission rules set maximum allowable carbon dioxide partial 
pressure at 7.5tnm Hg. LiOH cartridges are normally changed 
before cabin atmosphere carbon dioxide partial pressure 
reaches this value. 
c. Manned Spacecraft Center engineers devised and checked out a 
procedure for using the CM LiOH cannisters to achieve carbon 
dioxide removal. Instructions were given on how to build a 
modified cartridge container using materials in the space- 
craft. 
d. The crew made the modification at 93 hours, and carbon 
dioxide partial pressure in the LM dropped rapidly from 
7.5mm Hg to O.lmm Hg. 
e. Mission Control gave the crew further instructions for 
attaching additional cartridges in series with the first 
modification. After this addition, the carbon dioxide partial 
pressure remained below 2mm Hg for the remainder of the Earth- 
return trip. 
Determination 
The Manned Spacecraft Center succeeded in improvising and checking 
out a modification to the filter system which maintained carbon 
dioxide concentration well within safe tolerances. 
LM Anomaly 
47. Findings 
a. During the time interval between 97:13:53 and 97:13:55, LM 
descent battery current measurements on telemetry showed a 
rapid increase from values of no more than 3 amperes per 
battery to values in excess of 30 amperes per battery. The 
exact value in one battery cannot be determined because the 
measurement for battery 2 was off-scale high at 60 amperes. 
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b. At about that time the Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) heard a 
"thump" from the vicinity of the LM descent stage. 
c. When the LMP looked out the LM right-hand window, he observed 
a venting of small particles from the general area where the 
LM descent batteries 1 and 2 are located. This venting con- 
tinued for a few minutes. 
d. Prior to 97:13 the battery load-sharing among the four 
batteries had been equal, but immediately after the battery 
currents returned to nominal, batteries 1 and 2 supplied 9 
of the 11 amperes total. By 97:23 the load-sharing had re- 
turned to equal. 
e. There was no electrical interface between the LM and the CSM 
at this time. 
f. An MSC investigation of the anomaly is in progress. 
Determinations 
(I) An anomalous incident occurred in the I&l electrical system 
at about 97:13:53 which appeared to be a short circuit. 
(2) The thump and the venting were related to this anomaly. 
(3) The apparent short circuit cleared itself. 
(4) This anomaly was not directly related to the CSM or to the 
accident. 
(5) This anomaly represents a potentially serious electrical 
problem. 
CM Battery Recharging 
48. Findings 
a. About one half of the electrical capacity of reentry 
battery A (20 of 40 amp-hours) was used during emergency 
conditions following the accident. A small part of the 
capacity of reentry battery B was used in checking out dc 
main bus B at 95 hours. Tne reduced charge remaining in the 
batteries limited the amount of time the CM could operate 
after separation from the LM. 
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b. Extrapolation of LM electrical power use rates indicated a 
capacity in excess of that required for LM operation for the 
remainder of the flight. 
C. Mission Control worked out a procedure for using LM battery 
power to recharge CM batteries A and B. This procedure used 
the electrical umbilical between the LM and the CM which 
normally carried electrical energy from the CM to the LM. 
The procedure was nonstandard and was not included in check- 
lists. 
d. The procedure was initiated at 112 hours and CM batteries A 
and B were fully recharged by 128 hours. 
Determination 
Although there is always some risk involved in using new, untested 
procedures, analysis in advance of use indicated no hazards were 
involved. The procedure worked very well to provide an extra 
margin of safety for the reentry operation. 
Trajectory Changes For Safe Return to Earth 
49. Findings 
a. After the accident, it became apparent that the lunar landing 
could not be accomplished and that the spacecraft trajectory 
must be altered for a return to Earth. 
b. At the time of the' accident, the spacecraft trajectory was 
one which would have returned it to the vicinity of the Earth, 
but it would have been left in orbit about the Earth rather 
than reentering for a safe splashdown. 
c. To return the spacecraft to Earth, the following midcourse 
corrections were made: 
A 38-fps correction at 61:30, using the L&l descent propulsion 
system (DPS), required to return the spacecraft to the Earth. 
An 81-fps burn at 79:28, after swinging past the Moon, using 
the DPS engine, to shift the landing point from the Indian 
Ocean to the Pacific and to shorten the return trip by 
9 hours. 
A 7.8-fps burn at 105~18 using the DPS engine to lower Earth 
perigee from 87 miles to 21 miles. 
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A 3.2-fps correction at 137:40 using LM RCS thrusters, to 
assure that the CM would reenter the Earth's atmosphere at 
the center of its corridor. 
d. All course corrections were executed with expected accuracy 
and the CM reentered the Earth's atmosphere at 142:40 to 
return the crew safely at 142:54, near the prime recovery 
ship. 
e. Without 
not nav 
eters. 
Determinations 
(1) This se 5es of course corrections was logical and had the 
best chance of success because, as compared to other options, 
it avoided use of the damaged SM; it put the spacecraft on a 
trajectory, within a few hours after the accident, which had 
the best chance for a safe return to Earth; it placed splash- 
down where the best recovery forces were located; it shortened 
the flight time to increase safety margins in the use of elec- 
trical power and water; it conserved fuel for other course 
corrections which might have become necessary; and it kept 
open an option to further reduce the flight time. 
the CM guidance and navigation system, the crew could 
gate or compute return-to-Earth maneuver target param- 
(2) Mission Control trajectory planning and maneuver targeting 
were essential for the safe return of the crew. 
Entry Procedures and Checklists 
50. Findings 
a. Preparation for reentry required nonstandard procedures be- 
caluse of the lack of SM oxygen and electrical power supplies. 
b. The S&I RCS engines normally provide separation between the 
SM and the CM by continuing to fire after separation. 
c. Apollo 13 SM RCS engines could not continue to fire after 
separation because of the earlier failure of the fuel cells. 
d. The CM guidance and navigation system was powered down due to 
the accident. The LM guidance and navigation system had also 
been powered down to conserve electrical energy and water. A 
spacecraft inertial attitude reference had to be established 
prior to reentry. 
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e. The reentry preparation time had to be extended in order to 
accomplish the additional steps required by the unusual situa- 
tion. 
f. In order to conserve the CM batteries, LM jettison was de- 
layed as long as practical. The LM batteries were used to 
supply part of the power necessary for CM activation. 
Q* The procedures for accomplishing the final course correction 
and the reentry preparation were developed by operations 
support personnel under the direction of Mission Control. 
h. An initial set of procedures was defined within 12 hours 
after the accident. These were refined and modified during 
the following 2 days, and evaluated in simulators at MSC and 
KSC by members of the backup crew. 
1. The procedures were read to the crew about 24 hours prior to 
reentry, allowing the crew time to study and rehearse them. 
j. Trajectory evaluations of contingency conditions for LM and 
SM separation were conducted and documented prior to the 
mission by mission-planning personnel at MSC. 
k. Most of the steps taken were extracted from other procedures 
which had been developed, tested, and simulated earlier. 
Determinations 
(1) The procedures developed worked well and generated no new 
hazards beyond those unavoidably inherent in using procedures 
which have not been carefully developed, simulated, and 
practiced over a long training period. 
(2) It is not practical to develop, simulate, and practice pro- 
cedures for use in every possible contingency. 
51. Findings 
a. During the reentry preparations, after SM jettison, there was 
a half-hour period of very poor communications with the CM 
due to the spacecraft being in a poor attitude with the LM 
present. 
b. This condition was not recognized by the crew or by Mission 
Control. 
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Determination 
Some of the reentry preparations were unnecessarily prolonged by 
the poor communications, but since the reentry preparation time- 
line was not crowded, the delay was more of a nuisance than an 
additional hazard to the crew. 
52. Findings 
a. The crew maneuvered the spacecraft to the wrong LM roll 
attitude in preparation for LM jettison. This attitude put 
the CM very close to gimbal lock which, had it occurred, would 
have lost the inertial attitude reference essential for an 
automatic guidance system control of reentry. 
b. If gimbal lock had occurred, a less accurate but adequate 
attitude reference could have been reestablished prior to 
reentry. 
Determination 
The most significant consequence of losing the attitude reference 
in this situation would have been the subsequent impact on the 
remaining reentry preparation timeline. In taking the time to 
reestablish this reference, less time would have been available 
to accomplish the rest of the necessary procedures. The occur- 
rence of gimbal lock in itself would not have significantly in- 
creased the crew hazard. 
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PART 4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The cryogenic oxygen storage system in the service module should be 
modified to: 
a. Remove from contact with the oxygen all wiring, and the unsealed 
motors, which can potentially short circuit and ignite adjacent materials; 
or otherwise insure against a catastrophic electrically induced fire in 
the tank. 
b. Minimize the use of Teflon, aluminum, and other relatively com- 
bustible materials in the presence of the oxygen and potential ignition 
sources. 
2. The modified cryogenic oxygen storage system should be subjected to 
a rigorous requalification program, including careful attention to po- 
tential operational problems. 
3. The warning systems on board the Apollo spacecraft and in the Mission 
Control Center should be carefully reviewed and modified where appropriate, 
with specific attention to the following: 
a. Increasing the differential between master alarm trip levels and 
expected normal operating ranges to avoid unnecessary alarms. 
b. Changing the caution and warning system logic to prevent an out- 
of-limits alarm from blocking another alarm when a second quantity in the 
same subsystem goes out of limits. 
C. Establishing a second level of limit sensing in Mission Control 
on critical quantities with a visual or audible alarm which cannot be 
easily overlooked. 
d. Providing independent talkback indicators for each of the six 
fuel cell reactant valves plus a master alarm when any valve closes. 
4. Consumables and emergency equipment in the LM and the CM should be re- 
viewed to determine whether steps should be taken to enhance their po- 
tential for use in a "lifeboat" mode. 
5. The Manned Spacecraft Center should complete the special tests and 
analyses now underway in order to understand more completely the details 
of the Apollo 13 accident. In addition, the lunar module power system 
anomalies should receive careful attention. Other NASA Centers should 
continue their support to MSC in the areas of analysis and test. 
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6. Whenever significant anomalies occur in critical subsystems during 
final preparation for launch, standard procedures should require a presen- 
tation of all prior anomalies on that -particular piece of equipment, in- 
cluding those which have previously been corrected or explained. Further- 
more, critical decisions involving the flightworthiness of subsystems 
should require the presence and full participation of an expert who is 
intimately familiar with the details of that subsystem. 
7. NASA should conduct a thorough reexamination of all of its spacecraft, 
launch vehicle, and ground systems which contain high-density oxygen, or 
other strong oxidizers, to identify and evaluate potential combustion 
hazards in the light of information developed in this investigation. 
8. NASA should conduct additional research on materials compatibility, 
ignition, and combustion in strong oxidizers at various g levels; and on 
the characteristics of supercritical fluids. Where appropriate, new NASA 
design standards should be developed. 
9. The Manned Spacecraft Center should reassess allAp spacecraft 
subsystems, and the engineering organizations responsible for them at 
MSC and at its prime contractors, to insure adequate understanding and 
control of the engineering and manufacturing details of these subsystems 
at the subcontractor and vendor level. Where necessary, organizational 
elements should be strengthened and in-depth reviews conducted on selected 
subsystems with emphasis on soundness of design, quality of manufacturing, 
adequacy of test, and operational experience. 
5-41 
*“;,. ._- “____ -_-. ^__ ,“._. ,_“^_ .-“.__I..._.“_~-.-I,_i -I-- “--.,“..- .- 
This page left blank intentionally. 
5-42 
NASA - MSC 
. . -  I  -  ._ .  - _ - . .  . - ,  I_IL”--l.----l , . . _ , - .  ,__^ -___II_ - - - -+ . -  - . _ - -  ._.-_I-_.~ -l__-.--_--~...l- 
